Harris v. Louisville, N.O. & T.R. Co.

• Citation: 35 F. 116
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee
• Decision Date: 31 March 1888
• Parties: HARRIS v. LOUISVILLE, N.O. & T.R. CO.

35 F. 116

HARRIS v. LOUISVILLE, N.O. & T.R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Tennessee.

March 31, 1888

The plaintiff Harris left his home in North Carolina in 1885 to visit the exposition at New Orleans, and with the further object of bettering his financial condition. He carried with him letters of recommendation from a number of people of good position in his native state. After trying the lower Mississippi valley for a twelve-month or more without success, he took deck passage on the steamer Arkansas City for St. Louis, in July, 1886. Among the other passengers on board also bound for St. Louis was a man named McCall, who had been depot agent for the Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railroad Company, at Hampton, Miss., and who had embezzled $700 of the company's money. He was en route north to escape arrest. Manager Edwards notified Thiel & Co., who sent D. D. Anthony, a detective, who had some time before been detailed for the railroad company's service by Thiel's detective agency, at St. Louis, and instructed him to arrest McCall on the arrival of the brat at St. Louis. The detective got on Harris' trail, and followed him to Chicago, whither the young man went immediately after his arrival at St. Louis. At Chicago he called upon Supt. Sage of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad, and applied for work as a brakeman. He was told to return next morning at 7 o'clock for an answer. At the appointed hour the young man appeared at the superintendent's office, and a few minutes afterwards he was arrested there by Anthony and Detective Slayton, of the Chicago police force, without any warrant or papers of any kind. He protested that he had done nothing wrong, showed his letters of introduction, and demanded to know the cause of his arrest. The detectives took the letters, and kept them, but in answer to their prisoner's question, only said they 'wanted' him. Harris was taken before Chief of Police Burke, who told him that he was wanted for stealing money from the Louisville New Orleans & Texas Railroad Company. Harris again protested his innocence, and asked leave to communicate with people who knew him, and could prove that he was not guilty of any such offense, but to no avail. His captors locked him up in a cell in the jail, and that night, or next morning, he was handcuffed, put on a train, and taken back to St. Louis. As soon as possible he was conveyed to the office of Thiel's detective agency and there the discovery was made that not only was Harris the wrong man, but also that he did not in the least resemble the right one; being three or four inches taller, and of totally different hair, eyes, and complexion, and having a broken nose. Harris was given a dollar, and told that he was free to go where he chose until 10 o'clock next day, when he was to report at the office. He was there on time, and found several of 'the force' waiting for him. They took him into a private room, and induced him to sign an agreement to hold the detective agency and the railroad company blameless of the wrong to which he had been subjected. Harris swore at the trial that he did not read the paper, and that he signed it in order to escape from the clutches of his persecutors. They finally furnished him with a ticket to Memphis, and a couple of dollars in cash, and let him go. On arrival at Memphis, according to Harris' statement, he called on Manager Edwards, and claimed some compensation for the treatment he had undergone. The manager reminded him of the agreement signed at St. Louis, and refused to give him any money, but offered to give him passage to North Carolina. On first regaining his liberty Harris had determined to return to his old home, but subsequently decided to go to Oxford, Miss., where he has relatives, and Manager Edwards furnished him transportation to that place. He brought this suit against the railroad company for damages.

Chalmers & Cooper, and Gantt & Patterson, for plaintiff.

Holmes Cummins, for defendant.

HAMMOND J., (charging jury.)

It is not the least doubtful on the facts of this case that an enormous outrage has been committed against the plaintiff's right of personal liberty. That which distinguishes our Anglo-Saxon civilization most of all is its absolute guaranty to every citizen against arbitrary arrest. The only faith which he can have in that guaranty comes from his reliance on the ministers of the law to enforce it. His only remedy, short of that individual redress by combat which the law denies him, is the verdict of a jury against the wrong-doer, and that verdict you cannot withhold, if we have the wrong-doer here. No language of mind can adequately express the just indignation which every English-speaking judge and juror must feel at the recital of such methods as the detective Anthony confesses to have taken about this arrest, even if they had been taken against McCall, the real culprit, whom he was seeking. His audacious expression upon the witness stand of his conviction that 'cold iron'-- as he called the manacles with which he bound the plaintiff-- was the best reliance for producing that 'friendliness' of disposition of his victim, of which he boasted as a result of his skill in this case, shows that he is as cruel in his instincts as he is bungling in his work. That he is competent and incapable of appreciating the legal rights of those whom he may be called upon to arrest in the course of his employment, and that he is thoroughly reckless of the limitation imposed by law upon one engaged in making arrests, is demonstrated by the facts of this case. Detective bureaus, detective agencies, and detective agents are useful instrumentalities in the pursuit of criminals, and every citizen may resort to them as occasion may require for that purpose. They deserve and receive at the hands of intelligent courts encouragement in that work, and protection, as far as need be, from the natural human prejudice against their craft. But this treatment presupposes intelligence, human considerations of common fairness of conduct towards accused persons, and, above all, scrupulous care for legal rights as against arbitrary arrest. The wickedness of any other conduct on their part is always rebuked by courts and juries. Arbitrariness of method is not challenged as often as it should be, but, whenever it is, the courts apply the remedy, unless they are themselves recklessly arbitrary and disregardful of the traditional and constitutional rights of men, born into the privileges of our race of freemen.

Now how was it here? A freeman was arrested, without complaint according to law, without the warrant of law, or any sort of pretense of legal procedure; was detained without authority of any magistracy; was locked up on a cell, without any commitment or other process, or any pretense of any; and was hurried away to another state, without legal arrest for that purpose, or any purpose, in irons, to find at the end that he was not the man wanted; that there was no accusation against him, legally preferred or otherwise; and that, so far as this proof shows, the only justification for the arrest was that he had traveled on the same steam-boat upon which the real culprit was supposed to have traveled. The stupid detective had not the excuse of the slightest resemblance of the two men to each other. But, if he had taken the right man, his proceeding was none the less outrageous, and was to arbitrary and illegal that the fact of his being in pursuit of a felon should hardly mitigate the wrong done to the rights of freemen by a willful disregard of the privilege of exemption from all arrest, except by due process of law, which means an accusation made before a proper tribunal, and a written warrant authorizing the arrest, unless it may be that, under circumstances not pretended here, there may be a temporary detention until a magistrate may be reached. In such cases it is the duty of the arresting party to carry his prisoner immediately before a magistrate of lawful competency for that purpose, to accuse him there according to the forms of law, and obtain the necessary magisterial sanction for any further detention. This temporary proceeding, without previous warrant, can only be resorted to where there is an urgent necessity for proceeding without the delay of procuring the warrant beforehand, and the detention can only last long enough to bring the prisoner before the magistrate for a proper inquiry. There was not the least excuse here for any departure from the regular method of proceeding. If the plaintiff, or the real culprit who was wanted, had been 'located,' as this detective thought and reported him to be, nothing was easier than to have gone before the magistrate, made the accusation on oath, and, having procured the warrant, proceeded to the arrest. This not being done, the arrest was unlawful. So if, being otherwise arrested, he was not immediately taken before a magistrate and accused, that was unlawful. The arresting officer cannot lock up and detain the prisoner to suit his convenience for further inquiry; nor by the prisoner's consent can this be done. He must be taken before a magistrate for his protection there, and only by the sanction of that magistrate can he be detained, either with or without his consent. He is in no condition to consent freely, or to bind himself by a waiver of his rights, except under the protection of the magistrate. He is entitled to that protection, and without it his detention cannot be lawful, if ever he chooses to challenge the legality of the arrest. His consent may mitigate the damages, reduce them to a nominal amount, if he be intelligent and has knowledge of his rights in the premises, but never can it in the least justify the arrest, or make it lawful. Kings and...