Harris v. Maloughney
| Decision Date | 25 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. CV 92-133-M-LBE. |
| Citation | 827 F. Supp. 1488 |
| Parties | Joseph G. HARRIS, Richard McBay, and Paul Parker, Plaintiffs, v. Dan MALOUGHNEY, Superintendent, S.R.F.C.; James Gamble, Administrator, Department of Corrections; Dusty Miller, Security Manager, S.R.F.C.; Rick Krantz, Correctional Officer, Supervisor, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
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Stephen C. Berg, Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg, Kalispell, MT, for plaintiffs.
James B. Obie and David L. Ohler, Dept. of Corrections & Human Services, Helena, MT, for defendants.
On December 17, 1992, District Judge Charles C. Lovell issued an Order, pursuant to consent of the parties, referring the above captioned case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings, including entry of final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. 73.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' combined Motion to Dismiss and Motion for a More Definite Statement. The parties briefed the Motions and the Court being informed now enters the following:
ORDER
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO AMENDMENT, as to Claims 5 and 6 of the Complaint.
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to:
3. Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement is DENIED.
In the context of a motion to dismiss under F.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6) the court accepts all allegations of fact as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Dismissal should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265 at 1267 (9th Cir.1987). "A complaint should not be dismissed if it states a claim under any legal theory, even if the plaintiff relies on a different legal theory." Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners of California, 777 F.2d 462 at 464 (9th Cir.1985).
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint pro se, and although they now have counsel, their pleading has not been amended. Federal courts must construe a pro se inmate's pleadings liberally and hold them "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers...." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 at 9, 101 S.Ct. 173 at 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 at 169 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285 at 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Under the law of the Ninth Circuit, a pro se litigant must be given an opportunity to amend his complaint, and the court must provide the litigant with notice of the complaint's deficiencies. Noll v. Carlson et al., 809 F.2d 1446 at 1449 (9th Cir.1987); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621 at 623-24 (9th Cir.1988).
Plaintiffs are incarcerated at the Swan River Forest Camp (S.R.F.C.), a state correctional facility for young male convicts. Plaintiffs allege seven separate incidents as grounds for relief in their Complaint. The allegations are summarized as follows:
1. Excessive Discipline. On October 25, 1992, Defendants found a string tied across a dorm which was perceived to be intended to trip a staff member. As of the date of the pleading, November 11, 1992, no inmate had come forward and admitted responsibility and it is doubted anyone would. Defendants have instituted a "progressive discipline" program to punish all of the inmates until the responsible inmate or inmates come forward. As a result, the staff has placed restrictions on privileges with regard to VCR movies, and has scheduled future restrictions on breakfast, bedtime, television room, telephone, mail and visiting privileges. These restrictions will cause additional aggressive incidents to occur at the camp.
2. Mail Confidentiality. Defendants have opened Plaintiffs' legal mail from the court and their legal counsel, thereby violating confidentiality. Defendant Maloughney informed Harris that, "I can't give you a guarantee that this will not happen again." Plaintiffs state that there is factual support for this claim.
3. Access to Court and a Law Library. Defendants have denied Plaintiffs access to a law library. Defendants have told Plaintiffs that there is no funding or adequate space for a library. The inmates only have access to the 1989 Montana Code Annotated. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not have proper access to the courts.
4. Phone Monitoring. Defendants have denied Plaintiffs use of a private telephone line. Security personnel monitor phone calls and there is a sign over every phone that states, "Phone calls will be monitored." This violates Plaintiffs' right to confidential consultation with counsel, and they are afraid to talk to their attorneys. Plaintiffs have sent complaints to Defendant Miller but he has not changed the situation.
5. Medical Care. Defendants have not provided Plaintiffs with proper medical care. Plaintiff Parker received a one-inch cut and the medical staff provided only a piece of tape to cover the wound. Plaintiff Parker has a permanent scar due to the medical care provided. The camp resident handbook states that Defendants will provide medical treatment at either Bigfork or Kalispell, yet Defendants send some inmates to the Montana State Prison for treatment, where they are housed for two to six weeks, while others with similar medical conditions are taken to Bigfork or Kalispell and return the same day. Plaintiffs believe this is discriminatory and is done to discourage them from seeking medical treatment.
6. Overcrowding. The S.R.F.C. is overcrowded. Plaintiffs allege that the facility is designed for 30 inmates and it currently holds 50 or 60 inmates. This causes stress and affects inmates' attitudes. The "warehousing" is detrimental to Plaintiffs' rehabilitation.
7. Retaliatory Punishment. Plaintiff McBay was involved in an altercation with Defendant Krantz whereby Krantz violently pushed McBay into a wall and injured his shoulder. McBay has not received any response to a grievance he filed after the altercation. Defendants have threatened McBay and he has received unwarranted "write-ups." Defendant Miller has deemed McBay a "security risk" even though McBay has served in minimum security for almost a full year. Plaintiffs allege that this treatment is unnecessary and unwarranted since McBay has already received his punishment for the altercation.
Defendants contend their actions are entitled to qualified immunity, and the supervisory Defendants cannot be held liable simply in their capacity as supervisors or state officials.
Supervisory personnel cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action based only on their capacity as supervisors. Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 at 565 (9th Cir.1988). A plaintiff must also show that the named Defendants either personally participated in the alleged deprivation or caused such a deprivation to occur, Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121 at 1125 (9th Cir.1981), or that the named Defendants, as supervisors, failed to properly train personnel and this failure to train resulted in the alleged deprivation, Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675 at 680 (9th Cir.1984).
In Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 at 646 (9th Cir.1991), it was held that individual liability can be imposed against a supervisor under § 1983 for his own action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of subordinates, for acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations complained of, or for conduct showing a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others. Where a supervisor sets in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refuses to terminate such acts, liability will lie. Id.
Defendants assert that they have qualified immunity to civil liability and that this bars Plaintiffs' Complaint. This doctrine is not merely a defense to civil liability, but provides immunity from suit. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. ___ at ___, 112 S.Ct. 534 at 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 at 595 (1991) (per curiam). In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 at 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 at 410 (1982), the Court stated:
Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Id., 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d at 396.
The rights in question must be clearly established in a particularized sense, so that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034 at 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The unlawfulness of the an act "must be apparent in light of pre-existing law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 at 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092 at 1097-98, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id., 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096; Hunter v. Bryant, supra, 502 U.S. ___ at ___, 112 S.Ct. 534 at 537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 at 596.
In Harlow, supra, the Court stated that the issue of qualified immunity is appropriately resolved on summary judgment. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Although the question of immunity is one of law for the courts, Hunter v. Bryant, supra, 502 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 537, 116 L.Ed.2d at 596, resolution of the issue requires a specific factual inquiry by the Court that is not easily amenable to resolution in the context of a motion to...
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