Harris v. Metro. Gov't Nashville & Davidson Co. Tn

• Decision Date: 05 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08-6329.,No. 08-6330.,08-6329.,08-6330.
• Citation: 594 F.3d 476
• Parties: Milton HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Scott Brunette, Elizabeth Keel, Frank Cirrincione, Michael Tribue, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

594 F.3d 476

Milton HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Scott Brunette, Elizabeth Keel, Frank Cirrincione, Michael Tribue, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 08-6329.

No. 08-6330.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: December 1, 2009.

Decided and Filed: February 5, 2010.

ARGUED:

Allison L. Bussell, Metropolitan Department of Law, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Douglas B. Janney

III, Law Office, Nashville, Tennessee, Mac E. Robinson, Jr., Robinson & Robinson, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

Francis H. Young, Metropolitan Department of Law, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Douglas B. Janney III, Law Office, Nashville, Tennessee, Mac E. Robinson, Jr., Robinson & Robinson, Nashville, Tennessee, Joseph Howell Johnston, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before: GUY, RYAN, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, appeals from the entry of judgment in the amount of $9,258.82 in favor of plaintiff Milton Harris on his claim that the reduction to his coaching supplement as head boys' varsity basketball coach upon his return from leave violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a). Finding that the district court erred in failing to consider the proffered defense, and concluding that plaintiff was not prejudiced by the adjustment to the basketball coaching supplement, we reverse and enter judgment in favor of defendant on the plaintiff's FMLA claim.

The FMLA claim was only one of many, and plaintiff cross-appeals from the district court's earlier decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Metropolitan Government and the four individual defendants with respect to his claims of age discrimination and retaliation. Agreeing with the district court, we find that no reasonable juror could conclude that defendants' proffered reasons were pretext either for age discrimination or for retaliation. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants on those claims.

I.

Milton Harris was a veteran teacher and coach in the Metropolitan Nashville School System. From 1993 to 2003, Harris taught health and served as the head boys' varsity basketball coach at McGavock High School. Each year that plaintiff coached, he received a "coaching supplement" that was calculated based on his gross annual teaching salary. Yearly coaching assignments were made by the principal and coaching supplements were paid over the whole school year, beginning with the first pay period in the fall, regardless of when the season began. In 2003, the boys' basketball head coach supplement was twelve percent (12%).¹

The basketball team did not have a winning season under plaintiff's leadership until the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 seasons, although plaintiff received the "Coach of the Year Award" from the Nashville Black Coaches Association for 2002-2003. Plaintiff's performance evaluation from May 2003 reflected several areas in need of improvement, consistent with concerns expressed by McGavock's Executive Principal Michael Tribue and incorporated into the evaluation by McGavock's Athletic Director Dr. Frank Cirrincione. Cirrincione commented on the evaluation, however, that "Coach Harris is striving to improve the image of the team and coaching staff" and "is working toward changing the negative perceptions in his program." Despite his concerns, Tribue assigned plaintiff to be the head boys' varsity basketball coach for the following year because he said plaintiff was the best person for the job at the time.

Plaintiff reported for school in August 2003 and worked several days before taking leave to undergo prostate cancer surgery. He returned to work in mid-October and held a few meetings regarding the upcoming basketball season. Plaintiff worked only five days, however, before he suffered a heart attack that kept him from returning to work until January 12, 2004. In plaintiff's absence, the basketball team was coached by Marlon Simms, the assistant coach who received a six percent (6%) coaching supplement, and Terry Watson, a volunteer coach who died suddenly during the season and was replaced by Arcentae Broome.

Simms visited plaintiff while he was recuperating and consulted with him about coaching matters. During tryouts in November 2003, Simms approached Tribue for advice because plaintiff had asked that Simms cut an athlete from the team. Tribue testified that he believed plaintiff's reasons had to do with a conflict with the parents and advised Simms to do what he thought best. The athlete made the team and became one of its top three players.

In December 2003, after the basketball season was underway, Cirrincione talked to Tribue about the fact that Broome was not being paid anything to coach. Principal Tribue spoke to Scott Brunette, the Athletic Director for the Metropolitan Nashville Schools, who, in turn, spoke to Dr. June Keel, the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources for the Metropolitan Nashville Schools. Keel advised them both that two people could not receive the head coaching supplement, and that an employee was not entitled to receive a coaching supplement while on leave. Although Keel denied it, Brunette testified that she also opined that the FMLA did not apply to coaching supplements. On December 17, 2003, Cirrincione made a written request that plaintiff be "dropped" as head coach; that Simms be made head coach and receive a 12% coaching supplement; and that Broome be made assistant coach and receive a 7% supplement effective August 11, 2003. Brunette "okayed" the request by making a notation on that memorandum, but plaintiff was not notified. In fact, as the district court noted, payroll did not make this change and plaintiff's supplement was calculated at 12% for several more pay periods, with a deduction made against it to recoup the coaching supplement that should not have been paid.

Roughly half of the basketball season was over when plaintiff returned from leave on January 12, 2004. According to Simms, plaintiff told him that there were "three head coaches" and that there was "no reason for things to change." When plaintiff's next paycheck was smaller than usual, he contacted payroll and was told that he was not receiving the 12% supplement because he was no longer the head basketball coach. Plaintiff was very upset and immediately talked to Tribue, who assured him that it was a mistake and reinstated plaintiff as head coach effective as of his return on January 12, 2004. Plaintiff followed up with a letter to Tribue stating that he trusted the matter was an error and "not an attempt to circumvent the applicable federal and state laws governing employees on authorized sick leave." Tribue responded in a letter dated January 22, 2004, confirming the plaintiff's reinstatement but advising him that, according to human resources, the coaching supplement could not be paid for the period that plaintiff was not coaching.²

Tribue also sent Brunette a memorandum requesting that plaintiff be reinstated, on which Brunette made a hand-written notation of "ok" and "½ of 12%." There was evidence that this proration was defendant's policy, although plaintiff disputed whether it had been followed in every case. The "Agreement on Coaching Responsibilities for 2003-2004," which plaintiff did not sign until he returned from leave, reiterated that coaching assignments were made on a yearly basis and provided, among other things, that the coach agreed that he would have to "[c]omplete the season to receive the full supplement . . . [and would] be required to pay back any supplement not earned."

In this case, plaintiff's payroll history reflected an adjustment in January 2004 to a 6% basketball coaching supplement from which deductions were made to "recoup" overpayments made while plaintiff was on leave. The parties stipulated with respect to damages, (1) that the full 12% coaching supplement would have been a total of $6,812.93 for the year, and (2) that plaintiff actually received a total of $3,728.16 for the year—or a little more than half of the full supplement amount.

Plaintiff complained that despite his reinstatement there were several instances— before and after he filed his EEOC charge in February 2004—in which Simms was treated or referred to as the head coach. Plaintiff also felt he was mistreated with respect to classroom assignment, class composition, and the cancellation of the summer basketball league without consulting with him. While plaintiff claimed that Tribue ignored him, Tribue testified that it was plaintiff who avoided him and refused to acknowledge him during a track meet.³

Tribue did not make the coaching assignments for boys' basketball at the same time as he made the other coaching assignments for the 2004-2005 school year. Tribue met with Brunette and Keel to discuss naming a different head basketball coach, and they cautioned him that plaintiff might claim retaliation. Plaintiff received an EEOC right-to-sue letter, and filed this action on August 26, 2004. In a letter dated October 14, 2004, Tribue notified plaintiff that he would not be reassigned as the head basketball coach and identified several reasons for that decision. Tribue solicited applicants, interviewed two candidates, and selected Simms to be the head boys' varsity basketball coach for the 2004-2005 season. Plaintiff amended his complaint to allege that he was denied reassignment as the boys' basketball coach because of his race, his age, and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. Plaintiff continued to teach until he retired at the end of the 2005-2006 school year.

After being filed in August 2004, this case progressed through resolution of various dispositive motions, amendments to the complaint, and the...