Harris v. Monroe Cnty. Pub. Library Bd. of Trs.

• Decision Date: 22 May 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-00265-CG-N
• Parties: MARY HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. MONROE COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY BOARD OF TRUSTEES; MONROE COUNTY COMMISSION et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

MARY HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. MONROE COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY BOARD OF TRUSTEES;MONROE COUNTY COMMISSION et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-00265-CG-N

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

May 22, 2020

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) filed by Defendant Monroe County Commission ("MCC"), the Motion to Dismiss as to Counts I, II and IV (Doc. 33) filed by Defendant Steve Stacey ("Stacey"), and the Motion to Dismiss as to Counts I and II (Doc. 35) filed by Defendants Monroe County Public Library Board of Trustees ("the Board"), Shannon Powell ("Powell"), Ann Pridgen ("Pridgen"), and Jerome Sanders ("Sanders"). The assigned District Judge has referred said motions to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a). See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b); (10/22/2019, 10/25/2019, & 10/29/2019 electronic references). In reaching the conclusions herein, the undersigned has considered the aforementioned motions, the responses to all motions (Docs. 34-1, 39) filed by the Plaintiff Mary Harris ("Harris"), the Defendants' Replies to the Responses (Docs. 40, 41, 42), and related exhibits.

I. Applicable Legal Standards

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "accepting all well-pleaded facts that are alleged therein to be true." Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc., 461 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2006)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). That "standard 'calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' of the claim." Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but [rather] asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendants liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.' " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, quoting in part FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) generally sets the benchmark for determining whether a complaint's allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) ("Under [Rule] 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a 'short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' As the Court held in Twombly, . . . the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.").

Indeed, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); compare Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1381 ("[G]iven the pleading standards announced in Twombly and Iqbal, [plaintiff] must do more than recite statutory elements in conclusory fashion. Rather, his allegations must proffer enough factual content to 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" (emphasis added)), with Robinson v. Correctional Med. Assocs., Inc., Civil Action No. 1:09-cv-01509-JOF, 2010 WL 2499994, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2010) ("Factual allegations in a complaint need not be detailed but 'must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and emphasis omitted and added))).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that isplausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. . . .

[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not show[n]—that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); compare id. at 680 (a plaintiff must nudge his claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible."), with Patel v. Georgia Dep't BHDD, 485 F. App'x 982, 983 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2012) (per curiam) ("In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,' rather than merely conceivable." (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). In addition to the pleading requirements of Rule 8, FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b) provides that "[i]f doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count."

II. Well-Pleaded Allegations & Causes of Action

Plaintiff Harris, an African-American, is a former Assistant Librarian and Interim Director of the Monroeville Library, for which she worked from 1980 until her termination on September, 11, 2017. (Doc. 1, PageID.2-4, ¶¶ 9, 16). The Board oversees the library's operation. (Id., PageID.3, ¶ 12). At all times relevant to thecomplaint, Pridgen served as Chairman of the Board, while Powell, Stacey, and Sanders served as Board members. (Id., ¶¶ 12-15).

Beginning in January 2016, Harris served as interim Library Director. (Id., PageID.5, ¶ 23). In September 2016, Harris formally applied to become the Library Director, presenting letters from a cross section of the community advocating for her selection. (Id., ¶¶ 23-24). The Board refused to formally give Harris the "Director" title, though she received the appropriate pay for the Director job while serving as interim Director. (Id., ¶¶ 26 - 27). In refusing to formally make Harris Library Director, Pridgen told Harris that she could not be officially promoted because she was "a dinosaur" and that the library needed someone with "fresh ideas and youthfulness." (Id., ¶ 28).

After applying for the Library Director position, Harris was subjected to hostile acts from Board members. (Id., ¶ 30). The Board requested that the local District Attorney investigate Harris over library finances from the 2012-2015 time period, even though Harris was not serving as Library Director during that time frame, forcing Harris to hire an attorney at her expense to respond to the district attorney's subpoena. (Id., PageID.6, ¶¶ 31-32). Stacey made public allegations on Facebook, in the local newspaper, and on radio disparaging Harris's job performance, claiming she had stolen money. (Id., ¶ 33). Stacey also verbally abused Harris and disparaged her job performance in front of library patrons, causing patrons to be concerned for Harris. (Id., ¶ 34, 36). On August 2017, the District Attorney declined to bring charges over the 2012-2015 library finances. (Id., ¶ 38).

Harris then filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) protesting her treatment. (Id., ¶ 39). The charge also contained an allegation that the library hosted a celebration event in honor of the Confederate flag that was attended by "70 known affiliates of the KKK." (Id., PageID.4, ¶ 18). Harris and other patrons were upset and distressed that the library was being used to host the Confederate flag celebration. (Id.). After receiving the EEOC charge, the Board terminated Harris without further inquiry. (Id., ¶ 19). Harris's termination letter, signed by each Board member, acknowledged receipt of the EEOC charge and shock at the allegation about "known affiliates of the KKK," explaining that women are excluded from being KKK members. (Id., ¶ 20). The letter also stated that unnamed attendees of the meeting were upset and planned to sue over the contents of Harris's EEOC charge, though the letter did not explain how the contents of the charge were shared. (Id., PageID.5, ¶ 22). Harris was replaced with a white female who was in the same age range as her. (Id., ¶ 29).

Based on the foregoing allegations, Harris alleges the following causes of action:

• Count 1 - causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1981, and 1981a, against all Defendants;

• Count 2 - cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Equal Protection

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