Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.

Decision Date02 September 1997
Docket NumberNo. 1543,S,1543
Citation117 Md.App. 1,699 A.2d 447
PartiesSigridur E. HARRIS, et vir. v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. ept. Term 1996.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
Jerome A. Kuta, Camp Springs, for Appellants

James E. Garland, Annapolis, for Appellee.

Argued before WENNER and HARRELL, JJ., and JOHN J. BISHOP, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned.

JOHN J. BISHOP, Judge, Specially Assigned.

Appellants, Sigridur Harris ("Mrs. Harris") and Robert Harris ("Mr. Harris"), brought suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County to collect money allegedly owed to them under the terms of an uninsured/underinsured motorist policy issued by appellee, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ("Nationwide"). Both sides moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting Nationwide's motion and denying the Harrises' motion. Mr. and Mrs. Harris noted a timely appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.

ISSUES

Mr. and Mrs. Harris raise two issues, which we reorder and rephrase I. Did the circuit court err when it ruled that Sigridur Harris's injuries were not the result of an "accident," as that term is used in the applicable insurance policy?

II. Did the circuit court err when it ruled that Sigridur Harris's injuries did not arise out of the "ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle," as those terms are used in the applicable insurance policy?

FACTS

On November 7, 1993, Sigridur Harris was walking to her car in the parking lot of the Marlow Heights Shopping Center when an unidentified man in an unidentified car drove up beside her and grabbed a purse which was hanging from her shoulder. Mrs. Harris's arm became entangled in the purse's strap, and when the driver, who was still clutching the purse, accelerated, she was knocked to the ground and dragged about 15 feet before she was released. The driver sped away with her purse, and was never caught. Mrs. Harris, however, suffered severe injuries from the incident, including a broken shoulder and broken knuckles.

At the time of the incident, Mr. and Mrs. Harris owned an uninsured motorist policy issued by Nationwide. That policy provides, in relevant part:

YOU AND A RELATIVE

We will pay compensatory damages, including derivative claims, which are due by law to you or a relative from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury suffered by you or a relative, and because of property damage. Damages must result from an accident arising out of the:

1. ownership

2. maintenance; or

3. use

of the uninsured motor vehicle.

Mr. and Mrs. Harris asked Nationwide to pay them benefits under the policy for Mrs. Harris's injuries, but Nationwide At the conclusion of discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the circuit court granted Nationwide's motion and denied the Harrises' motion; according to the court, Mrs. Harris's injuries did not arise out of the "ownership, maintenance, or use of [an] uninsured motor vehicle," and were not the result of an "accident," as those terms are used in the applicable policy.

refused. Mr. and Mrs. Harris then brought suit against Nationwide for breach of contract.

DISCUSSION

Before we address the issues raised by Mr. and Mrs. Harris, we must make several introductory points about the interpretation of insurance policies in general, and of uninsured motorist policies in particular.

The General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating insurance. Accordingly, all insurance policies issued in Maryland must be interpreted in light of the pronouncements of the legislature.

This is particularly true in the interpretation of uninsured motorist policies. The legislature has mandated that insurers provide a minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage to their insureds, and insurers are strictly prohibited from contracting around the mandatory minimum. Any attempt by an insurer to provide less than the required minimum coverage will be voided by the courts. See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 314 Md. 131, 135, 550 A.2d 69 (1988) (An insurance policy in Maryland must contain the minimum coverage required by law; if an insurance policy excludes "a particular coverage required by law, the omission or exclusion is ineffective, and the insurance policy will applied as if [it contains] the minimum coverage."); Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 239, 528 A.2d 912 (1987) (Courts will not "recognize exclusions [in insurance policies] beyond those expressly enumerated by the legislature."). See also West American Insurance Here, the language of the applicable insurance contract mirrors that of the uninsured motorist statute. Under Md.Ann.Code art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(i) (1994 Repl.), an insurance company must pay a policyholder all damages "[t]he insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor vehicle[.]" The contract, in turn, provides:

Company v. Popa, 108 Md.App. 73, 82-88, 670 A.2d 1021, certiorari granted, 342 Md. 391, 676 A.2d 79 (1996) (Where uninsured motorist was the State of Maryland, Court of Special Appeals refused to give literal interpretation to uninsured motorist policy which limited insureds to amount they were "legally entitled to recover" from uninsured/underinsured tortfeasor, since that policy language provided insureds with less coverage than the minimum required by the legislature; Court of Special Appeals also voided exclusion in the uninsured motorist policy for accidents with government-owned vehicles, since such an exclusion provided insureds with less coverage than the statutory minimum).

YOU AND A RELATIVE

We will pay compensatory damages, including derivative claims, which are due by law to you or a relative from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury suffered by you or a relative, and because of property damage. Damages must result from an accident arising out of the:

1. ownership

2. maintenance; or

3. use

of the uninsured motor vehicle.

Because of the rule which prohibits insurance companies from providing less than the minimum coverage mandated by the legislature, and because the language of the contract sub judice mirrors the language of the applicable statute, this case, although nominally a contract dispute, requires statutory interpretation in order to resolve properly the dispute between the parties. That is, we must determine the scope of the terms "accident" and "ownership, maintenance, or use of [an] uninsured motor vehicle" in § 541(c)(2)(i) of Article 48A.

I. Meaning of "Accident"

The basic question here is whether the definition of the term "accident" in § 541(c)(2)(i) is broad enough to encompass the assault on Mrs. Harris. Nationwide contends that the term "accident" refers only to occurrences which are unintentional, and that the incident involving Mrs. Harris is therefore not covered because it involved an intentional act on the part of the unknown assailant. Mr. and Mrs. Harris, by contrast, argue that "accident" has a much broader meaning. They contend that the term refers to any occurrence involving an automobile, including those acts which are intentional.

In Md.Code Ann. art. 48A, § 538(a) (1994 Repl.), the legislature defines the term "accident," as that term is used in § 541. Under that definition, "[a]ccident means any occurrence involving a motor vehicle, other than an occurrence caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured, from which damage to any property or injury to any person results."

In Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 374 A.2d 347 (1977), the Court of Appeals established the following principles of statutory construction:

[T]he cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to effectuate the actual intention of the legislature ... The primary source from which [a court] glean[s] the legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. When the intent is expressed in clear and unambiguous language, [a court] will carry it out, if no constitutional guarantees are impaired. Words are granted their ordinary signification so as to construe the statute according to the natural import of the language used without resorting to subtle or forced interpretations for the purpose of extending or limiting its operation. If reasonably possible the parts of a statute are to be reconciled and harmonized, the intention as to any one part being found by reading all the parts together, and none of its words, clauses, phrases, or sentences shall be rendered surplusage or meaningless. Results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided whenever possible consistent with the statutory language. In other words, an interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not lead to absurd consequences.

Id. at 438-39, 374 A.2d 347. Applying these principles to the definition of "accident" in § 538(a), that definition would certainly appear broad enough to encompass the incident involving Mrs. Harris. Indeed, when given its plain or ordinary meaning, the phrase "any occurrence involving an automobile" refers to more than merely unintentional incidents; rather, it encompasses all incidents involving an automobile, whether intentional or unintentional.

This interpretation of the statute is reinforced by the interplay between §§ 541(c)(2)(v), 243H, and 243-I. Section 541(c)(2)(v) requires that the uninsured motorist coverage provided by an insurer be no "less than the coverage afforded ... under Article 48A, §§ 243 H and 243-I." Sections 243H and 243-I are the statutory successors to the provisions governing the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund, and they allow persons injured by a phantom vehicle and not otherwise covered by an...

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