Harris v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co

• Decision Date: 19 October 1959
• Docket Number: No. 81,81
• Citation: 4 L.Ed.2d 1,361 U.S. 15,80 S.Ct. 22
• Parties: Henry J. HARRIS, Petitioner, v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

361 U.S. 15

80 S.Ct. 22

4 L.Ed.2d 1

Henry J. HARRIS, Petitioner,

v PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO.

No. 81.

Decided Oct. 19, 1959.

Mr. Marshall I. Nurenberg, for petitioner.

Mr. Edwin Knachel, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We hold that the proofs justified with reason the jury's conclusion, embodied in answers to Interrogatories to Jury numbers I and II, that employer negligence played a part in producing the petitioner's injury. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493. See also Moore v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 358 U.S. 31, 79 S.Ct. 2, 3 L.Ed.2d 25, and cases cited therein. We therefore find it unnecessary to consider the petitioner's challenge to the Ohio procedure governing interrogatories to the jury.

For the reasons set forth in his opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 524, 77 S.Ct. 443, 459, 1 L.Ed.2d 493, Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER is of the view that the writ of certiorari is improvidently granted.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Mr. Justice STEWART took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

(For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice HARLAN, joined by Mr. Justice WHITTAKER, see 80 S.Ct. 29.)

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring.

The suggestion that this and related decisions mean that we have eliminated 'all meaningful judicial supervision over jury verdicts' in FELA, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., cases prompts me to file this opinion and bring up to date the compilation which I made in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68, 71—73, 69 S.Ct. 413 ,420, 422—423, 93 L.Ed. 497. The Wilkerson case was decided January 31, 1949. The attached Appendix presents a statistical summary¹ of our stewardship of these FELA cases from that date to October 19, 1959.

Of the 110 petitions for certiorari filed during this period of more than 10 years, 73 were filed by employees and 37 were filed by employers. Of these, 33 were granted, each at the instance of an employee who complained of the lower court's withholding the case from the jury or overturning a jury verdict in his favor. Thirty cases were reversed for usurpation of the jury function; and in each of three the lower court's decision was sustained.

Of the 77 petitions denied, 32 were by employees who sought reversal of a lower court's decision to withhold the case from the jury or to upset a jury's verdict. Eight more employees wanted this Court to overturn jury verdicts rendered in the employers' favor.

Of the petitions filed by employers, 35 asked this Court to reverse a lower court decision upholding a jury verdict or holding that the case should have been submitted to a jury. Employers in two other petitions complained of the lower court's action in setting aside a jury verdict and granting a new trial.

It is apparent from the decisions where we refused to review cases in which lower courts withheld cases from the jury or set aside jury verdicts (or where, having granted certiorari, we sustained the lower courts in that action) that the system of judicial supervision still exists in this as in other types of cases.

It is suggested that the Court has consumed too much of its time in reviewing these FELA cases. An examination of the 33 cases in which the Court has granted certiorari during the period of over 10 years covered by the attached Appendix reveals that 16 of these cases were summarily reversed without oral argument and without full opinions. Only 17 cases were argued during this period of more than a decade and, of these, 5 were disposed of by brief per curiam opinions. Only 12 cases in over 10 years were argued, briefed and disposed of with full opinions by the Court. We have granted certiorari in these cases on an average of less than 3 per year and have given plenary consideration to slightly more than 1 per year. Wastage of our time is therefore a false issue.

The difference between the majority and minority of the Court in our treatment of FELA cases concerns the degree of vigilance we should exercise in safeguarding the jury trial—guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment and part and parcel of the remedy under this Federal Act when suit is brought in state courts. See Bailey v. Cen- tral Vermont R. Co., 319 U.S. 350, 354, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 1065, 87 L.Ed. 1444; Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363, 72 S.Ct. 312, 315, 96 L.Ed. 398. Whether that right has been impaired in a particular instance often produces a contrariety of views. Yet the practice of the Court in allowing four out of nine votes to control the certiorari docket is well established and of long duration.² Without it, the vast discretion which Congress allowed us in granting or denying certiorari might not be tolerable. Every member of the Court has known instances where he has strongly protested the action of the minority in bringing a case or type of case here for adjudication. He may then feel that there are more important and pressing matters to which the Court should give its attention. That is, however, a price we pay for keeping our promise to Congress³ to let the vote of four Justices bring up any case here on certiorari hearings and not secure a decision by the whole court, it is proper to call attention to the very thorough and complete system by which discretionary jurisdiction is exercised. In granting or refusing a prayer for a certiorari the petitioner gets the judgment of the whole court. The application is not disposed of by a single justice. The luminous and informing statement of Mr. Justice Van Devanter tells the whole story:

"While the authority of the Supreme Court to take cases on petition for certiorari is spoken of as a discretionary jurisdiction, this does not mean that the court is authorized merely to exercise a will in the matter but rather that the petition is to be granted or denied according to a sound judicial discretion. What actually is done may well be stated here with some particularity. The party aggrieved by the decision of the circuit court of appeals and seeking a further review in the Supreme Court is required to present to it a petition and accompanying brief, setting forth the nature of the case, what questions are involved, how they were decided in the circuit court of appeals, and why the case should not rest on the decision of that court. The petition and brief are required to be served on the other party, and time is given for the presentation of an opposing brief. When this has been done copies of the printed record as it came from the circuit court of appeals and of the petition and briefs are distributed among the members of the Supreme Court, and each judge examines them and prepares a memorandum or note indicating his view of what should be done.

"In conference these cases are called, each in its turn, and each judge states his views in extenso or briefly as he thinks proper; and when all have spoken any difference in opinion is discussed and then a vote is taken. I explain this at some length because it seems to be thought outside that the cases are referred to particular judges, as, for instance, that those coming from a particular circuit are referred to the justice assigned to that circuit, and that he reports on them, and the others accept his report. That impression is wholly at variance with what actually occurs.

"We do not grant or deny these petitions merely according to a majority vote. We always grant the petition when as many as four think that it should be granted and sometimes when as many as three think that way. We proceed upon the theory that, if that number out of the nine are impressed with the thought that the case is one that ought to be heard and decided by us, the petition should be granted." H.R.Rep. No. 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3.

Appendix to Opinion of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS.

I. Cases in Which Certiorari Was Granted.

A. Where lower court which withheld the case from the jury or set aside a jury verdict for the employee and ordered a new trial or rendered judgment for the employer was reversed:

Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 336 U.S. 911, 69 S.Ct. 507, 93 L.Ed. 1075.

Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282.

Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105, 94 L.Ed. 100.

Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S.Ct. 226, 94 L.Ed. 236.

Stone v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co., 344 U.S. 407, 73 S.Ct. 358, 97 L.Ed. 441.

Harsh v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., 348 U.S. 940, 75 S.Ct. 362, 99 L.Ed. 736.

Smalls v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 348 U.S. 946, 75 S.Ct. 439, 99 L.Ed. 740.

O'Neill v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 348 U.S. 956, 75 S.Ct. 447, 99 L.ed. 747.

Neese v. Southern R. Co., 350 U.S. 77, 76 S.Ct. 131, 100 L.Ed. 60.

Anderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 350 U.S. 807, 76 S.Ct. 60, 100 L.Ed. 725.

Strickland v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 350 U.S. 893, 76 S.Ct. 157, 100 L.Ed. 786.

Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 350 U.S. 898, 351 U.S. 183.

Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493.

Webb v. Illinois Central R. Co., 352 U.S. 512, 77 S.Ct. 451, 1 L.Ed.2d 503.

Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe R. Co., 353 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, 1 L.Ed.2d 889.

Futrelle v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U.S. 920, 77 S.Ct. 682, 1 L.Ed.2d 718.

Shaw v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. et al., 353 U.S. 920, 77 S.Ct. 680, 1 L.Ed.2d 718.

Deen v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co., 353 U.S. 925, 77 S.Ct. 715, 1 L.Ed.2d 721.

Thomson v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 353 U.S. 926, 77 S.Ct. 698, 1 L.ed.2d 722.

McBride v. Toledo Terminal R. Co., 354 U.S. 517, 77 S.Ct. 1398, 1 L.Ed.2d 1534.

Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 354 U.S. 901, 77 S.Ct. 1093, 1 L.Ed.2d 1268.

Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. 18, 78 S.Ct. 2, 2 L.Ed.2d 1.

Stinson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 355 U.S....