Harris v. Perez
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-01335-BHS-TLF |
| Decision Date | 27 September 2023 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. JOSE PEREZ, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Noted for October 20, 2023
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on defendant's filing of a motion for summary judgment and, alternatively, to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 37(d) and Local Civil Rule (LCR) 11(c) for plaintiff's failure to participate in discovery. Dkt. 71. Plaintiff has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Jose Perez, a Snohomish County Sheriff's Deputy, for the alleged use of excessive force during the course of plaintiff's arrest on November 28, 2020.[1]This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Mathews, Sec'y of H.E.W. v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Local Rule MJR 4(a)(4). For the reasons set forth below, the Court should grant in part and deny in part defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 71) and deny defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 37(d) and LCR 11(c) (Dkt. 71).
In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Perez used excessive force during plaintiff's arrest on November 28, 2020, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Dkt 58. Plaintiff alleges the following:
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of these events, he incurred:
1) A vis[i]ble scar under my chin & visible scar on my right temple from the violent punches 2) a broken left leg 3) impaired vision in my right eye from the blunt force impact of 5 powerful punches 4) my neck and upper spine are in constant pain from the officers attempt to paralize [sic] me from his kneeing me in the neck 5) perm[anent] nerve damage from the deep gash from the cops intentional punch with [sic] split my temple open.
As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff fails to establish a constitutional violation and that defendant further is entitled to qualified immunity as his actions did not violate clearly established law. Dkt. 71. Additionally, defendant argues that the action should be dismissed pursuant to FRCP 37(d) and LCR 11(c) due to plaintiff's failure to participate in discovery. Id.
Summary judgment is supported “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FRCP 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine dispute concerning a material fact is presented when there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986). A “material” fact is one which is “relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit,” and the materiality of which is “determined by the substantive law governing the claim.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
When the Court considers a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [their] favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Yet the Court is not allowed to weigh evidence or decide credibility. Id. at 255. If the moving party meets their initial burden, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading; his or her response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56, must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. FRCP 56(e)(2). The Court may not disregard evidence solely based on its self-serving nature. Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2015).
In response to the motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is required to present specific facts, and cannot rely on conclusory allegations. Hansen v. U.S., 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993). The court must determine whether the specific facts that are presented by the non-moving party, considered along with undisputed context and background facts, would show that a rational or reasonable jury might return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor based on that evidence. Emeldi v. University of Oregon, 698 F.3d 715, 728-29 (9th Cir. 2012).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must allege: (a) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (b) the conduct deprived a person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Section 1983 is the appropriate avenue to remedy an alleged wrong only if both of these elements are present. See Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985).
Unless plaintiff makes a two-part showing, qualified immunity shields government officials from liability. The plaintiff must show both: the official(s) violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and at the time of the alleged act or failure to act there was clearly established law that defined the contours of the federal right objectively putting the official(s) on notice - i.e., any reasonable official would understand that what they are doing is unlawful. Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S.Ct. 500 (2019); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018).
When qualified immunity is reviewed in the context of a defense motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with respect to central facts. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per curiam). If there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning both: (1) Whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that their conduct was unlawful under the circumstances they confronted, and (2) Whether the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right, then summary judgment granting qualified immunity is not appropriate. Bonivert v. City of Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2018).
To determine whether there was clearly established law, the Court has stated, “[w]hile there does not have to be a case directly on point, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular [action] beyond debate”; and the Court has also observed, “there can be the rare obvious case, where the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.” Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 590. A clearly established right exists if “controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” have held, on facts that are close or analogous to the current case, that such a right exists. Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 2019).
In some contexts, there may be a general constitutional rule that has been identified in court decisions - and it may apply with such obvious clarity to the specific conduct of a defendant, that qualified immunity will not apply even though existing case law did not describe the specific factual scenario in the current situation. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997); Bonivert, 883 F.3d at 872-73. If qualified immunity operated as a shield for all conduct that was not specifically addressed in existing case law at the time of the event in question, then officials would not ever be held accountable for unprecedented constitutional violations that would appear obvious. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740-42 (2002) ().
In the Ninth Circuit, courts “analyze all claims of excessive force that arise during or before arrest under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard[.]” Coles v. Eagle, 704 F.3d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). “[T]...
To continue reading
Request your trial