Harris v. Powhatan Cnty. Sch. Bd., Civil Action No. 3:11–cv–224–JAG.

Decision Date07 August 2012
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:11–cv–224–JAG.
Citation885 F.Supp.2d 804
PartiesAlexander HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. POWHATAN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Powhatan County, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Barbara Allyn Queen, Lawrence & Associates, Richmond, VA, for Plaintiff.

Stacy Leann Haney, Dennis Patrick Lacy, Jr., Reed Smith LLP, Richmond, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN A. GIBNEY, JR., District Judge.

In this case, the plaintiff, Alexander Harris, accuses the Powhatan County School Board (“the Board”) of racial and age-based discrimination in eliminating his long-time position with Powhatan County Schools. The Board has moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). In the Amended Complaint, the plaintiff asserts four claims: race discrimination under Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count I), race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II), race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III), and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) (Count IV). Essentially, Harris contends (1) the Board eliminated his position because of his age and race; and (2) the Board breached an agreement to pay him for unused annual leave because of his race. Because the plaintiff fails to raise a reasonable inference that the defendant acted based on the plaintiff's age or race, the court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Harris, an African–American over 70 years old, began working for the Board in 1957 as a custodian. By the 20082009 school year, Harris had worked his way up to the position of Director of Maintenance and Custodial Services. He reported to Paul Imig (“Imig”), Assistant Superintendent of Finance & Business Operations.

Like other school employees, Harris' employment contract was limited to one school year at a time. Each fall, the Board asked its employees for notice of their intent to return the following year. In November 2008, Harris signed his “Notice of Intent” form for the 2009/2010 school year and, as instructed, returned it to his supervisor, Imig. Imig, however, did not forward Harris' form to the central office but instead held it and wrote a note on the form stating, “Hold—per discussions w/ Alex re retirement.” Prior to returning the “Notice of Intent” form, Harris and Imig had a conversation in which Harris indicated that he did not wish to retire, and Imig told Harris that his position may be eliminated the following year.

Harris' hesitation over his retirement stemmed from concern over receiving payment for accumulated annual leave, to which he felt entitled under an alleged oral agreement outside the terms of his formal, written contract. According to Harris, Dr. E. Lee Land, a previous Superintendent, approached him in the 1970s and asked him to forego summer vacations in order to prepare the schools for the upcoming academic year. In return, Harris claims, Dr. Land promised to pay him for the unused leave upon Harris' retirement. Harris also claims that subsequent Superintendents, including Dr. Margaret Meara, the current Superintendent, agreed to this arrangement. He asserts that the Board approved the agreement, but has no written documentation supporting the agreement.

Conversely, Dr. Meara denies ever entering such an agreement with Harris. Harris also acknowledges that Dr. Maynard Bean, the Superintendent between Dr. Land and Dr. Meara, told Harris that he does not recall addressing such an agreement before the Board. No such discussion or approval appears in the Board's minutes. In fact, the Board has a specific policy (Policy GCBDD) forbidding accumulation of back leave in excess of 48 days. Dr. Land, who allegedly hatched the vacation agreement with Harris, initially proposed and implemented the policy limiting the accumulation of back leave. The Board has not authorized Dr. Meara to award compensation for annual leave in excess of Policy GCBDD.

Additionally, Harris' leave record, which he cites to support his assertions that he was able to accumulate more annual leave than Policy GCBDD allows and that he abstained from taking leave during the summer, does not support his claims. Rather, the records show that Harris accumulated no more than 48 days of annual leave per year, the maximum allowed under Policy GCBDD, and that he did take time off during the summer, in conflict with the terms of the alleged contract.

Despite the apparent lack of an agreement, Harris wanted to collect his accumulated vacation pay. Harris therefore sent Dr. Meara a letter on January 29, 2009, indicating that he was considering retiring, that he wanted an accounting of the amount of annual leave lost over his tenure, and that he anticipated retiring on July 1, 2009. He estimated that his accumulated leave amounted to $19,500.

On February 2, 2009, Imig gave Dr. Meara a memorandum recommending that the Board eliminate Harris' position, at a savings of $100,000. The memo says that Harris had told Imig of his intent to retire in 2009 and that his retirement paperwork was forthcoming. Based on savings during an anticipated budgetary shortfall and the belief that Harris intended to retire, Dr. Meara recommended that the Board eliminate Harris' position. Harris acknowledges that the Board eliminated his position based on their belief that he wanted to retire.

The proposed budget reflected the elimination of Harris' position along with 13 other positions then held by employees of varying races and ages.1 The Board adopted the budget 2 and eliminated Harris' position, effectively ending his employment at the end of the fiscal year.

Harris met with Dr. Meara and Rose Studivant, the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources, on March 16, 2009 to discuss his retirement paperwork, which he had not yet completed. Though his position had already been eliminated, Dr. Meara wanted Harris to complete the paperwork so that he could receive his Virginia Retirement System benefits in a timely fashion.3 During this meeting, Harris reiterated that he wanted to retire but that he also wanted compensation for his unused leave. When Dr. Meara informed Harris that she lacked the authority to pay him for unused leave beyond School Board Policy GCBDD's limits, Harris became upset and said he would not retire without compensation for the entirety of his unused annual leave.

Throughout the course of the decision-making process, Dr. Meara regularly kept the Board's members abreast of the situation via e-mail. She told members that Harris' position was not needed and its continued existence was a waste of money. Additionally, after adopting the budget and effectively eliminating Harris' position, Dr. Meara e-mailed Board members to express that Harris was “bullying and attempting to extort money from the Board because everyone is afraid of what he and his friends will do.” A Board member told Dr. Meara that Harris' family had threatened to go to the media and garner community sympathy based on his long tenure with the school. Dr. Meara feared the backlash that would result and later clarified that by “friends” she was referring to the National Association of Colored People (NAACP), an organization whose name she claimed Harris often invoked. She never told the Board, however, that she had meant to refer to the NAACP or that she feared that any civil rights group would intervene in the dispute. Based on her fear of adverse publicity and the community's reaction, Dr. Meara approached the Board about reinstating Harris' position, even though the cost extended beyond the budget's finances.

At Dr. Meara's request, Board members weighed in on Harris' reinstatement. One member sent an email saying [t]his does not surprise me at all to say the least” and requesting Dr. Meara call him. Another member recommended putting Harris' reinstatement to a vote, though he stated that he did not intend to vote in favor of reinstatement. The Board's Chairman stated that he did not like being “held hostage,” that he did not want to employ someone at any pay level “that does not produce,” and that it was irresponsible to let the matter remain in limbo.

Ultimately, the board did not reinstate Harris. Rather, the Board transferred Harris' remaining duties to Russell Wilson, a Caucasian employee in his 50's. On June 10, 2009, Wilson agreed to perform the duties of Harris' former position, for an additional annual stipend of $10,000. This position was absorbed into Wilson's previous duties, and the Board gave him the new title of Director of Facilities.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute of any material fact and is thereby entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After an adequate period of time for discovery, Rule 56(a) mandates a grant of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The court resolves all genuinefactual disputes and inferences in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) ( per curiam ).

Once the movant satisfies its showing for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-movant may not rest on claims within its pleading, but “must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (internal quotation marks & emphasis omitted); see also Anderson v. Liberty...

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