Harris v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
| Citation | 383 F.Supp.3d 1315 |
| Decision Date | 15 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:09-cv-13482 |
| Parties | Patricia HARRIS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gerald Harris, Plaintiff, v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Andrew R. Kaufman, Pro Hac Vice, John T. Spragens, Pro Hac Vice, Kathryn E. Barnett, Kenneth S. Byrd, Pro Hac Vice, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Nashville, TN, Charlie Easa Farah, Jr., Farah & Farah, PA, Janna B. McNicholas, Norwood Sherman Wilner, Stephanie J. Hartley, Richard J. Lantinberg, The Wilner Firm, PA, Jacksonville, FL, Donald A. Migliori, Pro Hac Vice, Frederick C. Baker, Pro Hac Vice, Lisa M. Saltzburg, Pro Hac Vice, James W. Ledlie, Pro Hac Vice, Nathan D. Finch, Pro Hac Vice, Rebecca M. Deupree, Pro Hac Vice, Elizabeth S. Smith, Joseph F. Rice, Lance V. Oliver, Vincent I. Parrett, Motley Rice, LLC, Mount Pleasant, SC, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Martin D. Quinones, Richard M. Heimann, Robert J. Nelson, Pro Hac Vice, Sarah R. London, Pro Hac Vice, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, Jordan Elias, Pro Hac Vice, Girard Sharp LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jennifer Gross, Pro Hac Vice, Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, New York, NY, Todd Alan Walburg, Pro Hac Vice, Cutter Law PC, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff.
David Clifford Reeves, Jeffrey Alan Yarbrough, Joseph W. Prichard, Jr., Robert B. Parrish, Moseley, Prichard, Parrish, Knight & Jones, Dana G. Bradford, II, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, Patrick P. Coll, Smith Hulsey & Busey, John Andrew DeVault, III, Bedell, Dittmar, DeVault, Pillans & Coxe, PA, Jacksonville, FL, Rafael Cruz-Alvarez, Golden & Grimes, LLP, Giselle Gonzalez Manseur, Kelly Anne Luther, Maria Helena Ruiz, Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, Miami, FL, Joshua Reuben Brown, Joshua Reuben Brown, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Orlando, FL, Bonnie C. Daboll, Johnson Daboll Anderson PLLC, James B. Murphy, Jr., Terri L. Parker, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Laura K. Whitmore, Adams & Reese, LLP, Tampa, FL, Keri L. Arnold, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Theodore V.H. Mayer, Pro Hac Vice, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, LLP, New York, NY, Tiffany C. Raush, Jones Walker, Houston, TX, Bruce R. Tepikian, Jennifer L. Brown, Walter L. Cofer, Shook, Scott D. Kaiser, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Kansas City, MO, Emily Baker, John Fachet Yarber, Michael F. Stoer, Stephanie E. Parker, Jones Day, Atlanta, GA, Khalil Gharbieh, Maura McGonigle, Pro Hac Vice, Judith Bernstein-Gaeta, Pro Hac Vice, Peter T. Grossi, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Geoffrey Jonathan Michael, Khalil Gharbieh, M. Sean Laane, Matthew Oster, Maura McGonigle, Pro Hac Vice, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
This is an "Engle -progeny"1 lawsuit by Plaintiff Patricia Harris ("Plaintiff'), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gerald Harris ("Mr. Harris"), against three cigarette manufacturers, Philip Morris USA, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and Lorillard Tobacco Company (collectively, "Defendants"). The case is before the Court on Defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on All Claims or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial (Doc. 178), and Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Doc. 179). Plaintiff has responded to both motions. (Doc. 182; Doc. 183). The Court has also reviewed the parties' supplemental briefs. (Doc. 201; Doc. 202). The matter is thus ripe for a decision. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on All Claims and alternative Motion for New Trial is due to be denied. Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment is due to be granted to the extent that the Court will amend the judgment to reflect each party's comparative fault. Otherwise, the Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is due to be denied.
On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against the Defendants pursuant to Engle III . (Doc. 5). Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants' cigarettes were responsible for Mr. Harris's coronary heart disease
(CHD) and oral cavity cancer, as well as the lung cancer that ultimately claimed his life. Plaintiff sought wrongful death and survival damages under theories of negligence, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy to conceal.
Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on the claims of negligence and strict liability, but not on the claims of fraudulent concealment and conspiracy to conceal. (Doc. 143). In reaching its verdict, the jury determined as a threshold matter that Mr. Harris was addicted to cigarettes containing nicotine. (Id. at 1). The parties stipulated mat Mr. Harris's CHD manifested on or before the Engle class cutoff date of November 21, 1996 (see Doc. 121 at 35 ¶ 2; Doc. 163 at 180), but the jury determined that Mr. Harris's addiction to cigarettes was not the cause of his heart disease
(Doc. 143 at 2 ¶ 3). However, the jury found that while Mr. Harris's oral cavity cancer had not manifested by the cutoff date (id. at 2 ¶ 2), Mr. Harris's addiction to cigarettes was the cause of the oral cavity cancer (id. at 2 ¶ 3). The jury further found that Mr. Harris's addiction to cigarettes was the cause of the lung cancer that resulted in his death. (Id. at 4 ¶ 6).2
In accordance with the Court's instructions, the jury awarded two sets of compensatory damages: one for the diseases that did not cause Mr. Harris's death (i.e., oral cavity cancer
)3 and one for the diseases that did cause Mr. Harris's death (i.e., lung cancer ). The Court reasoned that damages for the injuries not resulting in Mr. Harris's death reflected survival damages, while damages for the injuries that did result in Mr. Harris's death reflected wrongful death damages. With respect to oral cavity cancer, the jury awarded $ 1,326,650.00 in survival damages (Doc. 143 at 12 ¶ 17), assigning 60% of the fault to Mr. Harris, 15% each to Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds, and 10% to Lorillard (id. at 3 ¶ 5).4 With respect to Mr. Harris's lung cancer, the jury awarded $ 400,000.00 in wrongful death in damages (id. at 12 ¶ 16), assigning 70% of the fault to Mr. Harris and 10% each to Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, and Lorillard (id. at 4 ¶ 7).5 Neither of the damage verdicts distinguished between economic damages (such as medical bills) and non-economic damages (such as pain and suffering). The jury determined that punitive damages were not warranted, (Id. at 13).
Two weeks after the trial ended, Defendants filed a "Motion for Judgment in Accordance with the Jury's Verdict." (Doc. 157). Defendants argued that based on the verdict, Mr. Harris was not an Engle class member because of the lack of unity between the disease that met the cutoff date requirement and the disease that was caused by the addiction to cigarettes. As noted above, the jury found that the tobacco-related illness that manifested by the Engle class cutoff date (CHD) was not caused by Mr. Harris's addiction to cigarettes, but that the tobacco-related illness that was caused by Mr. Harris's addiction to cigarettes (oral cavity cancer
) had not manifested by the Engle class cutoff date. The Court determined that Mr. Harris was an Engle class member nonetheless. (Doc. 174). The Court explained that in deciding class membership, it was bound by Engle III's treatment of class representative Angie Delia Vecchia. Id. at 4-5. In Engle III
, the Florida Supreme Court held that Delia Vecchia was properly included as a class member "despite a mismatch between the disease mat timely manifested (COPD) and the disease for which legal cause was found (lung cancer )." Id. at 6 (citing Engle III , 945 So. 2d at 1256, 1276 ). This Court reasoned that because Plaintiff stood in Delia Vecchia's shoes, id. at 5, Mr. Harris also qualified as an Engle class member even if the tobacco-related disease that manifested by the Engle cutoff date was different from the tobacco-related disease for which the jury found causation, id. at 10. Thus, the Court denied Defendants' motion.
Thereafter, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of $ 1,726,650.00. (Doc. 175). The original judgment reflected the total amount of damages found by the jury but did not reflect the degree of Mr. Harris's comparative fault. Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed the two instant motions.
The standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) is the same as the standard for granting the pre-submission motion under Rule 50(a).
Chaney v. City of Orlando, Fla. , 483 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Under that standard, "a district court's proper analysis is squarely and narrowly focused on the sufficiency of evidence." Id. A court "should render judgment as a matter of law when there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc. , 369 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2004). "The issue is not whether the evidence was sufficient for [the losing party] to have won, but whether the evidence was sufficient for it to have lost" Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc. , 518 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2008).
A court may grant a new trial "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A).
A losing party may ... move for a new trial under Rule 59 on the grounds that "the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair ... and may raise questions of law arising out of alleged substantial errors in admission or rejection of evidence or instructions to the...
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