Harris v. Railroad Retirement Bd.
| Decision Date | 01 October 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-4689,92-4689 |
| Citation | 3 F.3d 131 |
| Parties | Hazel M. HARRIS, Petitioner, v. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, Respondent. Summary Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Charles D. Barnette, Lavender, Rochelle, Barnette, Dickerson & Pickett, Texarkana, AR, for petitioner.
Catherine C. Cook, Michael C. Litt, Glen L. Bower, Chairman, Railroad Retirement Bd., Chicago, IL, for respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the Railroad Retirement Board.
Before JOLLY, WIENER, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
Hazel M. Harris challenges an order of the Railroad Retirement Board, 1 issued pursuant to the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. Secs. 231-231v (1988 & Supp. III 1991), and its 1981 amendment found in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub.L. No. 97-35, Sec. 1129(f), 95 Stat. 357, 642 (1981). Mrs. Harris had received a widow's annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act until she remarried. That marriage has now been annulled. We are called upon to determine whether the annuity should be revived under these facts and, if so, at what date and in what amount. Construing the statute, we affirm in part, allowing the annuity, effective from the date of annulment, and we reverse in part, directing that payments be calculated under the method applicable at the time of the widow's original award.
In October of 1981, Mrs. Harris was awarded a monthly widow's annuity under section 2(d)(1)(i) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, effective June 1981, based on the earnings of her late husband, Edward T. Harris, a former railroad employee. Mrs. Harris was drawing approximately $127.00 a month in widow's benefits when she married Robert C. Reid on December 25, 1988. In accordance with the provisions of section 5(c)(5) of the Railroad Retirement Act, her widow's annuity was terminated.
On February 9, 1989, Mrs. Harris's marriage to Mr. Reid was annulled under Texas law, based on Mr. Reid's lack of mental capacity. Following this annulment, Mrs. Harris's annuity entitlement was reinstated, effective as of the date of the annulment. The calculation of her annuity, however, was made under a new statutory provision that changed the computation of the benefit for annuity awards granted on or after October 1, 1986. The new computation provided Mrs. Harris the handsome monthly benefit of $1.08.
Mrs. Harris filed a timely appeal with the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals on February 7, 1991. The Bureau held no hearing because the issue was a matter of law. The Hearings Officer, in a decision dated July 24, 1991, ruled that Mrs. Harris, having undergone an annulment of a voidable marriage, must establish eligibility for a widow's annuity as of the date of the decree annulling the remarriage. The decision stated that, as of November 1988, Mrs. Harris was entitled to a rate of $126.73 a month. The decision further stated, however, that applying the current computation method, Mrs. Harris was entitled to receive only $1.08 a month. Following the July 1991 decision, Mrs. Harris appealed to the Railroad Retirement Board, and the Board issued their decision affirming and adopting the decision of the Hearings Officer on May 14, 1992. As a result of that decision, Mrs. Harris filed this petition for review.
We have previously established the standard of review for such appeals. The Board's findings of fact are conclusive, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 355(f) (1988); McCoy v. Railroad Retirement Board, 935 F.2d 87, 88 (5th Cir.1991); Elzy v. Railroad Retirement Board, 782 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam); Kurka v. United States Railroad Retirement Board, 615 F.2d 246, 249-50 (5th Cir.1980). In this case, however, the facts are not in dispute, and we review the Board's construction of the law de novo. McCoy, 935 F.2d at 88.
The statute at issue is the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. Secs. 231-231v (1988 & Supp. III 1991). We must, first, consider the application of the terms "a widow ... who has not remarried," 45 U.S.C. Sec. 231a(d)(1)(i), to the circumstances of Mrs. Harris. She contends that because her 1988 marriage to Mr. Reid was considered void ab initio under Texas law, she should be entitled to receive her survivor benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act as if she had never "remarried." She contends that the payments should relate back to the beginning date of her marriage to Mr. Reid, the time the payments were terminated. The Agency, however, urges a different effect of the annulment. The Agency acknowledges that Mrs. Harris's annuity benefit should be reinstated because the annulment effectively voided her "remarriage" under the statute. The Agency contends, however, that the payments should be effective from the date the marriage was annulled--not from the date that the marriage began.
In addition, Mrs. Harris asserts that her benefit payments should be calculated under the old formula that initially determined the amount of her annuity. Again, she argues that the annulment of her marriage should put her in the position she would have enjoyed under the Railroad Retirement Act had she never married Mr. Reid. The Agency, on the other hand, asserts that her annuity should be calculated using a new statutory provision that changed the computation of the benefit. The statutory provision that we must construe states that the new method of calculation of benefits is applicable "to all awards made on or after October 1, 1986." Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub.L. No. 97-35, Sec. 1129(f), 95 Stat. 357, 642 (1981).
Both the Agency and Mrs. Harris contend that the annulment of a widow's second marriage, which was voidable in Texas due to the mental incapacity of her second husband, revives the widow's right to an annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act. We agree with this conclusion.
Section 2(d)(4) of the Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 231a(d)(4) (1988), defining who is a widow of a deceased employee under the Act, incorporates by reference the definition contained in section 216(h) of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 416(h) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 216(h) looks to relevant state law to determine an individual's status as a widow. See id.; see also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 76 S.Ct. 974, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956). The Texas Court of Appeals held in the case of Bruni v. State, 669 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.App.--Austin 1984, no writ), that "[o]nce avoided by annulment, a voidable marriage is held to be void ab initio." Id. at 835 (citing Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex.1965)).
In 1960, we set a clear precedent for our decision today when we decided whether social security insurance benefits 2 should be revived following an annulment under Connecticut law. We determined that because the annulment caused the voidable marriage to become void ab initio under Connecticut law, the widow's social security benefits that were terminated by reason of remarriage should be revived upon annulment of the remarriage. Yeager v. Flemming, 282 F.2d 779 (5th Cir.1960). Our ruling is the same today: Because, under Texas law, annulment caused Mrs. Harris's voidable marriage to become void ab initio, 3 Mrs. Harris is restored to her previous status as widow and should, once again, receive annuity benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act. 4
We next consider whether Mrs. Harris should receive annuity payments for the period during her annulled marriage to Mr. Reid. In other words, the question is whether the annuity payments should be paid retroactively, dating back to the date of the remarriage, or only prospectively, from the date of the annulment.
As previously established, we must look to state law to determine family law questions relevant to the Railroad Retirement Act. Mrs. Harris relies exclusively on the statement in Bruni v. State, 669 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.App.--Austin 1984, no writ), that "[o]nce avoided by annulment, a voidable marriage is held to be void ab initio." Id. at 835 (citing Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex.1965)). The relation back doctrine, however, is not an absolute in Texas. In Kaska, the case cited by Bruni, the Supreme Court of Texas stated:
We generally think of annulment as placing the parties in the same position as if they had never married. In Garcia v. Garcia, the court stated that a suit for annulment presumes that there never was a valid marriage and that it should therefore be declared void....
In more recent and better reasoned cases, the courts have recognized that the doctrine of relation back is a legal fiction which must be utilized with some discrimination where the annulment of a marriage is involved....
The rule that an annulled marriage is void ab initio was also considered in Sefton v. Sefton, where the Supreme Court of California said:
* * * [T]he doctrine of "relation back" [with respect to annulments of marriages] is not without its exceptions. The doctrine was fashioned by our courts to do substantial justice as between the parties to a voidable marriage. It is a mere legal fiction which has an appeal when used as a device for achieving that purpose. The test for determining the applicability of the doctrine as applied to voidable marriages is whether it effects a result which conforms to the sanctions of sound policy and justice as between the immediate parties thereto, their property rights acquired during that marriage and the rights of their offspring. * * *
Kaska, 397 S.W.2d at 212 (citations omitted). Thus, in Kaska, the Supreme Court of Texas applied the reasoning of the California court and looked through the "fiction" of annulment for the purpose of determining the legitimacy of children. Furthermore, post-Bruni cases continue to recognize that annulment is a legal fiction and that the relation-back doctrine is a limited concept. See Fernandez v....
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