Harris v. Roraback

• Decision Date: 16 July 1904
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: HARRIS et al. v. RORABACK et al.

100 N.W. 391

137 Mich. 292

HARRIS et al. v. RORABACK et al.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 16, 1904

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County, in Chancery; Morse Rohnert Judge.

Suit by Albert S. Harris and others against Edwin C. Roraback and another. Decree for complainants. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

William F. McCorkle, for appellants.

William P. Corbett (Henry C. Walters, of counsel), for appellees.

CARPENTER, J.

The parties to this suit are owners of lots on Woodlawn avenue in the city of Detroit. The platters of this property placed in their conveyance of defendants' property, which ran to defendants' immediate grantor, the following restriction: 'That the said second party, his heirs and assigns, will not occupy said premises except for one dwelling house to each lot.' A similar restriction was placed in the conveyance of the property owned by complainants, and in all the conveyances on said avenue except one, and the owner of that excepted lot has complied with the restriction. Defendants have planned and started to build on their lot a two-story building, designed for two dwellings--one to occupy the ground floor, and one the second floor--each of which has a separate entrance and a separate cellar. Complainants contend that this structure is forbidden by the above-quoted language in the deed, and they bring this suit to enjoin its erection. They obtained a decree in the court below, and defendants have appealed to this court.

The decision of this case depends upon the proper construction of the restriction in the deed. We cannot agree with defendants that the force of this language is in any way impaired by the fact that the land contract which preceded the deed contained the words 'a dwelling house,' instead of the words 'one dwelling house.' If these two expressions have the same meaning, the land contract cuts no figure in this case. If they have different meanings, there is nothing to indicate that full force shall not be given to the language of the deed, which was the last expression of the parties. In my judgment, we can safely construe the restriction from its own language, and without looking outside that language. While there is authority for saying that, in construing this language, we should resolve doubts in favor of the defendants (see Stone v. Pillsbury, 167 Mass., at page 337, 45 N.E. 768, and authorities there cited), it is none the less our duty to give said language its obvious meaning. We are to construe the language in accordance with the intention of the parties to the deed. In construing it, we should not assume that the restriction was inserted solely for the benefit of the grantor. The purpose of the restriction is to benefit not merely the grantor, but every owner of property and every resident on the street. Such a restriction assures purchasers that property will be devoted in a specified manner to residence purposes, and has a tendency to increase its value. And we think it not improper to say that it may fairly be inferred in the case at bar that this restriction and its general...