Harris v. Royal, Case No. CIV-08-375-F

• Decision Date: 19 April 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. CIV-08-375-F
• Parties: JIMMY DEAN HARRIS, Petitioner, v. TERRY ROYAL, Warden, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

JIMMY DEAN HARRIS, Petitioner, v. TERRY ROYAL¹, Warden,Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Respondent.

Case No. CIV-08-375-F

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

April 19, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner, a state prisoner currently facing execution of a sentence of death, appears with counsel and petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-1999-5071, of one count of first-degree murder, one count of shooting with intent to kill, and one count of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. Respondent has responded to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter "Petition"),² and Petitioner has replied. The State court record has been supplied.³

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County of one count of first-degree murder, one count of shooting with intent to kill, and one count of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. For the crime of first-degree murder, the jury recommended the imposition of a sentence of death, finding the existence of the aggravating circumstance that Petitioner knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person. He was also sentenced to life in prison for shooting with intent to kill and ten years in prison for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (hereinafter "OCCA"). The OCCA affirmed Petitioner's convictions and the non-capital sentences, but reversed the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing trial for the first-degree murder conviction. Harris v. State, 84 P.3d 731 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). At the resentencing trial the jury found the existence of two aggravating circumstances: (1) Petitioner knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person; and (2) the existence of a probability Petitioner would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to death on the jury's recommendation. Petitioner's direct appeal from the resentencing trial was denied by the OCCA. Harris v. State, 164 P.3d 1103 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007). Certiorari was denied on March 24, 2008. Harris v. Oklahoma, 552 U.S. 1286 (2008). Petitioner filed an Application for Post-Conviction Relief which was denied by the OCCA in a published opinion. Harris v. State, 167 P.3d 438 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), when a federal district court addresses "an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). For the purposes of consideration of the present Petition, the Court provides and relies upon the following synopsis from the OCCA's opinion summarizing the evidence presented at Petitioner's trial. Following review of the record, trial transcripts, and the admitted exhibits, the Court finds this summary by the OCCA to be adequate and accurate. The Court therefore adopts the following summary of the facts as its own:

Harris, who was a skilled transmission mechanic, and his wife, Pam, worked in front office positions in transmission shops. Throughout their relationship the two often worked together. Despite being business partners as well as husband and wife, they had a stormy relationship. This worsened significantly when Pam was hired, but Harris was not, to work in Merle Taylor's AAMCO transmission shop in Oklahoma City. Harris commuted to work in Texas for several months, during which time the marriage suffered. After Harris had a work-related accident, he returned to Oklahoma. By the summer of 1999, Pam told him the marriage was over. While Harris agreed to a divorce, he was angry and upset, and continued to hope Pam would return to him. In mid-August of 1999, Harris called Pam, threatening to kill her, her parents, their daughter, her co-workers, and Merle Taylor. Pam got a protective order against Harris and filed for divorce. The divorce was granted on August 25, 1999, and Harris was ordered to leave the home without removing any property. Harris and Pam had previously taped an agreement dividing the house property. On the evening of the 25th, Harris moved out of the home, taking furniture and many of Pam's personal possessions. He also vandalized the house. Pam discovered the damage the next day, found out where Harris had stored her furniture and his tools, and had a lock put on that shed. In the succeeding days Harris called Pam often demanding that she remove the lock. Each time, she explained she could neither talk to him nor remove the lock, and told him to call her attorney. He refused,explicitly stating he would talk to her. He continued to threaten her and others. On August 31, 1999, he threatened to kill Pam and was seen driving by the AAMCO shop.

On the morning of September 1, 1999, Harris called the AAMCO shop several times, demanding that she remove the lock on the storage shed and threatening Pam and Merle Taylor. At approximately 9:00 a.m. Harris arrived at the shop and asked for Pam, who was standing with Merle Taylor and his daughter-in-law Jessica. He shot Taylor twice at close range, and shot at Jessica. Harris shot Pam, chased her when she ran, and pistol-whipped her when he ran out of bullets and could not quickly reload his gun. When Pam escaped, Harris fled, discarded the gun and his van, and hid in a friend's garage. Harris claimed he was angry and upset, and could not make good decisions because he was of low intelligence, was under the influence of alcohol and drugs, and was mentally ill (although not legally insane).

To support the aggravating circumstances, the State presented the evidence of the circumstances of the crimes. There was also evidence that, during the ongoing difficulties in mid-August, Pam had called police and Harris had resisted arrest. The State presented evidence that Harris assaulted a jailer while awaiting trial, and had physically, verbally and emotionally abused Pam throughout their relationship. The State also presented victim impact evidence. In mitigation, Harris presented evidence from his family and former co-workers, as well as expert evidence, regarding his traumatic and abusive childhood, history of substance abuse, low intelligence, emotional instability, and possible mental illness.

Harris, 164 P.3d at 1106-07.

PETITIONER'S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA"), in order to obtain federal habeas relief once a State court hasadjudicated a particular claim on the merits, Petitioner must demonstrate that the adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2).

The Supreme Court has defined "contrary to" as a State court decision that is "substantially different from the relevant precedent of this Court." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court). A decision can be "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent." Id. at 405-06. The "unreasonable application" prong comes into play when "the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case" or "unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Id. at 407. In ascertaining clearly established federal law, this Court must look to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decisions." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61 (2004) (quoting Williams, 529 at 412.

The "AEDPA's purpose [is] to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism. There is no doubt Congress intended AEDPA to advance thesedoctrines." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). "The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable - a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). The deference embodied in Section 2254(d) "reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011)(citation omitted).

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Ground 1: Mental Health Rebuttal Evidence.

During the first stage of trial, and after Petitioner had testified, the defense presented expert psychological and psychiatric testimony regarding Petitioner's intelligence and state of mind to support his diminished capacity defense of mental illness. Subsequent to the defense's notice that Petitioner intended to present such a defense, the State obtained permission to have Dr. John Call, a psychologist, interview Petitioner to determine if he was malingering. Dr. Call testified that Petitioner appeared to be feigning or exaggerating cognitive, memory, and...