Harris v. Ruthenberg, 13 C 4764
Decision Date | 05 May 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 13 C 4764,13 C 4764 |
Parties | CORD HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. RYAN RUTHENBERG, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Mr. Harris has filed pro se a "Motion for Relief of Judgement," citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §1655(3) [sic] [Dkt. #78].1 Mr. Harris is an experienced litigant with a number of appearances in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. He has not served the defendant or his prior recruited counsel. Nor has he noticed the motion, Mr. Harris is currently incarcerated. The normal procedural rules are not excused because someone appears pro se. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); S.E.C. v. Spadaccini, 256 Fed.Appx. 794, 795 (7th Cir.2007). Still, in certain contexts, pro se plaintiffs are accorded a measure of latitude - often substantial. See generally Stelmokas v. Kodzius, 460 Fed.Appx. 600, 605 (7th Cir.2012); Michael Fridkin and Rachel Brady, Playing on an Uneven Field: Litigating Against a Pro Se Opponent, The Circuit Rider 17 (May 2015); S.E.C. v. Spadaccini, 256 Fed.Appx. 794, 795 (7th Cir. 2007). But, it cannot be ignored that Mr. Harris is incarcerated and may not be able to set this case for hearing - or at least it does not appear that he can. But he could serve the defendant, but apparently has chosen not to.
Mr. Harris's underlying case, 13 C 04764, was dismissed with his explicit permission and while represented by counsel. On October 13, 2016, Mr. Harris executed a stipulation to dismiss [Dkt. #74, 76] in which he voluntarily agreed to dismiss his case. Here is the stipulation in full:
Pursuant to Rule 41 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED between the Plaintiff and the Defendants, by their respective attorneys of record, that an order granting Plaintiff a dismissal of his Complaint and this cause with prejudice and without the assessment of costs or attorneys' fees against either party, should be entered.
The Stipulation to Dismiss was signed by the plaintiff's lawyer, Jeanette Samuels.
His current motion [Dkt. #78] makes reference to supposed evidence that he conclusorily says is newly discovered; that evidence, however, it is not included with the motion, nor is its absence explained by Mr. Harris. So we have only Mr. Harris's unsupported assertion that it even exists. And that is not enough; "unfortunately... saying so doesn't make it so...." United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, Skokie, Ill., 607 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 2010). See also Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2012)(even "[l]awyers' talk is no substitute for data."). See also Miller v. Lehman, 801 F.2d 492, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(Edwards, J., concurring)("A party's position is not legally infirm because his opponent says so.").
Mr. Harris, as we have said, is no stranger to litigation. He is frequent litigant in this court, including before Judge Shadur. Judge Shadur's comments are significant because they demonstrate that Mr. Harris is not an ingenue whose current filing was made with knowledge of the rules. Here is what Judge Shadur said in different cases:
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