Harris v. Sissa
| Decision Date | 05 January 1917 |
| Parties | HARRIS et al. v. SISSA. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Appeal 'from Superior Court, Hartford County; Lucien F. Burpee, Judge.
Action by Charles Harris and others against Angelo Sissa. There was verdict and judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. No error.
Saul Berman and Moses A. Berman, both of Hartford, for appellant. Albert C. Bill, of Hartford, for appellees.
The complaint describes the plaintiffs as three individuals, copartners in business under the firm name of Harris, Conn & Harris, and alleges that on July 15, 1914, the plaintiffs were, and ever since have been, engaged in business as real estate brokers in Hartford; that the defendant on said day requested the plaintiffs to procure a customer for a certain piece of real estate belonging to him and agreed to pay them a commission therefor; that they did procure a customer to whom the defendant did sell the real estate; and that their commission is now due and unpaid. The defendant's answer is, in substance, a general denial. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the defendant moved to set it aside as against the evidence, and also moved for a judgment non Obstante veredicto. From the denial of these motions and for alleged errors in the charge, the defendant appeals.
An examination of the evidence discloses that there was sufficient testimony to support all of the essential allegations of the complaint, and that the motion to set aside the verdict was properly denied. The evidence which the jury must have accepted as true shows that the defendant first employed the firm of Harris & Harris to procure a customer in July, 1914; that the third plaintiff, Cohn, was not admitted to the firm and the new partnership of Harris, Cohn & Harris was not formed until the spring of 1915; that in the fall of 1915 the defendant told one of the plaintiffs to go ahead and see what he could do in the way of selling the property; and that the plaintiffs thereafter procured the customer who bought it.
There was therefore a variance as to the date when the firm of Harris, Cohn & Harris was formed and as to the date when the defendant first employed that firm; but no objection was made to the evidence on that ground, and as the difference in date did not arrect the terms of the employment, and as the customer was in fact procured by the firm of Harris, Cohn & Harris described in the complaint, the variance is immaterial.
The motion for judgment non Obstante veredicto was properly denied. At the common law only a plaintiff was entitled to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the defendant objected that the verdict was inconsistent with the pleadings, his remedy was by motion in arrest of judgment. Moreover, the motion as it appears of record is on its face insufficient, because it refers exclusively to alleged inconsistencies between the verdict and the evidence; whereas a motion of this bind must be based wholly on the ground that the verdict could not properly have been rendered on the pleadings. Finally the motion is without substantial merit because the only point of law presented by it which is not more properly covered by the motion to set aside the verdict...
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Gesualdi v. Conn. Co.
...event be rendered appears from other cases we later decided. In Streitweiser v. Lightbourn, 87 Conn. 527, 89 A. 186, and Harris v. Sissa, 91 Conn. 249, 251, 99 A. 580, we held that such judgments could not be rendered, not because they were not recognized in our procedure, but because such ......
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