Harris v. State
| Decision Date | 12 January 1950 |
| Docket Number | 69. |
| Parties | HARRIS v. STATE. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Joseph Kadans, Baltimore, for appellant.
Harrison L. Winter, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Hall Hammond, Atty. Gen., and A Gwynn Bowie, State's Atty. Prince George's Co., Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.
Before MARBURY, C J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.
Ronald Harris was jointly indicted with two other men by the grand jury for Prince George's County on April 12, 1944. The indictment consisted of five counts, the first of which charged robbery. At the time this indictment was returned against him he was confined in the Maryland Penitentiary, and still is confined in that institution under process of a court of this State. On May 1, 1944, the case was stetted. On December 29, 1947 Mr. Bowie, the State's Attorney for Prince George's County, wrote as follows:
'Your letter of December 18, 1947, addressed to Honorable William C. Coleman has been forwarded to me by Mr. Bernard J. Flynn, U. S. Attorney, for reply.
'With respect to your statements that various letters addressed by you to officials of Prince George's County have been ignored, I can only say that insofar as this office is concerned we have no record of having received any communication from you.
On February 17, 1949, Mr. Bowie wrote Harris:
'In reply to your letter to me of February 15th, you are advised that a necessary witness for the State in the case pending against you here is not available at this time and, for this reason, I am unable to comply with your request that the case be brought to trial now.'
Subsequently Harris petitioned the Honorable John T. Tucker, a member of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, and on March 4, 1949, Judge Tucker wrote him that he had no jurisdiction in the matter and suggested that he send the petition to one of the judges of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, which comprises Prince George's County, and gave him the names and addresses of the judges of that Circuit.
On April 29, 1949, the petition which Harris sent to Judge Tucker was filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, and on the same day Judge John B. Gray, Jr., filed an order in the case, in which he directed the State's Attorney 'to make inquiry as to the whereabouts of the prosecuting witness, when he will be available for trial, and communicate his findings to the Court so that the case may be brought to trial as expeditiously thereafter as is practical'. It is stated in the order:
The State's Attorney found the prosecuting witness and the case was assigned for trial on July 5, 1949. The warden of the penitentiary, in pursuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, produced Harris in court that day. On that day the prisoner, through his counsel, filed a motion to quash the indictment, which was overruled. On application of counsel for the prisoner the case was continued to August 5th, 1949, at 10 A.M., and on July 18, 1949, an appeal was taken from the order of Judge Charles C. Marbury overruling the motion to quash to this court. It further appears that Judge Charles C. Marbury passed an order on the 14th day of March, 1949, in which the State's Attorney was required to show cause on or before the 24th day of March, 1949, why Harris should not be granted an immediate trial.
On the 16th day of March, 1949, Harris filed a writ of mandamus in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland to require the State's Attorney to order immediate trial of the case herein involved, and on the 17th day of March, Judge Charles C. Marbury passed an order staying the proceedings in this case until after the petition for a writ of mandamus filed in the United States District Court was determined. The proceedings in the United States District Court were dismissed and an appeal taken, which was subsequently abandoned.
While it is stated by the prisoner and his attorney that communications were sent to the officials of Prince George's County demanding a prompt trial under the indictment returned in April, 1944, there is nothing in the record to show that any such demands were made. The only two letters in the record are those written by the State's Attorney to Harris, referred to. The record of the proceedings before Judge Charles C. Marbury on July 5, 1949, contains no testimony. There were no witnesses sworn. It consists of a general discussion between the Judge, Mr. Kadans, counsel for the prisoner, and the Assistant State's Attorney. The letter written on May 27, 1949, to Judge Charles C. Marbury by Mr. Kadans, is intended to be a legal argument, and Judge Charles C. Marbury's letter of June 1, 1949, to Mr. Kadans sets out what actually had been done in the case as of that date. These letters are in the record. The motion to quash is as follows:
'Now comes Ronald Harris, by Joseph Kadans, his Attorney and moves that the criminal indictment now pending against Ronald Harris be quashed and dismissed for the following reasons:
1. The defendant, Ronald Harris, has not been sufficiently informed of the charges pending against him. He has never been furnished with a copy of the indictment, nor has the indictment ever been read to him.
2. Prosecution at this time is barred. The Constitution of Maryland provides for a prompt and speedy trial. The defendant was indicted at the April 1944 term of the Grand Jury of Prince George's County. The whereabouts of the defendant were known to the State's Attorney for Prince George's County for several years; nevertheless, although the authorities could easily have done so, the prosecution was not activated until June of 1949, after considerable effort was made by the defendant to have the matter disposed of. Trial at this late date would be contrary to the Maryland law and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
3. An important witness needed by the defendant is now deceased. William Harris, brother of the defendant, who was familiar with the whereabouts of the defendant at the time of the alleged crime, died April 10, 1948. Other important witnesses needed to establish the alibi of the defendant have now moved and cannot be located.'
The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that the appeal was not taken from a final judgment. While it is perfectly true that an appeal will not lie from a judgment that is not final (State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647), and ordinarily denial of a 'motion to quash' is not a final judgment, on the other hand it is just as true that when a prisoner claims that he has been denied a speedy trial and has thereby become entitled to be freed of further proceedings in a case, and his claim is decided against him, this is a final ruling denying his claimed right, from which an appeal will lie. This appeal may be compared to the sustaining of a demurrer to an indictment, which is a final ruling. The State can appeal, and if the judgment is reversed the case will be remanded for further proceedings. State v. Archer, 73 Md. 44, 20 A. 172.
Counsel for appellant seems to think that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has application to the case at bar. That amendment, among other things, provides:
'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, * * *.'
Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, among other things, that a man has a right 'to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, * * *.'
There was never a doubt, from the time of the adoption of the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the first eight amendments applied to and limited the powers of the Federal government, but were not applicable to the States. When the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was passed, the first section thereof, among other things provided: 'nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; * * *.' Since the adoption of that amendment, it has been held that cases involving a violation of a basic or fundamental right will be protected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; but such protection is only accorded a person where a basic or fundamental right has been violated. Criminal proceedings arising in a State court, involving such rights, flow through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, become absorbed in federal process, and will be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319-329, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288; Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct....
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