Harris v. State, 8 Div. 582
Decision Date | 20 April 1982 |
Docket Number | 8 Div. 582 |
Citation | 412 So.2d 1278 |
Parties | Thomas Glenn HARRIS v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
James H. Tompkins, Tuscumbia, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and James F. Hampton of McLain & Hampton, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The defendant was indicted and convicted for assault with intent to murder. Alabama Code 1975, Section 13-1-46. Sentence was ten years and six months' imprisonment.
The defendant argues that his motion to dismiss the indictment should have been granted because he was denied a speedy trial.
The initial warrant for the defendant's arrest based upon the complaint of the victim is dated June 29, 1979. The indictment was returned in January of 1980 and the defendant was tried in August of 1981.
After a hearing on the motion was held on the day of trial, the trial judge denied the motion for two reasons: (1) because there was no showing of any prejudice resulting from the delay and (2) because there was never any demand for a speedy trial. The motion to dismiss is not dated and the record does not indicate when it was actually filed. The trial judge made findings that the defendant had been represented by five different attorneys and that on more than one occasion defense counsel had requested a continuance.
After considering the facts of this case in light of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we find no error in the denial of the motion to dismiss. Tidmore v. City of Birmingham, 356 So.2d 231 (Ala.Cr.App.1977), cert. denied, 356 So.2d 234 (Ala.1978). The record supports the findings of the trial judge.
The trial judge did not err in failing or refusing to charge the jury on any lesser included offenses. This alleged error has not been preserved for review because there were no written requested charges on lesser included offenses submitted by the defendant. "(I)t is necessary, to present the action of the trial court in refusing special charges requested for review by this court, to show affirmatively by the record that the charges requested were in writing." Gilbert v. State, 2 Ala.App. 94, 96, 57 So. 127 (1911); Alabama Code 1975, Section 12-16-13.
The refusal to instruct on lesser included offenses was not error for a second reason. The State proved a prima facie case of assault with intent to murder. The defense was alibi. Consequently, the defendant was either guilty of the crime charged in the indictment or he was guilty of nothing. An accused is not entitled to charges on lesser included offenses when he denies committing the crime itself. Williams v. State, 377 So.2d 634, 637 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied 377 So.2d 639 (Ala.1979).
While a portion of Colbert County Sheriff's Investigator Ronnie May's testimony did constitute hearsay in that he was testifying to information which he had received from the victim, the overruling of defense counsel's objection and motion to exclude was not reversible error. This same information had previously been adduced, without objection, when defense counsel on cross examination of the witness asked, "How do you explain that that bullet hole is there?" Furthermore, the victim had already testified to these same facts on both direct and cross examination. Under these circumstances, allowing Investigator May to testify to information that Mrs. Malone had given him was only harmless error where both Investigator May and Mrs. Malone had previously testified to the substance of this information before objection was made. Love v. State, 377 So.2d 8 (Ala.Cr.App.1979); Rule 45, Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The defendant argues that the trial judge committed reversible error in her oral charge to the jury. From the record:
(emphasis added)
At trial defense counsel made the following objection:
"And the defendant objects also to that part of the oral charge wherein the Court charged that if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense as charged you cannot find the defendant not guilty."
No matter how conclusive the evidence, the trial court may not direct a verdict of guilt in whole or in part. United States v. Ragsdale, 438 F.2d 21, 27, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919, 91 S.Ct. 2231, 29 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971).
Arnold v. State, 29 Ala. 46, 50 (1856).
Roberts v. State, 36 Ala.App. 491, 494, 59 So.2d 821 (1952); Brasher v. State, 21 Ala.App. 360, 108 So. 266 (1926). The defense in this case was alibi. Where there is evidence of an alibi offered by the defendant, the trial court may not instruct the jury that if they believe the State's witnesses, the defendant is guilty. State v. Connelly, 5 N.J.Misc. 393, 136 A. 603 (1927); Anno., 72 A.L.R. 899, 910 (1927).
The charge should not have been given. Clemmons v. State, 167 Ala. 20, 52 So. 467 (1910); Amos v. State, 73 Ala. 498 (1883). However, the fact that isolated instructions are erroneous or misleading is no ground for reversal where the instructions as a whole present the case properly. Johnson v. State, 81 Ala. 54, 1 So. 573 (1886). Where a portion of the oral charge is erroneous or misleading, the whole charge may be looked to, and the entire charge must be construed together to see if there be reversible error. Gosa v. State, 273 Ala. 346, 139 So.2d 321 (1962); Baugh v. State, 218 Ala. 87, 117 So. 426 (1928); Stewart v. State, 381 So.2d 214 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 381 So.2d 220 (Ala.1979); Standard v. State, 51 Ala.App. 176, 283 So.2d 627 (1973); Barber v. State, 11 Ala.App. 118, 65 So. 842 (1914).
Looking to the entire oral charge, we find that the objectionable character of the portion objected to was cured and that the objection advanced on appeal is not well taken. The misleading quality of the court's instruction is self-correcting when considered in the context of the entire oral charge when the charge is considered as a whole and when each instruction is considered in connection with the others. We think it a reasonable assumption that the jury took a common sense view of the instructions and gave to them their plainly apparent meaning.
Additionally, we find that the objection made at trial misses its intended mark and fails to preserve any error for review. An exception to an oral charge must be taken and reserved to the particular language the exceptor conceives to be erroneous. Allford v. State, 31 Ala.App. 62, 65, 12 So.2d 404, cert. denied, 244 Ala. 148, 12 So.2d 407 (1943). "A reservation to...
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