Harris v. State

• Decision Date: 10 April 1913
• Citation: 8 Ala.App. 33,62 So. 477
• Parties: HARRIS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

62 So. 477

8 Ala.App. 33

HARRIS v. STATE.

Court of Appeals of Alabama

April 10, 1913

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1913

Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County; C.P. Almon, Judge.

Lucien Harris was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion. The following charges were refused defendant:

"(3) If you are reasonably satisfied from all the evidence in this case that Lucien Harris killed Zophus Jackson in self-defense, as I have defined self-defense to you in my charge to you, it is your duty to acquit."

"(6) If you are reasonably satisfied from all the evidence in this case that at the time of the killing Lucien Harris was under duress of such mental disease as that he could not resist the impulse to shoot Zophus Jackson, and that the shooting of Jackson was related to the mental disease closely in cause and effect, then you should acquit him on his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

"(7) If there is a probability of the innocence of defendant from all the evidence, then you should acquit him."

E.B Almon, of Sheffield, and Travis Williams, of Russellville, for appellant.

R.C. Brickell, Atty. Gen., and W.L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

WALKER, P.J.

The case was tried on issues joined on the defendant's pleas of "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity."

So far as the record discloses, there was no eyewitness of the killing; but there was evidence of an admission by the defendant that he killed the deceased by shooting him with buckshot, and also evidence as to the location of the body of the deceased, as it was found shortly after the shooting was heard by a witness who was some distance away, as to some gun wadding being found near a tree about 10 steps distant from the body of the deceased, and as to the finding where some twigs had been shot between that tree and where the body was lying. In connection with this evidence it was permissible to prove by a witness, who visited the scene not long after the killing, that footprints were found about the tree above referred to. This circumstance was such a one as might especially in connection with other circumstances deposed to, shed light on the relative positions of the defendant and the deceased at the time of the shooting. It was a question for the jury whether the probative value of this evidence was impaired or destroyed by the fact, subsequently brought out, that a number of other persons had been about the scene of the shooting before the witness got there.

The appellant cannot complain of the action of the court in sustaining the objection to the question to the witness Henry Harris as to whether the defendant talked and acted like a rational man, as the question was practically answered by the admitted testimony of the witness, describing the appearance and demeanor of the defendant after he experienced the trouble which is claimed to have unbalanced his mind, and which included an explicit statement of the opinion of the witness that the defendant was insane. It is equally plain that the effect of sustaining objections to questions asked the witness Marion Mason was not to deprive the defendant of any testimony to which he was entitled. The witness was permitted to describe at length the conduct of the defendant and the change that came over him, and was afforded an opportunity to express an opinion as to whether he was sane or insane.

The plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was sought to be supported by evidence of the defendant's becoming mentally unbalanced following and, as it was claimed, in consequence of his receipt of information of gross misconduct of the deceased towards the wife of the defendant while the latter was absent from his home, which was the scene of the misconduct reported to him. The utmost latitude was accorded to the defendant in permitting the introduction of testimony as to what was said to him after his return to his home by his wife and other inmates of the house in reference to the misbehavior of the deceased. Exceptions were reserved to the action of the court in sustaining objections to questions which sought to elicit testimony as to the movements of the deceased preceding and following his entry into the defendant's residence on the occasion of the alleged misbehavior. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that there could have been any basis for a claim that the defendant was subjected to a mentally disturbing influence otherwise than by his receipt of information as to what had occurred in his home during his absence; and the court properly declined to permit the introduction of evidence as to what the deceased did elsewhere before or after the occurrence in the defendant's residence. The matters sought to be elicited by the questions referred to were without any relevancy or pertinency to any issue in the case, either the one raised by the plea of not guilty, or the one raised by the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. They could shed no light on the inquiry as to the defendant's guilt or innocence if he was mentally responsible, or on the inquiry as to his sanity or insanity.

The defendant, as a witness in his own behalf, testified that it was about an hour and a half after he left his home to go after his cows that he met the deceased at the spring near which the killing occurred. What he was doing before he reached the spring was not a part of the res gestae, and he was not entitled to testify as to his movements during that time. Ferguson v. State, 134 Ala. 63,

32 So. 760, 92 Am.St.Rep. 17. Plainly it was not permissible for him to state what was his undisclosed motive in going to the spring.

Certainly it cannot be said that it is clearly made to appear that the court was in error in overruling the...