Harris v. State

Docket Number22-02478-MSN-tmp
Decision Date27 September 2022
PartiesQUANNAH HARRIS, d/b/a LAST MINUTE CUTS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF TENNESSEE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES DIVISION and JUDGE MATTIELYN WILLIAMS, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

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QUANNAH HARRIS, d/b/a LAST MINUTE CUTS, Plaintiff,
v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES DIVISION and JUDGE MATTIELYN WILLIAMS, Defendants.

No. 22-02478-MSN-tmp

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

September 27, 2022


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TU M. PHAM, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Office of the Tennessee Secretary of State Administrative Procedures Division (“APD”) and Administrative Law Judge Mattielyn Williams on August 29, 2022.[1](ECF No. 10.) Pro se plaintiff Quannah Harris filed an Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on September 7, 2022. (ECF No. 11.) For the reasons below, it is recommended that defendants' motion to dismiss be granted.

I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

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Quannah Harris is a barber in Memphis, Tennessee. (ECF No. 7.) She is the master barber instructor and owner of Last Minute Cuts School of Barbering and Cosmetology (“Last Minute Cuts”). (Id.) Harris's claims in this case arise from an ongoing dispute regarding her school's licensure. This dispute has spanned across many years of state administrative proceedings and multiple federal lawsuits.

The events underlying Harris's allegations date back to 2017.

That year, Harris was alleged to have violated the regulations governing barber and cosmetology schools. (ECF No. 7-1.) As a result, the Tennessee Board of Cosmetology and Barber Examiners (“Board”) issued an Agreed Order and Statement of Understanding outlining a compliance plan that served as a “compromise and settlement” of the claims. (Id. at PageID 50.) Harris subsequently challenged the Board's actions in a federal lawsuit filed on September 14, 2018. Harris v. Biddle, No. 18-2631-MSN-tmp, 2019 WL 6222280, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6219544. There, Harris alleged that inspectors had given her school unfavorable inspection reports as a result of an extortion scheme involving demands for money and sexual favors. Id. The court considered her substantive due process claims and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Harris v. Biddle, No. 18-2631-MSN-tmp, 2020 WL 3980816, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2020),

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report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1558118.

Meanwhile, adjudication of the dispute continued administratively. Between May 2018 and November 2018, and again in March 2021, inspectors reported that Harris's school exhibited numerous violations of Tennessee's cosmetology and barber regulations. (ECF No. 10-3 at PageID 80-87.) As a result, a Notice of Hearing and Charges was filed on July 1, 2021. (Id. at PageID 77.) Harris then filed her second federal lawsuit. Harris v. Barnes, No. 21-2717-JTF-tmp, 2022 WL 2706174, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 25, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2046106. There, she made several new allegations against both the Board and its inspectors. Id. However, the administrative adjudication of her claims remained ongoing at that point. In recognition of this, the district court ultimately abstained from hearing her claims under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Id. Harris's federal case was administratively closed pending the resolution of the ongoing proceedings. Id.

On December 6, 2021, the Board convened a disciplinary hearing to address the administrative complaints that had been opened against Harris's school. (ECF No. 10-3.) Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mattielyn Williams, one of the defendants in the present case, presided over the hearing. (Id.) Harris was also present. (Id.) As a result of the hearing, the Board found that Harris had

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violated several applicable statutes and regulations. (Id.) Consequently, it revoked Harris's cosmetology and barber school licenses. (Id.)

On February 7, 2022, Harris responded to the revocation by filing a petition for review in the Chancery Court of Shelby County. (ECF No. 10-4.) The petition named the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance, and the Board as defendants. (Id.) It also initially named the APD. (Id.) However, the Chancery Court dismissed the claim as to that defendant, finding that “the APD's only role in the case below was to provide an administrative judge” to preside over the Board's hearing. (ECF No. 10-6 at PageID 125.) Harris's claims against the other defendants remain pending in the Chancery Court. (ECF No. 10-5.)

The Chancery Court's dismissal prompted the filing of Harris's third federal lawsuit, which is the subject of the present motion to dismiss. In her amended complaint, Harris names the APD and ALJ Williams as defendants. (ECF No. 7.) Her action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) Harris claims that ALJ Williams, acting on behalf of the APD, prevented Harris from having a fair hearing on her school's licensure because she “acted in corruption” and “failed to impartially oversee a hearing.” (ECF No. 7 at PageID 35.) She alleges that ALJ Williams admitted and relied on inadmissible evidence, refused to admit exculpatory evidence, and

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declined to hear Harris's motion. (ECF No. 7.) Additionally, Harris writes that ALJ Williams “asked personal favors and/or special accommodations from the Board's attorney, Michael Underhill” and that she “had secret meetings and or conversations regarding Harris' case.” (Id. at PagelD 35-36.) For all these reasons, Harris alleges that ALJ Williams “clearly failed to make a decision free from personal bias.” (Id. at PageID 35.) Harris only seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at PageID 45-47.)

The defendants filed their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on August 29, 2022. (ECF No. 10-1.) They argue that the claims against the APD should be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds and that those against ALJ Williams should be dismissed based on absolute judicial immunity. (Id.) Alternatively, they ask the court to abstain from hearing Harris's claims under Younger v. Harris due to ongoing state judicial proceedings. (Id.)

Harris filed an opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss on September 7, 2022. (ECF No. 11.) Harris argues that ALJ Williams is not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because she acted “in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution.” (ECF No. 11-1 at PageID 145.) Regarding Younger abstention, she argues that the presence of two exceptional circumstances exempt her from the doctrine's application: bad faith and harassment, and the lack of an adequate state forum. (Id. at PageID 142.) Harris does not

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respond to the defendants' arguments based on the Eleventh Amendment.

II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Standard of Review

Defendants bring their motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction; they can adjudicate only those claims authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland, 695 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2012). A challenge to this court's subject matter jurisdiction can come in two forms. A facial attack accepts the material allegations of the complaint as true but insists nonetheless that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). A factual attack claims that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction regardless of what the plaintiff has pleaded and requires the trial court to weigh the evidence before it in determining whether that is the case. Id. The present case involves a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction.

Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed.” Otworth v. Budnik, 594 Fed.Appx. 859, 861 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)). However, “the lenient treatment generally

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accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991)). Even pro se plaintiffs must present fair notice of claims against the defendants that are within the court's jurisdiction. Miller v. Countrywide Home Loans, 747 F.Supp.2d 947, 953 (S.D. Ohio 2010).

B. Claims Against the APD

Defendants first argue that the claims against the APD must be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment proscribes “a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant” unless the State has waived its sovereign immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldernman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); see also Haertel v. Mich. Dep't of Corrs., No. 20-1904, 2021 WL 4271908, at *3 (6th Cir. May 11, 2021). This prohibition includes “all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments.” Id. (quoting Thiokol Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotations omitted). Tennessee has not waived its sovereign immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102. The Eleventh Amendment therefore bars suit against any of its agencies, such as the APD.

Further, Harris's claims against the APD are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is not applicable to states. Dulai v. Mich. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 71 Fed.Appx. 479, 481 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing

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Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989) (“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983)). Since Harris sued a state agency under § 1983, her claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and not cognizable under § 1983. It is therefore recommended that her claims against the APD be dismissed.

C. Claims Against ALJ Williams

Defendants next argue...

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