Harris v. State

Decision Date25 May 1971
Docket NumberNo. 1070S247,1070S247
PartiesWilliam E. HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

John V. Hampton, Muncie, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., J. Frank Hanley, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

HUNTER, Judge.

Appellant was charged by affidavit in the Delaware Circuit Court with the crime of armed robbery and robbery. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty as charged and appellant was sentenced to the Indiana Reformatory for a determinate period of ten (10) years.

The sole question before this court is the trial court's alleged error in denying appellant's motion for discharge, he having been detained in jail in excess of six months prior to trial. The facts upon which said error is bottomed may be briefly summarized as follows. Appellant was arrested on the robbery charge, filed August 7, 1969, on August 8; the charging affidavit was amended on August 28, 1969 to include the charge of armed robbery. On September 2, 1969 arraignment was conducted and appellant entered a plea of not-guilty. Appellant's co-defendant was arraigned on September 24, 1969 and it was at this time that trial was set for March 2, 1970. When the trial judge announced the trial date, he noted for the record the fact that the trial date set was at odds with Rule CR. 4(A), it being in excess of six months from the date the appellant was arrested, but indicated that the delay was necessary due to his busy trial schedule. No further action was taken in the case until the day of trial, March 2, 1970, such date being approximately six (6) days short of seven (7) months from the date of appellant's arrest.

The pertinent provision of our new Rule CR. 4 reads as follows:

'(A). Defendant in jail. No defendant shall be detained in jail on a charge, without a trial, for a continuous period embracing more than six (6) months from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge (which ever is later); except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall make such statement in a motion for continuance not later than ten (10) days prior to the date set for trial, or if such motion is files less than ten (10) days prior to trial, the prosecuting...

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21 cases
  • Gillie v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • July 9, 1984
    ...449 U.S. 881, 101 S.Ct. 231, 66 L.Ed.2d 105; Gill v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 160, 164, 368 N.E.2d 1159, 1162; Harris v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 464, 466, 269 N.E.2d 537, 539. "The reasonableness of such delay must be judged in the context of the particular case, and the decision of the trial ......
  • Summerlin v. State, 1070S257
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • July 19, 1971
    ...at the end of the six month period subject to the 'spirit of the rule' exception made previously by this court in Harris v. State (1971), Ind., 269 N.E.2d 537. After a delay, the defendant can still avail himself of the fifty judicial day rule, CR 4(B), and get his speedy trial. If he cause......
  • Fortson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • August 9, 1978
    ...3, 1977. Congestion of a trial court's calendar is a legitimate basis for extending the time periods of Rule 4. Harris v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 464, 269 N.E.2d 537; Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(B)(1), Supra. Thus, it was not error to grant this On December 28, 1976, and before the trial date of January......
  • Dunville v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • August 20, 1979
    ...prosecuting attorney to bring it to the attention of the court by filing the motion provided for in Rule 4(B)(1). See Harris v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 464, 269 N.E.2d 537. However, appellant attempts to distinguish Gill by arguing that neither the prosecutor nor the court showed in the reco......
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