Harris v. State

• Decision Date: 27 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 83A01–1509–CR–1311.,83A01–1509–CR–1311.
• Citation: 60 N.E.3d 1070
• Parties: Lisa R. HARRIS, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

60 N.E.3d 1070

Lisa R. HARRIS, Appellant–Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 83A01–1509–CR–1311.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

July 27, 2016.

Larry Crawford Thomas, Clinton, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Larry D. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

ROBB

, Judge.

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Lisa Harris appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained from a consent search during a seat belt enforcement stop. Concluding the officer lacked an independent basis of

reasonable suspicion justifying inquiry above and beyond the seat belt violation, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 25, 2014, Indiana State Police Trooper Mike Organ was parked outside a gas station in Clinton, Indiana, when he observed the driver and passenger of a passing vehicle were not wearing seat belts. Trooper Organ pulled out of the parking lot, and the vehicle abruptly turned onto an adjacent street. Trooper Organ followed the vehicle, activated his emergency lights, and initiated a traffic stop. Trooper Organ approached the driver's side and first asked the driver for identification. The driver produced her driver's license, which indicated her name was Lisa Harris. Trooper Organ immediately recognized her name as appearing on National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx) reports “in the past.” Transcript at 7.¹ Trooper Organ then asked Harris “where she was going, and where she was coming from.” Id. at 8. Harris stated she was going to a gas station. When Trooper Organ pointed out she had just passed a gas station and turned onto a street with no gas stations, Harris revised her answer, stating she was actually on her way to apply for food stamps. When Trooper Organ again pointed out Harris was traveling away from her purported destination, Harris's passenger stated they saw Trooper Organ pull out of the parking lot and turned in order to avoid him. Trooper Organ noticed Harris appeared “overly excited” during this brief exchange, so he asked “if there was anything inside of the vehicle that [he] needed to know about[.]” Id. at 8–9. Harris stated, “absolutely not.” Id. at 9.

[3] Trooper Organ returned to his police vehicle to check Harris's driving status, determine whether she had any outstanding warrants, and confirm Harris's name appeared on NPLEx. Harris had a valid driver's license and did not have any outstanding warrants, but NPLEx indicated Harris had purchased pseudoephedrine nine times in the past year.² Her most recent purchase occurred four days prior to the traffic stop. With this information, Trooper Organ returned to Harris and asked her to speak with him in his police vehicle. Harris agreed. When Trooper Organ asked Harris if she purchased cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine

on November 21, 2014, Harris admitted she had, “for her nose.” Id. at 12. He then asked where the pills were. Harris stated the pills were at her house, but when Trooper Organ asked if she could provide proof of this, Harris admitted the pills were no longer in her possession because she sold them for $20.

[4] Trooper Organ obtained Harris's consent to search her vehicle and its contents. Inside Harris's purse, he discovered a baggie of white powder that field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Harris claimed she forgot about the methamphetamine and admitted she regularly smokes methamphetamine. Trooper Organ cited both Harris and her passenger for failure to wear a seat belt but arrested only Harris. The State charged Harris with possession of methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony. Harris filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. The trial court certified the order for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B)

.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[5] We review the denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar to reviewing the sufficiency of evidence. Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind.2013)

. We do not reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling, as well as undisputed evidence favorable to the defendant. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind.2014). “We defer to a trial court's determination of historical fact, but we review de novo whether those facts constitute reasonable suspicion.” Johnson v. State, 21 N.E.3d 841, 844 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied. “The record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision.” State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind.2006).

II. Motion to Suppress

[6] Harris contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because Trooper Organ's investigation above and beyond the seat belt violation contravened Indiana's Seatbelt Enforcement Act (“Act”). We agree. Although a vehicle may be stopped to determine compliance with the Act, “a vehicle, the contents of a vehicle, the driver of a vehicle, or a passenger in a vehicle may not be inspected, searched, or detained solely because of a violation of [the Act].” Ind.Code § 9–19–10–3.1(a)

(emphasis added). “[T]he Act simply does not permit investigatory behavior based solely on a seat belt violation unless circumstances arise after the stop that independently provide the officer with reasonable suspicion of other crimes.” State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Ind.2010).

[7] In Richardson, a police officer initiated a traffic stop based solely on her observation of the defendant driving unrestrained by a seat belt. The officer immediately recognized Richardson from a prior traffic stop and recalled no violence or resistance during that encounter. Richardson was cooperative and readily admitted the seat belt violation, but the officer noticed “a very large, unusual bulge” in Richardson's pocket. Id. at 381

. When the officer asked Richardson what was in his pocket, Richardson said he was carrying a handgun. The officer requested Richardson's gun permit and ran a criminal background check, which revealed Richardson had a prior conviction for possession of cocaine as a Class D felony. The officer arrested Richardson for possession of a firearm with a prior felony conviction within the past fifteen years. Another officer searched Richardson incident to that arrest and discovered cocaine on his person. The State charged Richardson with dealing in cocaine, among other charges. Prior to trial, Richardson filed a motion to suppress the cocaine. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appealed. Our supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling because the officer's observation of an “unusual bulge” failed to provide an independent basis of reasonable suspicion that would justify further inquiry during the seat belt enforcement stop. Id. at 384.

[8] By contrast, in State v. Morris, 732 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.Ct.App.2000)

, the defendant failed to produce his driver's license during a seat belt enforcement stop, which prompted the officer to run a license check. The license check revealed Morris's driving privileges had been suspended, and the officer asked Morris to step out of his vehicle. As Morris did so, the officer detected an odor of alcohol on his breath. Morris admitted he had been drinking and agreed to submit to a chemical breath test, which revealed an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.10 grams. The State charged Morris with driving while suspended and operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Morris filed a motion to suppress, arguing the evidence was obtained in violation of the Act. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and we reversed, holding (1) the officer was justified in requesting Morris's license because it was reasonably necessary to issue a citation for failure to wear a seat belt, and (2) that Morris's failure to produce his driver's license was a circumstance independent of the initial seat belt violation:

Upon learning that Morris did not have a driver's license with him, Officer Huskins ran a license check and discovered that Morris's license was suspended. Morris's failure to produce his license was a circumstance independent of the initial seatbelt violation, which provided Officer Huskins with reasonable suspicion that Morris might not have a valid driver's license. After determining that Morris's license was suspended, Officer Huskins acted reasonably in requesting that Morris exit the vehicle, because he could not allow Morris to continue driving on a suspended license. When Morris exited the vehicle and Officer Huskins detected the odor of alcoholic beverage on Morris's breath, a second circumstance independent of the seatbelt stop arose, which led to Officer Huskins's reasonable suspicion that Morris was driving under the influence.

Id at 228

.

[9] We conclude the facts of the present case are more akin to that in Richardson because Trooper Organ's only basis for additional questioning was his recollection of Harris's name appearing on NPLEx.³ NPLEx is a database used by retailers and law enforcement to track and regulate sales of over-the-counter medications containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. Tr. at 7

; see also

Montgomery v. State, 22 N.E.3d 768, 775 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied. Indiana Code section 35–48–4–14.7(e) provides a person may not purchase medications containing more than:

(1) three and six-tenths (3.6) grams of ephedrine

or pseudoephedrine, or both, on one (1) day;

(2) seven and two-tenths (7.2) grams of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, or both, in a thirty (30) day period; or

(3) sixty-one and two-tenths (61.2) grams of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, or both, in a three hundred sixty-five (365) day period.

In order to enforce these limits, Indiana Code section 35–48–4–14.7(d)

imposes certain requirements on pharmacies and other retailers. Relevant here, retailers shall submit the following information to NPLEx before completing...