Harris v. State
| Decision Date | 21 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3206,3206 |
| Parties | NICHOLAS HARRIS v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. 03-K-09-004384
UNREPORTED
Meredith,* Kehoe, Gould, JJ.
Opinion by Meredith, J.
*Meredith, Timothy E., J., now retired, participated in the hearing of this case while an active member of this Court, and after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and the preparation of this opinion.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
On July 2, 2010, a jury found Nicholas Harris, appellant, guilty of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, and other related offenses. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, with all but 50 years suspended. In an unreported opinion, this Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court on direct appeal. Nicholas Jermaine Harris v. State, No. 1706, September Term 2010 (filed July 31, 2012).
On August 8, 2016, Mr. Harris filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and that the State had withheld material impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The post-conviction court denied relief. This Court granted Mr. Harris's application for leave to file this appeal.
Mr. Harris presents these four issues (which we have reordered) for our review:
For the reasons set forth herein, we agree that Mr. Harris should be granted the right to file a belated motion for modification of his sentence, and we shall remand for further proceedings in that regard. Otherwise, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.
On August 9, 2009, Mr. Harris—who was then 15-years-old—along with three other teenagers, were accused of sexually assaulting a woman at knifepoint. Mr. Harris was the first to have intercourse with the woman. When confronted by the police, Mr. Harris did not deny having sex, but contended that it was consensual. One of his three cohorts, however, corroborated the woman's account that she did not consent, but was raped.
Mr. Harris was charged with multiple offenses, including rape in the first-degree and sexual offense in the first-degree. Because both rape in the first-degree and sexual offense in the first-degree are crimes punishable by life imprisonment, Mr. Harris was charged as an adult despite his youth at the time of the offenses.1
CP § 4-202(d) states that the circuit court, when "determining whether to transfer jurisdiction" to juvenile court, "shall consider" the following five factors:
"The burden is on the juvenile to demonstrate that under these five factors, transfer to the juvenile system is in the best interest of the juvenile or society." Whaley v. State, 186 Md. App. 429, 444 (2009). See generally Gaines v. State, 201 Md. App. 1, 9-11 (2011) ().
At the reverse waiver hearing, counsel for Mr. Harris relied upon reports that had been submitted to the court by Renetta Cole, an employee of the Department of Juvenile Services ("DJS") responsible for preparing waiver summaries for juveniles charged with various crimes. She recommended that the circuit court waive jurisdiction and transfer the case from the criminal system into the juvenile system. Ms. Cole testified at the hearing as the only witness. It was her opinion that Mr. Harris was amenable to treatment in the juvenile system. She explained that his age and his amenability to treatment were the two statutory factors under CP § 4-202(d) which weighed in his favor. She explained that he "was cooperative," that his parents "were cooperative and supportive of him," that he was only "15 years old," and that he had had "no prior contacts either formal or informal in the juvenile judicial system." But she conceded that, under CP § 4-202(d), three of the five factors weighed against waiving jurisdiction into the juvenile system; she acknowledged that the serious nature of the alleged crime, the possible danger to public safety, and the fact that Mr. Harris had no mental or physical impairments all weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction in the criminal system.
At the end of the reverse waiver hearing, the court agreed that Mr. Harris's age would "mitigate in his favor." But the court was not persuaded by Ms. Cole's recommendation that Mr. Harris would be amenable to treatment if the case was transferred, and the court emphasized the court's "responsibility to protect the public and in this situation to make a determination of where this juvenile or how this defendant should be treated." The court denied the motion for transfer, stating: "[S]ince the defense bears the burden, the request for reverse waiver is denied."
On June 30, 2010, the case proceeded to trial. At trial, Mr. Harris's trial counsel made the following argument to the court with respect to his discovery request for impeachment information about the complaining witness pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(6): "[I]n my request for discovery, I asked for all information in reference to [the victim], in reference to arrests, outstanding warrants, criminal record and in the State's discovery they refer[red] me to [the Maryland Case Search] site." Mr. Harris's trial counsel argued that the State failed to provide the discovery that was required. But the witness was permitted to testify.
During closing argument, in rebuttal, the prosecutor responded to concern that the jury might be motivated by sympathy for Mr. Davis on account of his youthful age, telling the jury that it would be "human of you" to say "come on, he is only 15; . . . look what he is facing here." The prosecutor followed that up by saying: The prosecutor reminded the jury that its job is to "apply the facts to the law" and to "uphold the law,"and urged the jury to "think of the only thing that makes sense" regarding what happened in the case. No objection to the argument was made at trial.
After the jury found Mr. Harris guilty, Mr. Harris's trial counsel filed a motion for a new trial. That motion was denied, and the court sentenced him as follows: on the count of first-degree rape, life imprisonment, suspend all but 50 years; on the count of first-degree sex offense, 50 years concurrent; on the count of false imprisonment, 10 years concurrent, all to be followed by 5 years of supervised probation upon his release. Immediately after the announcement of the sentences, defense counsel advised Mr. Harris as follows on the record:
Mr. Harris, you have 90 days to ask the judge to reconsider his sentence, 30 days to file an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and 30 days to ask a three judge panel to review your sentence. The three judge panel may increase your sentence, may decrease your sentence or leave it the same. They may consult with [the trial judge] but he would not be on that panel. If you wish to exercise any of those rights, you must do so by notifying the clerk of the Court in writing.
On September 14, 2010, Mr. Harris's trial counsel filed a notice of appeal. As noted above, this Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court on direct appeal.
On August 8, 2016, Mr. Harris filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding impeachment evidence of the victim's prior criminal conduct. On August 1, 2018, a hearing was held. On September 12, 2018, the circuit court denied all of Mr.Harris's claims for...
To continue reading
Request your trial