Harris v. State
Decision Date | 08 February 1988 |
Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
Citation | 743 S.W.2d 822,294 Ark. 484 |
Parties | Robert Earl HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 87-171. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Tami Harlan, Little Rock, for appellant.
Theodore Holder, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
This is a criminal case in which appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated robbery and theft of property. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and robbery convictions and ten years for the theft crime. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred in finding he voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights and in admitting his confession into evidence. Appellant's contentions are wholly without merit, and we affirm.
We first dispose of appellant's argument that the waiver of rights form he signed failed to meet the requirements under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) because it did not reflect that he had the right to an attorney at no cost. See Mayfield v. State, 293 Ark. 216, 736 S.W.2d 12 (1987) ( ). Appellant never raised this specific objection at trial, and he cannot change the grounds for an objection on appeal. See Halfacre v. State, 290 Ark. 312, 718 S.W.2d 945 (1986); Vasquez v. State, 287 Ark. 473-A, 702 S.W.2d 411 (1986). We also note that appellant failed to abstract any waiver form for our review, and the appellee, in furnishing its supplemental abstract, abstracted a form that the appellant previously had executed in connection with a breaking and entering charge and not the crimes involved here. In sum, however, we do not address this issue since it is raised for the first time on appeal. See e.g. Puckett v. Puckett, 289 Ark. 67, 709 S.W.2d 82 (1986).
Appellant's actual argument below was that he did not knowingly and voluntarily sign the waiver form because of his low IQ, and while he knew what a lawyer was, he failed to understand the terms of the waiver or the word "attorney" when he was read his rights. He further contended that his confession was the result of an officer's threat "to stick appellant with a needle to make him pass out and to fry him until his eyes popped out." Appellant's testimony concerning the waiver form and his confession was rebutted by the testimony of law enforcement Officers Beaver and Thomas.
Thomas testified that he arrested appellant, and after taking him to the Little Rock Police Department, he placed him in an interrogation room, where the appellant remained by himself for about three hours. Both Thomas and Beaver then joined the appellant in the interrogation room, where they advised him of his rights, and after the appellant signed the waiver form, the officers said the appellant began making a statement. The officers denied all of appellant's allegations that he had been threatened or offered promises. They also testified that appellant gave no indication that he failed to understand his Miranda rights.
While the state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of an in-custodial confession, any conflict in the testimony of different witnesses is for the trial court to resolve Harvey v. State, 272 Ark. 19, 611 S.W.2d 762 (1981), and the finding of the trial court will not be set aside unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See Stone v. State, 290 Ark. 204, 718 S.W.2d 102 (1980); Walters v. State, 267 Ark. 155, 621 S.W.2d 468 (1979). In our review of the conflicting testimony given in this cause, we are unable to say the trial court's finding that the appellant understood and voluntarily waived his rights and gave his confession was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
We also find no merit to appellant's argument that the evidence fails to support his convictions. Appellant gave varying accounts of his own contacts with the male victim who had been beaten to...
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