Harris v. State
| Decision Date | 27 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04-9602-PC-56,49A04-9602-PC-56 |
| Citation | 671 N.E.2d 864 |
| Parties | Ronnie L. HARRIS, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pro-se Petitioner-Appellant Ronnie Harris appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following his plea of guilty to the crimes of Rape, a Class A felony; 1 Confinement, a Class B felony; 2 Burglary, a Class B felony; 3 and Theft, a Class D felony. 4
We affirm the post-conviction court.
Harris presents several issues which we restate and consolidate as follows:
1. Whether Harris's guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily and whether the State complied with its side of the bargain.
2. Whether Harris received effective assistance of guilty plea counsel.
3. Whether the trial court erred in ordering that the current sentence be served consecutive to a sentence received for a crime Harris committed while in jail pending trial on the current charges.
During the early morning hours of August 25, 1989, the victim and her daughter were asleep in their home. At approximately 4:00 a.m. the victim was awakened when Harris put his hand over her mouth. Harris had broken into the victim's apartment through a rear window of the residence. While holding a sharp object to the victim's side, Harris forced her to fondle his penis and submit to intercourse. Harris threatened to stab the victim's daughter if she refused. The victim did as she was told, fearing for her safety and the safety of her daughter. As Harris completed the attack, he told the victim to stay in bed for ten minutes, or he would stab her.
During the attack, the victim was able to get to a phone to call the police. She gave a description to the police dispatcher, and officers were immediately dispatched to the scene. While en route, Officer D. Tippit observed a subject who matched the description given by the victim. The subject, who was later identified as Harris, was apprehended. 5 Harris had several items that belonged to the victim in his possession.
As a result of this incident, Harris was charged with rape, confinement, burglary and theft. Several months later, the State filed an habitual offender charge against Harris. Harris initially pled not guilty; however, he withdrew that plea on the morning of trial, and entered a plea of guilty. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Harris pled guilty to all four charges initially filed and the State agreed to forego prosecution of the habitual offender charge. The State further agreed to make no sentencing recommendation.
Harris received a thirty year sentence for his rape conviction, ten years for his confinement conviction, ten years for his burglary conviction and two years for the theft conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently. Harris now appeals.
Harris contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered for several reasons. Indiana has long recognized that a defendant may forego a trial before a jury of his peers and plead guilty. A criminally accused is afforded "the right to elect as to whether he will stand trial or plead guilty." Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Ind.1996) (citing Abraham et al. v. State, 228 Ind. 179, 185, 91 N.E.2d 358, 360 (1950)). Harris raises issues regarding both requirements for a valid guilty plea: waiver of his constitutional and statutory rights, and the existence of an adequate factual basis.
Under the rules of post-conviction relief, the petitioner must establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1; Channell v. State, 658 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) reh'g denied, trans. denied. To prevail on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the trial court. Id.
First, Harris contends that the trial court erred by accepting his guilty plea when he maintained his innocence. At the guilty plea hearing, the State summarized the events that purportedly took place the night of the crime, and Harris agreed to the factual basis presented. Harris further stated that he did not wish to make any corrections, and that he wished to plead guilty. After concluding that an adequate factual basis was presented, and that Harris understood the nature of the charges against him, the court accepted his plea of guilty.
Prior to sentencing, however, Harris told the probation officer completing his presentence report that he did not rape the victim. Specifically, the presentence report reveals as follows:
[Harris] stated that he was forced by time and by the fact no defense for him has been undertaken, to sign a plea agreement. He stated further that he was not guilty as charged in the Information; he admitted that a sexual act had taken place but described it as a consensual act, one agreed to by Ms. Hayes as an exchange for money owed the defendant for drugs that he had sold to her.
(R. 58). At the sentencing hearing, the court questioned Harris extensively regarding the comments he made to the probation officer which found their way into the presentence report. The following colloquy took place:
(R. 93-96). Harris then went on to express his disenchantment with his attorney, and said that his attorney had no argument for his defense, so "what [was he] supposed to do?" (R. 97).
Our review of the guilty plea hearing reveals that when asked if the State's recitation of the offense accurately depicted what happened, Harris responded, "[b]asically, yes, ma'am." (R. 88). When asked if he wished to make any corrections to the State's evidence, Harris responded that he did not.
In North Carolina v. Alford, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a court could accept a guilty plea when it is accompanied by protestations of innocence and hence contains only a waiver of trial but no admission of guilt. 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Alford, who had been charged with murder, took the stand and testified that he had not committed the murder, but that he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do so. The Court said that "while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty." Alford, 400 U.S. at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 167. Specifically, the Court held that the fact that a criminally accused maintains his innocence should not be a bar to his entering and the court accepting a guilty plea. Id. at 37-39, 91 S.Ct. at 167-68. The Court said that its holding did not, of course, prevent the individual States from barring its courts from accepting guilty pleas from defendants who assert their innocence. Id. at 38, n. 11, 91 S.Ct. at 168, n. 11. Indiana did precisely that: The acceptance of a guilty plea when the defendant contemporaneously maintains his innocence is prohibited in Indiana; hence, we do not recognize the so-called "best interest" plea.
Although there were several...
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