Harris v. State

• Citation: 723 So.2d 546
• Decision Date: 12 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 94-CT-00837-SCT.,94-CT-00837-SCT.
• Parties: Roger B. HARRIS v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

723 So.2d 546

Roger B. HARRIS v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 94-CT-00837-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 12, 1997.

Rehearing Denied September 24, 1998.

Merrida Coxwell, Charles R. Mullins, Keyes Danks Coxwell & Leonard, Jackson, for Appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, DeWitt T. Allred, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for Appellee.

En Banc.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

McRAE, Justice, for the Court:

After granting Roger Harris's petition for writ of certiorari, we are asked to address the propriety of Harris's conviction in the Circuit Court of Hinds County on three counts of aggravated assault, which were entered after the trial court granted a directed verdict on charges of deliberate design murder and allowed the prosecution to proceed on the unindicted charge. Upon careful review, this Court is of the opinion that the trial judge erred by allowing the State to go forward with its case after granting Harris a directed verdict on the charges of deliberate design murder. We will therefore reverse and render Harris's conviction for aggravated assault.

I.

Roger Harris owned and managed a nightclub called "Club Colours," located on Mill Street in Jackson, Mississippi. In the early morning hours of November 14, 1993, Harris was crossing Mill Street on foot when a black Jeep Cherokee, driven by Harold Williamson, came toward him. In the Cherokee with Harold were his wife Sarah, his brother, Hosea, and his wife Doris.

As the Cherokee proceeded north on Mill Street, Harris, feeling that the driver was purposefully trying to injure him, fired at the Cherokee with a .357 magnum handgun. The gunshot hit Doris Williamson in her back. After realizing that Harris's shot had struck his wife, Hosea Williamson then exited the Cherokee and began walking toward Harris. As Hosea walked toward Harris, Harris asked him not to come any closer. Hosea continued toward Harris, and Harris shot him in the leg. Pandemonium ensued.

Several shots were fired from the Cherokee, which was about a block away from Harris. Harold then spun the Cherokee around in an attempt to go back and pick up the injured Hosea. In the process, the Cherokee hit several vehicles parked in the area, including Harris's Blazer and a car owned by Barry Alexander, who was inside Club Colours. Harris stopped firing his weapon, and Harold Williamson attempted to get Hosea into the Cherokee.

After realizing that his vehicle had been hit by the Cherokee, Alexander ran out of the nightclub, went to the trunk of his car, retrieved an AK-47 assault rifle, and opened fire in the direction of the Cherokee, shooting continuously as the Cherokee drove away. Doug Williams, another patron of Club Colours, also rushed outside and began firing a nine-millimeter handgun at the Cherokee, which eventually came to a stop at the corner of the block.

In the aftermath of the shootout, Doris, Harold, and Hosea Williamson died of gunshot wounds inflicted by a high-velocity weapon or weapons. Sarah Williamson was not injured. A Hinds County grand jury indicted Harris, Alexander, and Williams on three charges of deliberate design murder under § 97-3-19 of the Mississippi Code. The circuit court granted Harris's motion for severance, and his trial occurred on July 26, 1994.

At the trial, Dr. Rodrigo Galvez, expert for the State, testified that Doris, Harold, and Hosea Williamson were killed by a high-velocity weapon. The proof at trial, however, showed that Harris had fired a .357 magnum, which is not considered a high-velocity weapon. At the close of the State's case, Harris moved for a directed verdict based on a lack of evidence that he had caused the victims' deaths. The trial judge granted the directed verdict, but, over objection by the defense, the trial judge allowed the State to proceed on three counts of aggravated assault. Even though the aggravated assault charge was not included on the indictment, the trial judge reasoned that the aggravated assault charge was a lesser included offense of the deliberate design murder charge. The jury eventually convicted Harris of the three counts of aggravated assault and the judge sentenced him to three consecutive twenty-year prison sentences. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and we granted Harris's petition for writ of certiorari.

II.

Harris contends that after the trial court granted him a directed verdict of acquittal on deliberate design murder, the State should not have been allowed to proceed on the theory that aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of deliberate design murder. We agree. A trial court determination of insufficiency leading to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge in the indictment summarily concludes the State's case on that charge. If the State has made no other charges within the indictment, then the State is precluded from trying the defendant on a lesser included offense. It is well-settled that a court-directed verdict to the jury to find the defendant not guilty has the same effect as a jury-deliberated verdict of not guilty. McGraw v. State, 688 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1997). It follows, then, that a directed verdict on an indictment for murder is a bar to trying the defendant on aggravated assault, since he had not been indicted for the offense of aggravated assault.

The State argues in its brief to this Court that the authority of the trial judge to grant a directed verdict on one or more of the offenses charged allows a judge to grant a directed verdict specifically on the charge for which the defendant is being tried, but not necessarily the lesser included offenses of that charge. On the other hand, the defense basically argues that there is no difference between a judge's directed verdict and a jury's verdict of acquittal.

One essential distinction between the directed verdict and the jury verdict is that the jury has the option to return a verdict of guilty on a lesser and included offense, while the trial judge's directed verdict of acquittal can only be on the charge contained in the indictment. See State ex rel Robinson v. Blackburn, 367 So.2d 360, 362-63 (La.1979)

. The State would argue that this difference means that a judge's directed verdict of acquittal of deliberate design murder is "limited," making it only a legal holding as to the offense charged and leaving unanswered the question of the defendant's guilt on any lesser included offenses. In essence, the State maintains that a directed verdict, unlike a jury verdict, is only an acquittal of the offense charged, and not an acquittal of the lesser included offenses.

The difference between a directed verdict and a jury verdict lies only in the source; the effect of acquittal is the same in either case. Id. After trial has begun on a multiple count indictment for one crime, a directed verdict of acquittal on that crime, such as deliberate design murder, prevents the trial from continuing on a lesser included offense, such as aggravated assault, when the lesser included offense was not specifically pleaded in the indictment.

Our conclusion finds support in the logical premise that a judgment of acquittal, whether entered by jury verdict or by grant of a directed verdict, should be accorded equal weight and consequences. People v. McElroy, 208 Cal.App.3d 1415, 256 Cal.Rptr. 853, 858 (1989). A jury's verdict of acquittal on the charged...