Harris v. State, No. 1D00-3775

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: ERVIN, J.
• Citation: 879 So.2d 1223
• Decision Date: 26 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 1D00-3775, No. 1D00-4749.
• Parties: Morris HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

879 So.2d 1223

Morris HARRIS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee

Nos. 1D00-3775, 1D00-4749.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 26, 2002.

Opinions on Denial of Rehearing October 4, 2002.

879 So.2d 1224

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Robert S. Friedman, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

ERVIN, J.

These consolidated appeals raise various issues resulting from appellant's involuntary civil commitment as a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act (sections 394.910-931, Florida Statutes (1999)).¹ Case number 00-3775 is an appeal from a final order of involuntary commitment, and case number 00-4749 is an appeal from a post-judgment order denying appellant's motion to enforce. Because we reverse and remand on an issue which is common to both appeals, urging that the lower court erred in denying appellant's motion to enforce his plea agreement, we do not address the remaining points raised in these consolidated cases.

In the appeal from the order denying the motion to enforce the plea agreement and sentence, Harris claims the state breached the agreement after he had served practically all of the agreed-upon sentence, by filing a petition requesting that he be declared a sexually violent predator and civilly committed. Because we agree that the lower court erred in refusing to enforce the plea agreement, which was binding on both parties, we reverse the order of denial and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The plea agreement that Harris and the state entered into in 1995 provided that he

879 So.2d 1225

would be sentenced to a term of 15 years' imprisonment for the offense of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 16 years,² and, at the conclusion of seven years' incarceration, the remainder of the sentence would be suspended and he would be placed on probation with the special condition that he complete a sex offender treatment program. He alleged that the state violated the contract in that on May 27, 1999, four days before his tentative release date from prison, it filed a petition seeking his civil commitment under the Ryce Act. The lower court denied the motion to enforce, ruling that the state had not reneged on its earlier promises because at the time of the agreement in 1995, the Ryce Act had not yet been enacted into law;³ the civil commitment was an unforeseen, collateral consequence of the crime; and because the court found appellant was serving probation while awaiting trial in the civil proceeding.⁴ Shortly after the entry of this order, the case proceeded to nonjury trial, and after presentation of the evidence, the judge found by clear and convincing evidence that appellant was a sexually violent predator requiring civil commitment. Harris thereafter filed his appeal from the order denying enforcement of the plea agreement and the order civilly committing him

Florida courts have routinely held that a defendant who was not informed that he was subject to civil commitment under the Ryce Act is not entitled to withdraw a guilty or nolo contendere plea to a charged offense on the ground that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, because such commitment is deemed a collateral, not a direct consequence, of the plea. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 780 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Donovan v. State, 773 So.2d 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Pearman v. State, 764 So.2d 739 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Oce v. State, 742 So.2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), cause dismissed, 763 So.2d 1044 (Fla.2000); LaMonica v. State, 732 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Burkett v. State, 731 So.2d 695 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Collie v. State, 710 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Benitez v. State, 667 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). The case at bar, however, does not involve the issue of the voluntariness of Harris's plea. Rather, appellant asserts that the state breached the plea agreement, thereby requiring either that the agreement be specifically enforced, or that he be allowed to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.⁵

A case which is perhaps the most factually similar to that at bar is Acosta v. State, 784 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), involving the Third District's per curiam denial of Acosta's petition for writ of certiorari. As did Harris below, Acosta filed a motion for enforcement of the plea agreement, complaining that the state had reneged on its contractual obligation. The trial court denied the motion for the reason

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that commitment under the Ryce Act is civil rather than criminal. Acosta then sought certiorari review of the order. Although the majority's reasoning for its denial in Acosta is not set out, Judge Ramirez, in his concurring opinion, explained that Acosta argued that the state had violated the plea agreement by bringing a civil action against him, and Acosta had relied upon a case which involved a civil forfeiture proceeding. Judge Ramirez pointed out that the case Acosta cited was distinguishable, because the forfeiture provision was a significant factor in the defendant's plea agreement, while the Jimmy Ryce Act was not even enacted until years after Acosta's plea, and, therefore, could not have been within the parties' contemplation when they agreed on the terms of the plea

In that the Third District did not explain its rationale, other than in Judge Ramirez's concurring opinion, the Acosta decision cannot be considered even persuasive authority. Moreover, the fact that neither of the parties in the case at bar contemplated the subsequent passage of the Ryce Act at the time the agreement was struck in 1995, does not relieve the state of its obligation to comply with the terms of its contract, as Judge Ramirez suggests.

We likewise find Murray v. Kearney, 770 So.2d 273 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (on reh'g), review granted, 791 So.2d 1100 (Fla.2001), is distinguishable because it is in a substantially different procedural position than the present case. In Murray, the defendant sought specific performance of the plea agreement before the trial court after his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. When the motion was denied, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In denying the petition, the court noted at the outset that its "habeas jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the challenged order was entered without jurisdiction or is illegal." Id. at 274. The court observed that the civil commitment was legal because the trial court clearly had jurisdiction to entertain civil commitment proceedings under the Ryce Act, and it noted that Harris had "raised no argument that his confinement violates the requirements of the act under which his confinement was obtained." Id. at 275 (footnote omitted).

Unlike Harris, the petitioner in Murray did not raise the issue before the trial court of whether the state had violated its plea agreement; instead, he argued that the commitment was illegal, because it violated the plea agreement. Nevertheless, the court specifically noted that even if the state violated the plea agreement by bringing a civil commitment action against Murray, such facts still would not make the civil commitment order illegal, because Murray qualified as a sexually violent predator under the Ryce Act. Id. In contrast to Murray, Harris raised the issue that the state violated the plea agreement in the Ryce Act proceeding and the criminal proceeding, and is directly appealing the court's rulings in both proceedings. Because he timely raised this issue before the trial court, he is entitled to review of the question whether civil commitment violates the terms of the plea agreement, which was not decided in Murray.

Insofar as the issue of whether the state can be regarded as breaching its agreement, we consider it immaterial that one's confinement under the Ryce Act has been held a collateral, rather than a direct consequence, of a defendant's plea.⁶ Harris

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bargained for and was led to believe that in exchange for his agreement to surrender certain rights, most notably, that of trial by jury, he would receive a fifteen-year sentence, and, after service of seven years, the remaining portion of the sentence would be suspended and served on probation, during which time he would receive treatment as a sex offender. By pursuing civil commitment under the Ryce Act, the state has breached the plea agreement in regard to the terms of the sentence.

In our judgment, this is a classic case for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the elements of which are (1) a representation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later-asserted position; (2) reliance on that representation; and (3) a change in position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel, caused by the representation and reliance thereon. See Dep't of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla.1981); Mandarin Paint & Flooring, Inc. v. Potura Coatings of Jacksonville, Inc., 744 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Elements one and two of the doctrine are easily satisfied in that the state clearly represented to Harris the sentence he would receive in exchange for his plea, and he relied on the representation.

As to the third element, we consider that the state subsequently changed its position in a manner detrimental to Harris by filing the civil commitment action against him. Although a court of equity will not demand that a contract be specifically enforced against a party who, due to future circumstances, is unable to comply with the agreement, compare Standard Lumber Co. v. Florida Industrial Co., 106 Fla. 884, 141 So. 729 (1932), we note that the legislature's later passage of the Ryce Act did not render the state's future compliance with the agreement impossible. The state attorney was given...