Harris v. State
| Decision Date | 10 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-74,96-74 |
| Citation | 933 P.2d 1114 |
| Parties | Daniel Lee HARRIS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender, Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, for Appellant.
William U. Hill, Attorney General, Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General, D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kimberly A. Baker-Musick, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and LEHMAN, JJ.
Appellant Daniel Harris appeals from the sentence which was entered against him on one count of first-degree felony murder.
We affirm.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
ISSUE I
Was reversible error committed when the trial court judge commented on the weight of the evidence showing [the] appellant's guilt and defined reasonable doubt for the jury?
ISSUE II
Was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the appellant's motion for new trial when the jury found the appellant guilty of mutually exclusive crimes?
ISSUE III
Was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion for a new trial when the trial court erred in its polling of the jury?
ISSUE IV
Can the guilty verdict stand for the attempted first degree sexual assault conviction or the attempted second degree sexual assault conviction when the evidence is clear that the appellant renounced his criminal intentions?
ISSUE V
Was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment of acquittal on the felony murder count when the victim's death was not a part of the res gestae or things done to commit the alleged felony?
ISSUE VI
Was reversible error committed when the trial court failed to advise the appellant of his right to testify and inquire on the record whether the appellant was voluntarily waiving the right to testify?
ISSUE VII
Was it error for the trial court to deny the appellant an instruction on the appellant's theory of the case?
On December 12, 1994, Appellant met the female victim in a Newcastle bar. When the bartender refused to serve Appellant more alcohol, Appellant and the victim left the bar together and got into a pickup.
Appellant drove the pickup to a train depot where he and the victim began kissing and caressing each other. When the victim said that it was too bright at the depot and asked to go some place more private, Appellant drove to a rural road outside of Newcastle where he parked the pickup. Appellant and the victim began kissing again, and Appellant attempted to slide his hand down inside of The victim's body was discovered the next morning near the road. Except for the one sock that she was wearing, she was nude. The victim had multiple abrasions and bruises, and she had a broken nose. The autopsy revealed that the actual cause of her death was hypothermia.
the victim's pants. The victim said, "no," and Appellant became angry. He hit her two or three times in the temple area of her head. Appellant then pulled the victim's pants off of her, and he tried to get on top of her. The victim pushed Appellant away with her leg. At that point, Appellant opened the passenger door and shoved the victim out of the pickup. After cursing at the victim, he drove away.
Evidence left in the area of the victim's body led the police to Appellant. After the police interviewed Appellant, he was arrested and charged with a number of crimes. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges, and a jury trial was held. The jury returned its verdict, finding Appellant guilty of attempted first-degree sexual assault, attempted second-degree sexual assault, first-degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, and assault and battery. The jury found him not guilty of involuntary homicide and aggravated assault and battery. The trial court ruled that the other counts merged with the felony murder count and sentenced Appellant on that count. Appellant appealed to this Court.
Appellant contends that, during voir dire, the trial judge improperly stated that enough evidence existed to show Appellant's apparent guilt. Appellant complains that the trial judge then "exa[c]er[b]ated the problem when he back pedaled into the presumption of innocence and, while explaining this presumption, defined reasonable doubt." Appellant also takes issue with a comment made by the trial judge during the trial which, he insists, could have convinced the jury that the trial judge believed the State's evidence.
This Court has stated that the trial judge must " 'be careful and cautious and not comment on the evidence.' " Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 458 (Wyo.1979) (quoting Peterson v. McMicken (Nelson's Estate), 72 Wyo. 444, 499, 266 P.2d 238, 261 (1954)). In a trial before a jury, the trial judge must abstain from expressing or indicating, by word, deed, or otherwise, his personal feelings on the weight or quality of the evidence. Id. Comments or expressions of opinion on the evidence which have the tendency to indicate bias on the trial judge's part are regarded as being an infringement on the jury's duties and are prejudicial to the defendant. Id.
In order to obtain a full understanding of the comments which Appellant complains about in this case, we must put them into context. See Shaffer v. State, 640 P.2d 88, 105 (Wyo.1982). During voir dire, a prospective juror indicated that he had discussed the case with other people and that the other people had expressed their opinions to him and he had expressed his opinions to them. The juror indicated that, although he would have difficulty ignoring those discussions, he would try to do so. He went on to state, however, that those opinions would have to be proven wrong before he would be able to put them out of his mind. Defense counsel challenged the juror for cause, but the trial court denied his request.
The defense attorney resumed his questioning of the prospective juror. The juror stated that, although according to the law Appellant was presumed to be innocent, he did not believe that Appellant was innocent because of what he had read in the newspapers. He stated that he might not be able to begin his deliberations with a presumption that Appellant was innocent. Defense counsel again asked to have the juror disqualified. The State questioned the juror and objected to his dismissal because he had stated that he would look at the evidence which was presented at the trial to make his decision and that he would return a verdict of not guilty if the evidence showed that there was a reasonable doubt as to Appellant's guilt.
At that point, the trial judge made the following statements in the presence of the prospective jurors:
I don't want to hear a batch of argument. First of all, our system is such that we don't proceed to this stage of a criminal prosecution unless there's some evidence to support the State's position. It does not mean that a defendant is guilty. It does not mean that he's not presumed innocent when we get to this stage of the proceeding. But our system simply is such that there's going to be--that we don't get here unless there's some preponderance of the evidence upon which the State's case rests.
[Defense counsel] is correct that a defendant is entitled--every person is entitled to the presumption of innocence. That means that you as jurors, when you start the process, start with a clean slate. In fact, you start with less than a clean slate. If it were like a scale, you start with the scales tipped in favor of the defendant. The State has to pile enough evidence on its side of the scales that at the conclusion of the trial you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, otherwise, you must vote to acquit [him]. You must do it based on the evidence presented in the courtroom, as I've said before, on the law as I instruct you, not on other factors.
So I'll return, sir, to the question that I asked you before and ask in spite--in spite of what you may have heard or in spite of what you may have said, do you think that you're able to decide the case based upon what is presented here and the law as I instruct you?
The juror answered that he did not think that he would be able to do so, and the trial judge excused him.
Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Wyo.1986), confirmed on reh'g, 731 P.2d 558 (Wyo.1987) (quoting Gresham v. State, 708 P.2d 49, 56 (Wyo.1985)). Since the trial judge did not express his personal feelings on the evidence, Appellant was not prejudiced, and his claim must fail. Furthermore, any harm which may have resulted from the trial judge's comments was more than cured by the instructions which informed the jury that it could not consider the fact that Appellant was charged as being evidence of his guilt and that Appellant was presumed to be innocent.
Appellant also contends that the trial judge improperly defined reasonable doubt in the second paragraph of the quoted material. It is " ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ryan v. State
...trial judge's part are regarded as being an infringement on the jury's duties and are prejudicial to the defendant. Id. Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Wyo. 1997). Ryan asserts that the trial judge's comment rises to the level of error per se. We disagree. More than a mere misstatemen......
-
Harlow v. State
...law and the entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were presented at the trial.'" Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo.1997)). Brown v. State, 2002 WY 61, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 97, 100 (Wyo.2002). See also Wheaton v. State, 2003 WY 56, ¶ 20, 68 P.3d 1167, 1......
-
Yellowbear v. State
...law and the entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were presented at the trial.'" Id. (quoting Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo.1997)). Brown v. State, 2002 WY 61, ¶ 9, 44 P.3d 97, ¶ 9 [¶ 33] This analysis will be convoluted because of the tortuous path thi......
-
Cloud v. State
...with the murder and equally as culpable as the individual brandishing the murder weapon. See Mares, 939 P.2d 724; Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114 (Wyo.1997) ; Cloman v. State, 574 P.2d 410 (Wyo.1978) ; Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837 (Wyo.1977).[¶ 60] While a "mere" accomplice may not have had ......