Harris v. U.S.

Citation19 F.3d 1090
Decision Date04 May 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-7204,93-7204
PartiesW.L. HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Preston D. Rideout, Jr., Greenwood, MS, for plaintiff-appellant.

Patricia Driver Rogers, Asst. U.S. Atty., Robert Q. Whitwell, U.S. Atty., Oxford, MS, Ted L. Elders, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Office of General Counsel, Atlanta, GA, for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before HENDERSON, * SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff W.L. Harris brought suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Farmers Home Administration ("FmHA") had unlawfully placed wetland easements on his land and that the property declared by the FmHA to encompass wetlands actually did not. The district court denied relief, 820 F.Supp. 1018. Harris now appeals, and we affirm.

I

In 1987, the Grenada Bank of Mississippi foreclosed on 1,893 acres of farmland owned by Harris. The FmHA, which held a junior lien on the property, successfully bid for the property at the subsequent sale held by the bank. The following year, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), pursuant to a request from the FmHA, inspected the property, found that it contained large areas of wetlands, and recommended that the FmHA impose wetland conservation easements on approximately 1,005 acres. In June 1988, the FmHA offered to let Harris lease-back or buy-back the farmland, subject to conservation easements imposed on the 1,005 acres. Harris opted to repurchase the land for $371,700, which was the land's fair market value with the conservation easements in place. 1 The wetland easements prevent Harris from farming the land and allow the FWS to manage water flow and other conditions on the land.

Harris subsequently sued the FmHA, contending that it had no authority to impose the wetland conservation easements. Harris alternatively contended that the FmHA's decision to impose the easements was arbitrary and capricious because much of the property designated as wetlands did not possess scientifically-accepted indicators of wetland status. The district court granted summary judgment for the United States as to Harris' first contention, holding that the FmHA had the authority to place wetland easements on the property that he repurchased. After a bench trial regarding the second claim, the district court found that the FmHA did not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner when imposing the easements because the land at issue constituted wetlands. Harris now appeals, contending that the district court erred with respect to both claims.

II

Executive Order 11990 requires that all federal agencies "take action to minimize the destruction, loss or degradation of wetlands, and to preserve and enhance the natural and beneficial values of wetlands in carrying out the agency's responsibilities for (1) acquiring, managing, and disposing of Federal lands and facilities...." Exec. Order No. 11990, Sec. 1(a), 42 Fed.Reg. 26,961 (1977), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4321 note (1988). Moreover,

[w]hen Federally-owned wetlands or portions of wetlands are proposed for lease, easement, right-of-way or disposal to non-Federal public or private parties, the Federal agency shall (a) reference in the conveyance those uses that are restricted under identified Federal, State or local wetlands regulations; and (b) attach other appropriate restrictions to the uses of properties by the grantee or purchaser and any successor, except where prohibited by law; or (c) withhold such properties from disposal.

Id. Sec. 4 (emphasis added). Both parties agree that this order, which was issued by President Carter pursuant to statutory authority, 2 has the force and effect of a statute enacted by Congress. See Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir.1985). The FmHA contends that the order authorized it to impose the wetland conservation easements at issue. Harris, on the other hand, argues that the FmHA was "prohibited by law"--i.e., prohibited by the Food Security Act of 1985, Pub.L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1526 (1985), and the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub.L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1669 (1988)--from imposing the challenged easements.

A

Harris initially contends that 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(e), 3 which was added by the Agricultural Credit Act, prohibits the FmHA from imposing wetland easements on the property at issue because "[n]o where in the language of [Sec. 1985] is the Secretary given the right to condition the exercise of leaseback/buyback rights on the acceptance of a wetlands easement." In essence, Harris' argument is that Congress prohibited the FmHA from imposing wetland conservation easements by not specifically codifying the FmHA's authority to do so. Nonetheless, there is no question that, in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary, Executive Order 11990 binds the FmHA. Thus, the issue presented is whether Congress sub-silentio rendered Executive Order 11990 void as it pertains to the buyback program by not specifically codifying the FmHA's authority to impose wetland easements. Harris relies upon four statutory provisions to support his contention that Congress barred the FmHA from imposing wetland conservation easements on property subject to the borrower's redemption rights.

Harris first asserts that language found in Sec. 1985(e)(7) supports his interpretation of Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A). Subsection (7) states:

In the case of farmland administered under this chapter that is highly erodible land (as defined in section 3801 of Title 16), the Secretary may require the use of specified conservation practices on such land as a condition of the sale or lease of such land.

7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(e)(7). Because Congress did not similarly codify the FmHA's authority to impose such conditions of sale with regard to wetlands, Harris concludes that subsection (7) provides "strong evidence of Congress' intent not to subordinate the leaseback/buyback rights to any affirmative duty that the FmHA might have had under Executive Order 11990 to place wetlands easements on inventory land." However, an alternative--and more plausible--reading of Congress' inaction is that Congress felt no need to codify the FmHA's power to impose wetland easements because Executive Order 11990 already obliged the FmHA to do so. Consequently, we find Harris' contention unavailing.

Harris next argues that the language of 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1997, which authorizes the FmHA to acquire conservation easements from delinquent borrowers, supports his reading of Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A). Section 1997 allow the FmHA to "purchase" such easements

by canceling that part of the aggregate amount of such outstanding loans of the borrower held by the Secretary ... that bears the same ratio to the aggregate amount of the outstanding loans of such borrower held by the Secretary ... as the number of acres of the real property of such borrower that are subject to such easement bears to the aggregate number of acres securing such loans.

7 U.S.C. Sec. 1997(e). Harris concludes that because "Congress intended for the FmHA to 'purchase' conservation easements from distressed borrowers, Congress did not intend to empower the Secretary of Agriculture to extract a conservation easement by coercion from a farmer exercising his leaseback/buyback rights." Harris, however, overlooks the fact that the Sec. 1997 program could not be used in this case because Grenada Bank, not the FmHA, foreclosed upon Harris' farm. Thus, the FmHA could not have purchased the easements from Harris as Harris did not own the property when the FmHA acquired it. Accordingly, Harris' reliance upon Sec. 1997 is misplaced.

Harris next points to Sec. 616 of the Agricultural Credit Act, which allows the FmHA, for conservation purposes, to transfer to a Federal or State agency any real property administered by the FmHA "with respect to which the rights of all prior owners and operators have expired." 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2002. Harris argues that because "Congress expressly made leaseback/buyback rights superior to the right of the FmHA to transfer land under the 616 program ..., it would seem logical that Congress also intended to make leaseback/buyback rights superior to the right of FmHA to exercise its authority under Executive Order 11990 to enhance wetlands." Harris fails to demonstrate, however, that the imposition of wetland conservation easements pursuant to Executive Order 11990 is inconsistent with the Sec. 616 program. Indeed, Congress now has statutorily authorized the FmHA to impose easements on inventory land subject to the redemption provision of Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A), see part II.A.4 infra, while at the same time retaining the Sec. 616 program. Consequently, we find Harris' contention without merit.

Harris finally contends that 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(g), which Harris concedes is not applicable here, 4 supports his interpretation of Sec. 1985(e)(1)(A). Subsection (g) allows the FmHA to "establish perpetual wetland conservation easements to protect and restore wetlands or converted wetlands that exist on inventoried property, as determined by the Secretary in accordance with title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. Sec. 3801 et seq.)." 7 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1993). Harris submits that Congress charged the FmHA with the duty to impose such easements because the FmHA did not have such a duty previously. Harris, however, fails to recognize that Congress, in adopting subsection (g), recognized the prior existing authority of the FmHA to impose wetland conservation easements. For example, the relevant Senate report noted that the enactment of subsection (g) would

alleviate[ ] a problem with the current use of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service easements on inventory property.... Easements can...

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