Harris v. Union Pac. R.R.
Decision Date | 05 August 2020 |
Docket Number | 8:16CV381 |
Parties | QUINTON HARRIS, GEOFFREY MILLER, NORMAN MOUNT, SCOTT ZINN, THOMAS TAYLOR, and JOHN BAKER, Plaintiffs, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Sever Plaintiffs' Claims (Filing No. 331). For the reasons explained below, the motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
An amended complaint alleging fourteen causes of action was filed by Plaintiffs Quinton Harris ("Harris"), John Baker ("Baker"), Geoffrey Miller ("Miller), Norman Mount ("Mount"), Thomas Taylor ("Taylor"), and Scott Zinn ("Zinn") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") on February 19, 2016. (Filing No. 20.) Plaintiffs, who are all current or former employees of Defendant, contend that Defendant's fitness-for-duty policy unlawfully discriminates against employees based on disabilities and genetic information. Under Defendant's fitness-for-duty program, employees holding certain positions are required to disclose specified heath conditions and reportable heath events so Defendant can evaluate the employee's fitness for duty. These events generally include cardiovascular conditions, seizures or loss of consciousness, significant vision or hearing changes, diabetes treated with insulin, and sleep apnea. Plaintiffs maintain they were "excluded from their positions on the basis of disabilities that had no effect on their ability to perform the essential functions of their jobs." (Filing No. 20.)
Plaintiffs have asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"): (1) disparate treatment—alleging that through its fitness-for-duty program, Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination by implementing qualification standards and other criteria that screen out individuals with disabilities; (2) disparate impact—alleging that the fitness-for-duty program had an adverse impact on individuals with disabilities by, for example, screening them out or tending to screen them out of work; and (3) unlawful medical inquiry—alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A), which provides that an employer "shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity." Plaintiffs Baker, Miller, Mount, Taylor, and Zinn also assert claims under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq. Additionally, four plaintiffs allege claims under the laws of their respective home states. (Filing No. 20.)
On August 17, 2018, Plaintiffs sought class certification on the ADA disparate treatment claim. (Filing No. 240.) A class was certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on February 5, 2019. (Filing No. 307.) Defendant appealed the order granting class certification to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing Plaintiff did not meet Rule 23(b)(2)'s cohesiveness requirement or Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance and superiority requirement.1 Harris v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 953 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2020). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed class certification, finding that the "individualized inquiries in this case cannot be addressed in a manner consistent with Rule 23." Id. at 1035. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court cannot determine whether the fitness-for-duty policy "constituted a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination without considering whether the policy is job-related for each of over 650 positions in question and whether the policy is consistent with business necessity in each situation." Id. The Eighth Circuit stated that in making this determination, the district court "would have to consider whether [Defendant's] policy is job-related and consistent with businessnecessity in light of the medical conditions to which it applies," which would require "answering many individual questions." Id. at 1036.
DISCUSSION
Defendant requests that the Court sever Plaintiffs' claims into separate, single-plaintiff actions. Defendant contends joinder is improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) because Plaintiffs' claims neither arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, nor present common questions of law or fact. Defendant argues Plaintiffs' claims involve six different factual circumstances, with each requiring individualized proof and defenses. Plaintiffs contend, however, that each of their claims depend upon their ability to demonstrate that they were wronged as a result of Defendant's fitness-for-duty policy and, therefore, the requirements for joinder under Rule 20(a) are satisfied. Plaintiffs claim it is irrelevant that each of them suffered from different disabilities, worked in different jobs, and for different supervisors because each of their removals were decisions to remove a worker from service based on a reportable health event.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a), persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if two requirements are satisfied: (1) "they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences," and (2) "any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. The appropriate remedy for improper joinder of parties is for the court to "drop a party" or "sever any claim against a party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.
"The Eighth Circuit has embraced a liberal reading of the same transaction and occurrence language, finding it permits joinder of all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties." Tridle v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, No. 8:08CV470, 2009 WL 1783558, at *2 (D. Neb. June 22, 2009) (internal quotation omitted). "[A]ll logically related events entitling a person to institute legal action against another generally are regarded as comprising a transaction or occurrence." Mosley v. General Motors Corp, 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974). However, Id. at 1333.
The Court finds Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the same transaction or occurrence requirement for joinder under the circumstances of this case. Although each of the individual plaintiff's claims are rooted in allegations that Defendant's fitness-for-duty policy is discriminatory, the claims nevertheless "hinge on distinct facts that are unique to each plaintiff and, thus, do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence." Payne v. Grant County, Okla., No. CIV-14-362-M, 2014 WL 3349617, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 8, 2014). See also Corley v. Google, Inc., 316 F.R.D. 277, 285 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ().
The Eighth Circuit has already concluded that the resolution of Plaintiffs' ADA disparate treatment claims will require individualized determinations as to whether each plaintiff's fitness-for-duty evaluation was job-related and consistent with business necessity. Harris, 953 F.3d at 1035. The Eighth Circuit found the district court will have to assess whether the fitness-for-duty policy is "job-related and consistent with business necessity in light of the medical conditions to which it applies." Id. at 1036. The district court will also have to "consider the unique circumstances of each position in question to determine whether the policy is unlawfully discriminatory." Id. at 1037. Therefore, the determination of whether the fitness-for-duty policy is job-related and consistent with business necessity will require an examination of each plaintiff's medical condition, position, and job responsibilities.
Here, Plaintiffs have distinct medical conditions and were subject to fitness-for-duty evaluations for different reasons. Plaintiffs worked in separate locations and held different positions with distinct job duties. Harris suffers from epilepsy and worked as a mechanical service operator in Little Rock, Arkansas. (Filing No. 243.) Harris' position required him to move locomotives, perform service work, and operate forklifts. (Id.) Miller, who suffered from cardiomyopathy, was a signalman in Delta, Ohio. (Filing No. 244.) Miller's job duties included digging out and placing signal cabins, running cable and wire, and operating backhoes and heavy trucks. (Id.) Mount, who has a pacemaker, was employed as a signal maintainer in Illinois. (Filing No. 245.) Mount's position required him to maintain signal equipment and address equipment-related safety issues. (Id.) Taylor worked as a signalman in Berkley, Illinois. (Filing No. 246.) Taylor, who suffers from epilepsy, was responsible for the installation, inspection, maintenance,and repair of signal equipment. (Id.) Zinn, who was employed by Defendant as a ballast tamper operator in Wilcox, Arizona, suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and substance abuse problems. (Filing No. 247.) Zinn's responsibilities as a ballast tamper included the operation of on-track machinery. (Id.) Baker worked as a holster in Little Rock, Arkansas. (Filing No. 242.) His position involved attending to switches in the rail yard, breaking down trains, and switching trains from one track to another. (Id.) Baker was subject to a fitness-for-duty evaluation after experiencing syncopal episodes. (Id.) The factual differences between each of the plaintiff's situations are legally significant and resolution of each plaintiff's claims will require an...
To continue reading
Request your trial