Harris v. Union Pac. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1882
• Citation: 13 F. 591
• Parties: HARRIS v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

13 F. 591

HARRIS v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, D. Colorado.

June, 1882

E. L Johnson, for plaintiff.

Willard Teller, for defendant.

McCRARY C.J., (charging jury.)

It is your province and duty to determine the facts of this case in the light of the evidence which you have heard, and of the law, which the court will now state to you. The plaintiff sues the defendant to recover damages upon the ground that he has been injured in his person by reason of the negligence of the defendant, the Union Pacific Railway Company.

You will observe, therefore, gentlemen, that the question which lies at the foundation of this suit, and which you must decide as a question of fact, is a question of negligence. If the plaintiff has failed to establish, by a fair preponderance of the proof, that his injury was the result of the negligence of the defendant, he cannot recover; but if he has established that fact by a preponderance of evidence, he may recover.

Negligence is the want of that care and prudence which a man of ordinary intelligence would exercise under all the circumstances of the given case. You may consider the question of negligence in this light: Whether a man of ordinary care and prudence would have done the acts which are shown by the evidence to have been done by the defendant railway company, and of which this plaintiff complains. You must be satisfied that the defendant company was negligent, and also that the plaintiff's injury was the result of that negligence, or as the law puts it, that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. It may be well to explain to you what is meant by the term 'proximate cause;' and I think perhaps, as good a definition as I can give you is this: that the injury must have been the natural and ordinary result of the cause; or, in other words, the question here may be stated to be whether a reasonably prudent and cautious person ought to have apprehended that the injury might result from the act which was done. Now, in this case the proof shows and about that there is no dispute, that a 'push car' was left near the track by one of the employes of the defendant, and that it was not locked or secured in any way to prevent its being placed upon the track. It was, however, placed upon the track, and by whom we are not advised. It is not to be presumed that it was done with the knowledge or consent of the defendant. If that were so, it would be incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish it by proof. So that we may take it to be established that it was placed upon the track by some third person, by some outside party, and the question for you to determine is, whether the leaving that push car in that position was an act of negligence. In order to determine that question you must consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, and, in the light of such knowledge as you have, which is common knowledge to everybody, you will decide whether the railroad company was bound to anticipate that the push car might be placed upon the track, and that injury might therefore result to some person passing on a train. If it had been some other article besides a push car there might be no question about it; as, for example, if it had been a common road wagon which had been left by the side...