Harris v. United States
| Decision Date | 10 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 7:20-cv-08029-LSC,7:17-cr-00145-LSC-HNJ-l |
| Parties | RAYMON MARQUELL HARRIS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
I. Introduction
Before this Court is a motion by Raymon Marquell Harris (“Harris” or “Petitioner”) to vacate set aside, or otherwise correct his sentence of 210 months' imprisonment and 60 months' supervised release pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“§ 2255”). (Doc. 1.) The United States (“Government”) responded in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 10.) For the reasons set forth below Harris's § 2255 motion (doc. 1) is due to be denied and the present action dismissed.
On March 31, 2017, a grand jury indicted Harris, charging him with being a felon[1] in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Cr. Doc. 1 at l.)[2] Adam Danneman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, represented Harris in the subsequent proceedings. (See Cr. Doc. 8.) Harris ultimately entered into a plea agreement with the Government and pleaded guilty to the charge. (Cr. Doc. 15.) This Court accepted his guilty plea on July 20,2017. (Cr. Doc. 36 at 1,16.) Pursuant to his agreement, Harris stipulated that the factual basis therein was “substantially correct.” (Cr. Doc. 15 at 4.) Specifically, Harris acknowledged that he had admitted to possessing the firearm at issue and that he had previously accrued seven felony convictions. (Id. at 3-4.) The Government, in turn, agreed to recommend a term of incarceration on the low end of the sentencing guideline range. (Id. at 4.) Additionally, Harris waived his right to challenge his conviction and/or sentence through an appeal or, inter alia, a motion pursuant to § 2255 unless (a) this Court imposed a sentence greater than the applicable statutory maximum sentence and/or the guideline sentencing range or (b) Harris received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 5-6.)
At Harris's sentencing hearing, this Court adopted the findings of Harris's pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) and determined that his advisory guideline imprisonment range was 180 months to 210 months after applying a sentence enhancement pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). (Cr. Doc. 35 at 10.) Harris objected to the application of the sentence enhancement, and the Government responded in support thereof. (Cr. Doc. 35 at 2-9.) This Court overruled Harris's objection. (Id. at 9.) The Government recommended, and Harris's counsel, Danneman, requested, a sentence of 180 months' imprisonment. (Id. at 11-13.) Considering Harris's extensive criminal history, this Court determined that a sentence on the high end of the guideline range was appropriate in light of “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of this particular defendant.” (Id. at 13-14.) Accordingly, this Court sentenced Harris to 210 months' imprisonment followed by 60 months' supervised release. (Id.) On March 30, 2018, this Court entered judgment against Harris. (Cr. Doc. 25.)
Harris filed a timely appeal of his sentence on April 12, 2018, still listing Danneman as his counsel. (See Cr. Doc. 28.) Harris's only argument on appeal concerned this Court's classification of his prior state conviction for attempted first-degree assault as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA sentence enhancement. See Harris, 941 F.3d at 1050. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this Court's decision. Id. Harris did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Harris filed the present § 2255 petition on July 1, 2020.[4] (Doc. 1 at 12.) Liberally construing the claims in Harris's petition,[5] including those in his motions to supplement and amend the petition , he asserts four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and three substantive claims upon which he contends that he is due relief. (See Doc. 1 at 4-8; Doc. 3 at 1-2; Doc. 11 at 1-3; Doc. 13 at 1-15.) Harris argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for the following reasons:
(See Doc. 1.) Harris also raises the following substantive claims:
(See Docs. 4,11,13.)
III. Timeliness and Non-Successiveness of Harris's § 2255 Motion
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this Court's decision on November 27, 2019. Harris, 941 F.3d at 1050. Because Harris did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari, the Eleventh Circuit's judgment became final on February 25, 2020. See SUP. CT. R. 13; see also Michel v. United States, 519 F.3d 1267,1268 n.l (11th Cir. 2008) ”) (citations omitted). Harris filed the instant § 2255 motion on July 1,2020, within one year after the date on which his conviction became final, making his filing timely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).
Harris is bringing his first § 2255 motion, so it is not “second or successive” within the meaning of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. at §§ 2255(h), 2244(b)(3)(A).
IV. Standard of Review
Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are limited. A petitioner is entitled to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198,1199 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 813 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225,1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Richards v. United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988)).
In litigation stemming from a § 2255 motion, Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Guerra v. United States, 588 F.2d 519,520-21 (5th Cir. 1979)). However, an evidentiary hearing is appropriate if, “accepting] all of the petitioner's alleged facts as true,” the petitioner has “allege[d] facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief.” Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 834 (11th Cir. 1991) ().
V. Discussion
Harris asserts four grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel in his § 2255 motion. All of these assertions are meritless and will be dismissed without a hearing.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised for the first time in a § 2255 motion and are therefore not subject to procedural default for failing to raise them on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two components: first, the petitioner “must show that the counsel's performance was deficient;” second, the petitioner “must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the first component, the petitioner “must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. The second component is satisfied only when the petitioner shows that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ” Id. at 694.
In examining counsel's performance, the Court should be “highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The Court must make “every effort... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Id. The Court must also “indulge a...
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