Harris v. Vanderburg

• Decision Date: 10 February 2022
• Docket Number: 4:19-CV-111-D
• Parties: WILLIAM HARRIS, and PHYLLIS HARRIS, Plaintiffs, v. MARY JANE VANDERBURG, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina

WILLIAM HARRIS, and PHYLLIS HARRIS, Plaintiffs, v. MARY JANE VANDERBURG, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:19-CV-111-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Eastern Division

February 10, 2022

ORDER

James C. Dever III United States District Judge

On August 9, 2019, William and Phyllis Harris (the “Harrises” or “plaintiffs”) filed suit against Mary Jane Vanderburg (“Vanderburg”) Douglas Matthew Gurkins (“Gurkins”), Remco East Inc. (“Remco”), and Mary Grace Bishop (“Bishop”) (collectively “defendants”) alleging claims under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. and state law [D.E. 1, 33]. On March 15, 2021, Vanderburg moved for summary judgment [D.E. 94] and filed a memorandum and other documents in support [D.E. 95, 96]. The same day, Remco and Bishop moved for summary judgment [D.E. 98] and filed a memorandum and documents in support [D.E. 99, 100], On April 28, 2021, the Harrises responded in opposition to both motions for summary judgment and filed documents in support [D.E. 106 through 113]. On June 23, 2021, Vanderburg, Remco, and Bishop replied [D.E. 124, 125]. On June 30, 2021, the Harrises moved for leave to file a combined surreply [D.E. 126]. As explained below, the court grants in part Remco and Bishop's motion for summary judgment, grants in part Vanderburg's motion for summary judgment, and denies as moot the Harrises' motion for leave to file a combined surreply.

I.

In the 1980s, Vanderburg and her husband built several rental properties along Huntingridge Road in Greenville, North Carolina, including 559 Huntingridge Road. See [D.E. 96] ¶¶ 1- 2; [D.E. 113] 1. 559 Huntingridge Road is a duplex with two units: 559A and 559B. See [D.E. 96] ¶ 2; [D.E. 113] 2. In 2016, after the death of her husband, Vanderburg hired Remco, a property management company, to manage some of her properties. See [D.E. 96] ¶ 5. Remco began to manage the 559B unit in 2017. See [D.E. 96] ¶ 5; [D.E. 99] ¶ 3; [D.E. 113] 9. During the relevant time period in this case, Remco did not manage the 559A unit. See [D.E. 96] ¶ 5; [D.E. 99] ¶ 3; [D.E. 113] 2-3; [D.E. 24-1] 9. Remco's duties included leasing and maintaining Vanderburg's properties. See [D.E. 96] ¶ 6; [D.E. 113] 3.

In February 2017, the Harrises signed a lease with Remco to rent the 559B unit See [D.E. 96] ¶ 7; [D.E. 99] ¶ 4; [D.E. 99-2]; [D.E. 113] 4; [D.E. 108-1] 30-34. Bishop was the broker in charge at Remco during the Harrises' tenancy. See [D.E. 96] ¶ 10; [D.E. 113] 4. Although Vanderburg owned the property, the Harrises understood they were renting from Remco. See [D.E. 96]¶8;[D.E. 113]4. WhentheHarrisesmovedinto559B, Gurkins, whoisVanderburg'snephew, was living in the 559A unit See [D.E. 96] ¶ 9; [D.E. 113] 4. Because Remco did not manage the 559A unit, Gurkins was not one of Remco's tenants.

After the Harrises moved in, Gurkins began harassing the Harrises, including yelling racial slurs at them, threatening them, and repeatedly driving through the Harrises' front yard. SeeCompl. [D.E. 1] ¶¶ 26-42; [D.E. 114]. The Harrises also suspect Gurkins broke a light on their porch and damaged their cars. In response, the Harrises contacted Bishop and Remco multiple times, seeking help. See [D.E. 108-1] 86-90, 94-102. Bishop repeatedly advised the Harrises to call the police but otherwise did not intervene. See [D.E. 107-3] 11-12. The Harrises called the police, filed several reports against Gurkins, filed criminal charges against him, ^[1] and sought and obtained a temporary restraining order. See [D.E. 108-1] 69-84, 92-93, 184-94, 199-202. At the same time, Gurkins complained to Vanderburg that the Harrises were creating disturbances at the duplex. See Id. at 87, 135; Vanderburg Aff. [D.E. 96-2] ¶¶ 11-12. On September 26, 2017, at Vanderburg's urging, Remco initiated eviction proceedings againstthe Harrises because of the Harrises' supposed “failure to maintain a peaceful environment so as not to disturb other tenants' peaceful enjoyment of the Premises.” [D.E.99-3]. On October 10, 2017, the Pitt County District Court dismissed the eviction proceedings with prejudice. See [D.E. 99-4].

As the situation deteriorated, the Harrises attempted to terminate their lease. On October 18, 2017, the Harrises sent a letter to Remco asking for a refund of half the rent they had paid and early termination of the lease. See [D.E. 108-1] 145. Vanderburg refused, and Remco responded declining the Harrises' offer and stating the Harrises' lease would not be renewed. See Id. at 147. OnNovember 1, 2017, the Harrises, through counsel, renewed their request, asking instead for a full refund. See Id. at 152-53. The same day, after consulting with Vanderburg, Remco responded that it would refund half the rent if the Harrises moved out by November 30, 2017. See Id. at 156. The Harrises did not accept that offer. On December 29, 2017, the Harrises notified Remco that they would vacate the 559B unit within 30 days. See Id. at 164-65. The Harrises moved out on January 29, 2018. See Id. at 170-74. After the Harrises moved out, Remco refunded their $550 security deposit See Id. at 178-79.

On August 9, 2019, the Harrises filed suit against Vanderburg, Gurkins, Rem.co, and Bishop, (alleging claims under the Fair Housing Act and state law. See [D.E. 1, 33]. On March 15, 2021, Vanderburg, Rem.co, and Bishop moved for summary judgment. See [D.E. 94, 98]. The Harrises oppose the motions. See [D.E. 110, 112].

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Scott v. Harris. 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment must initially demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317.325 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, see Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248-49, but "must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis and quotation omitted). A trial court reviewing amotionfor summaryjudgment should determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Anderson. 477 U.S. at 249. In making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Harris. 550 U.S. at 378.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. See Anderson. 477 U.S. at 249. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position [is] insufficient" Id. at 252: see Beale v. Hardy 769 F, 2d 213.214 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The nonmoving party, however; cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another."). Only factual disputes that affect the outcome under substantive law properly preclude summary judgment See Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248.

The Harrises allege that Vanderburg, Remco, and Bishop violated multiple sections of the Fair Housing Act-namely, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(c) and 3617. In seeking summary judgment, Vanderburg, Remco, and Bishop do not dispute that Gurkins racially harassed the Harrises. Instead, they focus on whether they violated the FHA or bear any civil liability under the FHA for Gurkins's conduct. Vanderburg, Remco, and Bishop argue they are not liable and are entitled to summary judgment on the Harrises' FHA claims either because the record does not demonstrate any violations of the Fair Housing Act under the provisions alleged or because Vanderburg, Remco, and Bishop are not directly or vicariously liable for Gurkins's conduct The Harrises disagree.

"A plaintiff may establish a violation of the FHA either through direct evidence of discrimination," circumstantial evidence, or the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Martin v. Brondum 535 Fed.Appx. 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Corey v. Secretary. U.S. Dep't. Hous. &Urb. Dev, . 719 F.3d 322, 325 (4th Cir. 2013); Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp.. 907 F.2d 1447, 1451 (4th Cir. 1990). Direct evidence includes "conduct or statements that both (1) reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude, and (2) bear directly on the contested [housing] decision." Martin. 535 Fed.Appx. at 244 (quotation omitted); see Laing v. Fed. Express Corp.. 703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013). As for their claims under section 3604(a)-(c), the Harrises do not rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework but instead make a disparate-treatment claim based on circumstantial evidence. See [D.E. 110] 21. In a disparate-treatment claim, "a plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive." Texas Dep't of Housing & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project. Inc. 576 U.S. 519, 524 (2015) (quotation omitted); Ricci v. DeStefano. 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009); Wadlev v. Park at landmark, T.P. 264 Fed.Appx. 279, 281 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished); Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs.. 736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984). As for their claim under section 3617, the Harrises rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework. See [D.E. 110] 24-26; [D.E. 112] 19-22.

A.

Initially the court must determine whether Vanderburg, Remco, and Bishop bear any responsibility for Gurkms's conduct...