Harris v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-cv-10936,15-cv-10936 |
| Parties | KNIEAKAY T. HARRIS, as independent administrator of the estate of GERALD ANDRE GREEN, Plaintiff, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Gerald Andre Green was a prisoner in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") at Stateville Correctional Center ("Stateville"), who suffered from end-stage renal disease. Several days before his scheduled release from prison, Green had a medical emergency due to his illness. He was transferred to an outside hospital, where he died. The administrator of Green's estate, Knieakay Harris, has now sued Wexford Health Sources, Inc. ("Wexford"), the state contractor that provides health care services to IDOC inmates, as well as Dr. Saleh Obaisi and Nurse Bernadette Ononiwu, two Wexford employees who cared for Green at Stateville. Harris has also brought claims against Defendants Michael Magana, who was Stateville's warden at the beginning of 2014, Randy Pfister, Stateville's warden starting November 2015, and NaphCare, Inc., a dialysis provider at Stateville, alleging that they lost or destroyed Green's medical records. Now before this Court are the various Defendants' motions to dismiss the claims against them in the Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"). (Dkt. Nos. 86, 89, & 100.) For the reasons stated below, NaphCare's motion is granted; Defendants Ononiwu, Obaisi, and Wexford's1 motion is granted in part and denied in part; and Defendants Magna and Pfister's2 motion is granted.
For purposes of the instant motions, the Court accepts the facts alleged in the TAC as true and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014).
Green had been a prisoner at Stateville since June 1, 2013; he was scheduled to be released on March 21, 2017. (TAC ¶ 5 at 2, ¶ 14 at 4, Dkt. No. 83.)3 Green suffered from renal failure and hypertension—as a result, he required frequent dialysis and heath monitoring. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 17 at 5.) At the relevant time, Wexford and NaphCare had contracts with the State of Illinois to provide healthcare services and management within Stateville—with NaphCare providing dialysis. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11 at 3.)
The medical emergency at the center of the present case was not Green's first hospitalization while he was incarcerated at Stateville. On February 25, 2014, he had to be transferred from Stateville to an outside hospital because he was experiencing a volume overload (i.e., too much fluid in the body), pulmonary edema (i.e., excess fluid in the lungs), and high blood pressure. (Id. ¶ 18 at 5.) Green was dialyzed over several days in the intensive care unit of the hospital to get his hypertension under control and then he was released from the hospital to return to Stateville with orders to continue dialysis. (Id.)
However, on March 17, 2014, Green did not receive his regularly scheduled dialysis treatment. (Id. ¶ 19 at 5.) The next day, he had a medical emergency. It is unclear exactly what happened—some prison official or representative appears to have reported that Green lost consciousness during dialysis, while other medical records suggest that Green could not be dialyzed on March 18 or March 19 due to cardio-pulmonary distress. (Id. ¶ 20 at 5, 6.) Regardless, it appears that on March 18, 2014, Green presented to Stateville's medical department sometime around 10:00 to 11:30 p.m. in an acute distress. (Id. ¶ 35 at 21.) He was seen there by Nurse Ononiwu at around 2.00 a.m. By that point, Green was experiencing difficulty breathing and chest pain, and he was sweating and vomiting. (Id. ¶ 21 at 6.) His vital signs showed that Green had high blood pressure and low oxygen saturation. (Id.) Nurse Ononiwu called Dr. Obaisi, but Dr. Obaisi did not answer his phone. (Id. ¶ 22 at 6.) Dr. Obaisi was Stateville's medical director at the time, and, on March 19, 2014, he had a "duty" to be available to Statesville's medical staff for consultations 24 hours a day.4 (Id. ¶ 29 at 26, ¶ 33 at 27.) Despite this duty, he did not return Nurse Ononiwu's call. (Id. ¶ 33 at 27.) Nurse Ononiwu then called another doctor who told her to send Green to a hospital. (Id. ¶ 22 at 6.)
Around 2:07 a.m., before the ambulance arrived, Nurse Ononiwu started Green on a saline infusion—a treatment that would only exacerbate Green's condition. (Id. ¶ 23 at 6, ¶ 37 at 21.) The infusion lasted at least until 2:50 a.m., when an ambulance took Green to an outside hospital. (Id. ¶ 25 at 6.) The hospital's records indicate that Green was unconscious and in cardiac arrest when the ambulance picked him up from Stateville. Green never regained consciousness; he passed away on March 24, 2017. (Id. ¶ 14 at 4, ¶ 26 at 6, 7.) The medical records show that immediately prior to his death, Green was diagnosed with acute fluid overload, end-stage renaldisease on hemodialysis, hypertensive emergency, and chronic anemia. His cause of death was brain anoxic damage, cardiac arrest, and pulmonary edema. (Id. ¶ 15 at 5.)
As the administrator of Green's estate, Harris filed the present lawsuit on December 5, 2015. Her original complaint contained claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to Green's serious medical need against Wexford, the IDOC's director, and Pfister as Stateville's warden. (Dkt. No. 1.) On February 17, 2016, Harris amended her complaint to include, among other things, § 1983 claims against NaphCare and Magana, as a "director" of IDOC. (Dkt. No. 26.) Harris amended her complaint again on March 24, 2016 to include § 1983 claims against Nurse Ononiwu and Dr. Obaisi, as well as claims under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/1 et seq., against Wexford, NaphCare, Nurse Ononiwu, and Dr. Obaisi. (Dkt. No. 34.) At some point, Harris discovered that some of Green's dialysis records were missing5 and so she amended her complaint yet again on October 12, 2016. The resulting Third Amended Complaint, which is now the operative complaint before this Court, asserts § 1983 claims against Wexford (Count I), Nurse Ononiwu (Count VI), and Dr. Obaisi (Count VIII); Illinois Wrongful Death Act claims against Wexford (Count II), Nurse Ononiwu (Count VII), and Dr. Obaisi (Count IX); and negligent spoliation of evidence claims against Magana (Count III), Pfister (Count IV), and NaphCare (Count V). (Dkt. No. 83.)
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for themisconduct alleged." Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court "must construe [the complaint] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
Wexford Defendants argue that Count I against Wexford should be dismissed because Harris has failed to sufficiently plead a deliberate indifference claim under a Monell theory of liability, as she did not adequately allege an unconstitutional policy or widespread practice required for such claim. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (). Wexford Defendants also argue that Harris cannot impute liability to Wexford based on the actions of its employees as § 1983 does not create vicarious liability. Harris counters that Count I does not allege vicarious liability, but instead alleges that Wexford had an unspoken and unwritten practice of denying medically-necessary consultations and referrals for care outside of the prison, that Wexford had final policymaking authority, and that Green suffered harm because Wexford improperly and insufficiently trained its staff.
It is true that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2017); but see Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 786, 789-95 (7th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1024 (2015) (). Thus, to recover on a § 1983 claim, Harris must show that Green's constitutional injury was caused by Wexford's express policy, a widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice, or a decision by Wexford's agent with final policymaking authority. See Milestone v. City of Monroe, Wis., 665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011). It is difficult, but not impossible, to demonstrate an official policy or a custom based only on one inmate's experience because ultimately evidence of a policy, not a random event, is needed. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2008). At the same time, the Seventh Circuit has cautioned district courts against applying a heightened pleading standard to Monell claims. See White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016). And it is important to recognize that Harris's pleading burden is commensurate with the amount of information available to her; she is not expected to plead facts that are not accessible to her without discovery. Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 528-29 (7th Cir. 2015)....
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