Harris v. Woodlands Club

• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ALEXANDER
• Citation: Harris v. Woodlands Club, 55 A.3d 449, 2012 ME 117 (Me. 2012)
• Decision Date: 11 October 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. Cum–11–435.
• Parties: J. Cole HARRIS et al. v. The WOODLANDS CLUB et al.

55 A.3d 449

2012 ME 117

J. Cole HARRIS et al.

v.The WOODLANDS CLUB et al.

Docket No. Cum–11–435.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: Sept. 13, 2012.

Decided: Oct. 11, 2012.

Gerald F. Petruccelli, Esq. (orally), Bruce A. McGlauflin, Esq., and Jisel E. Lopez, Esq., Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, for appellants J. Cole Harris and P. Daphne Harris.

Jonathan W. Brogan, Esq., and David A. Goldman, Esq., Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for cross-appellant The Woodlands Homeowners Association.

Thomas R. McKeon, Esq. (orally), and Joseph L. Cahoon, Jr., Esq., Richardson, Whitman, Large & Badger, Portland, for cross-appellant The Woodlands Club.

Panel: ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

ALEXANDER, J.

[¶ 1] J. Cole Harris and P. Daphne Harris appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) in favor of The Woodlands Club and The Woodlands Homeowners Association (collectively, the Woodlands). In their complaint, the Harrises allege that the Woodlands tortiously discharged surface water onto their property causing flooding and an increase in wetland. The Harrises challenge the court's (1) entry of a judgment in favor of the Woodlands following a nonjury trial on the Harrises' common law trespass claim, (2) grant of a summary judgment in favor of the Woodlands on the Harrises' claim for negligence, (3) entry of a pretrial order excluding certain testimony, and (4) refusal to grant the Harrises an injunction. The Woodlands cross-appeals from the court's judgment on the Harrises' common law trespass claim, arguing that its legal characterization of their drainage system was flawed. We affirm the judgment.¹

I. CASE HISTORY

[¶ 2] The following facts are taken from the court's written findings following a nonjury trial and are viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.²See Van Dam v. Spickler, 2009 ME 36, ¶ 2, 968 A.2d 1040.

[¶ 3] The Woodlands Club is a corporation that operates a golf course in Falmouth. The Woodlands Homeowners Association is a corporation that owns the common elements of a residential development that surrounds the golf course as well as the golf course itself, its cart paths, and its drainage facilities. The Club leases the golf course from the Association pursuant to a long-term lease.

[¶ 4] Fairway Villas, Inc.³ was the original developer of the Woodlands. As part of the development, Fairway Villas submitted a permit application to the Maine Department of Environmental Protection that included plans and designs for the golf course and the residential development. The designs included plans for the stormwater management system. The Department issued a site-location permit in 1987.

[¶ 5] In 2004, the Harrises purchased a twelve-acre parcel that abuts the northern boundary of the Woodlands Club. The land was the topographic low point to which water would drain from the Woodlands property and other properties before any development at the Woodlands. The relevant watershed in this case, Watershed A, is located on the northwest portion of the Woodlands development. Before the Woodlands was constructed, Watershed A drained, following the natural contour of the land, onto what is now the Harris parcel, mostly at a location known as Discharge Point A.

[¶ 6] The Woodlands stormwater management system was designed to slowly drain water into areas where it would naturally discharge, including the Harris property. The stormwater management system featured topographic bowls or basins typically not entirely filled with water that were either artificially created or naturally occurring. Some of the bowls also serve as water hazards for the golf course, which means they contain some water that fills only a fraction of the bowl area.

[¶ 7] As built, the Woodlands stormwater management system varied from the plan approved in the Department permit. Particularly relevant to this case is a basin that included part of the third fairway, which is near the Harris property. The basin as designed was to be bordered by an elevated golf cart path. As built, however, the path is a foot lower than that for which the design called. Further, two culverts not shown on the plan were placed along the rim of the basin, and the spillway as built is longer than that for which the plans called.⁴

[¶ 8] The purpose of the stormwater system is to prevent erosion and sudden surges of water by controlling the rate at which stormwater flows onto neighboring properties. Even as built, the stormwater system has achieved this goal because the rate at which stormwater flows across the northern boundary of the Woodlands meets Department requirements and does not exceed the rate at which stormwater flowed onto the Harris parcel prior to the development of the golf course.

[¶ 9] Although the rates of stormwater flow have not increased, the construction of the golf course and the residential development have increased the total volume of stormwater discharged onto the Harris parcel. This occurs, the evidence indicates, because developed lands with cut grass surfaces and impervious surfaces such as golf cart paths and other common features of development tend to retain less stormwater than brush, grasslands, and woodlands in their natural state. A hydrologist testified that the development increased the volume of stormwater discharged in a two-year storm event by thirty-one percent. The Woodlands accounts for twenty-four percent of the stormwater discharged at the southern boundary of the Harris parcel during a two-year storm event. Larger storms result in larger volumes, but the percentage of stormwater for which the Woodlands is responsible in larger storms decreases.

[¶ 10] There was no evidence that the drainage system as built discharges more stormwater than it would have had the original design been followed. The evidence supports the court's conclusion that all of the increased stormwater discharged onto the Harris parcel from the Woodlands is runoff that would have been discharged onto the parcel even if the Woodlands did not have a stormwater management system to collect and channel stormwater.

[¶ 11] After storms, particularly when the ground is frozen, there is standing water on the Harris parcel. The location of the standing water is largely within areas that constituted wetlands before the Woodlands was developed. Stormwater from the north, the side opposite the Woodlands, also contributes to the wetness of the parcel. In fact, during storms, more water drains onto the Harris property from the north than from the Woodlands to the south. Because of the development of the Woodlands, the amount of wetlands on the southwest corner of the Harris parcel has increased marginally. The Woodlands did not cause other increases in wetlands in other areas of the Harris parcel.

[¶ 12] The Harrises knew or had ample reason to know, before they purchased the parcel in 2004, that the property included substantial portions of wetland and received stormwater runoff from the Woodlands and other properties. At that time, all of the drainage features at the Woodlands already existed. In addition, the existence of a stream ⁵ that crossed the Harris parcel and arrived at a culvert ⁶ under Woodville Road was apparent on the face of the earth even before the Woodlands was constructed.

[¶ 13] In November 2008, the Harrises filed a three-count complaint against the Woodlands alleging statutory trespass, common law trespass, and negligence. The Woodlands moved for a summary judgment. The court granted a partial summary judgment in favor of the Woodlands on the statutory trespass and negligence claims. The court concluded that disputes of material facts precluded a summary judgment on the common law trespass claim.

[¶ 14] Before trial on the common law trespass claim, the court granted the Woodlands's motion to exclude the testimony of the Harrises that, in their opinion, the value of their property had declined to about $500,000 from about $3,500,000 because of the alleged trespass. Previously, the Harrises had represented their damages in their statement of material facts opposing summary judgment and in Cole Harris's deposition testimony as about $255,000. The court found that Cole Harris's opinion was disclosed so late in the proceedings—five days before jury selection and eleven days before trial—as to constitute a discovery violation pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2)(B). The court found that Daphne Harris's opinion was also disclosed too late—after jury selection and five days before trial—and that her methodology was flawed. Subsequently, the Harrises voluntarily withdrew their claim for damages and elected to seek injunctive relief only in a nonjury trial; however, they sought to preserve for our review the court's exclusion of their testimony as to damages.

[¶ 15] The court conducted a nonjury trial on the common law trespass claim in May 2011 and entered a judgment, with extensive findings of fact, in favor of the Woodlands. The court concluded that the Harrises failed to prove that the Woodlands committed common law trespass. The court also explained why it would not have granted the Harrises' proposed injunction, noting that their proposal to precludeany discharge of water from the Woodlands by the construction of a dam—“would be completely impractical and was described by the Harrises' own hydrologist as an ‘absurd’ solution.”

[¶ 16] The Harrises timely appealed the court's summary judgment on their statutory trespass ⁷ and negligence claims and the judgment after trial on their common law trespass claim. The Woodlands timely cross-appealed. ⁸

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Common Law Trespass

[¶ 17] The Harrises argue that the Superior Court erred in finding that they had failed to prove that the discharge of stormwater from the Woodlands constitutes a common law trespass. A party who had the burden of proof at trial can prevail on a claim that the trial court should have...