Harrison v. Burford

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Writing for the Court: Joseph R. Goodwin
• Decision Date: 07 June 2012
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11-cv-00700
• Citation: Harrison v. Burford, CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11-cv-00700 (S.D. W.Va. Jun 07, 2012)
• Parties: PATRICIA HARRISON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTOPHER BURFORD, et al., Defendants.

PATRICIA HARRISON, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CHRISTOPHER BURFORD, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11-cv-00700

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CHARLESTON DIVISION

ENTER: June 7, 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court is the defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Docket 5]. For the reasons provided below, this motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

A. Background

On September 13, 2009, Brian Good led numerous police officers on a high-speed chase that began on Virginia Street in Charleston and ended in Quick, West Virginia. (Compl. [Docket 1], ¶¶ 11-12). Good was shot and killed by one of the officers involved in the pursuit. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13). The complaint alleges that by pursuing Good, the police officers "acted in an unreasonable manner in disregard of the obvious risks," to Good's safety and to the safety of his passenger, Natasha Light. (Id. ¶ 17).

On November 6, 2009, Patricia Harrison brought suit, individually and in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Brian Good, against the City of Charleston in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia. The complaint alleged that the city was vicariously liable forthe actions of the police officers who caused Brian Good's death. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 16). The Circuit Court of Kanawha County granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The opinion explained that the City of Charleston is covered by the West Virginia Tort Claims Insurance Reform Act ("WVTCIRA"), which limits the circumstances under which a political subdivision is liable in a civil action for "injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision." W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-3(b)(1). Based on the WVTCIRA, the circuit court held as follows:

The WVTCIRA prohibits a political subdivision from being held liable for the intentional acts of its employees. Insofar as the shooting was intentional, the City of Charleston, a political subdivision, cannot, as a matter of law, be liable for its officers' shooting of Mr. Good. Mr. Good's death was the result of the officers' intentional discharge of their weapons and Defendant, the City of Charleston, cannot be held liable and is entitled to summary judgment.

(Order Granting Def. City of Charleston's Mot. for Summ. J. [Docket 5-1], ¶ 14).

Subsequently, the plaintiff filed another lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia, naming as defendants the City of Charleston, the Charleston Police Department, and the following individual officers: Christopher Burford, Owen Morris, Thomas Ranson, Eric Johnson, and Brent Webster. (Compl. [Docket 1]). The plaintiff asserted claims for wrongful death; suffering prior to death; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; negligence; tort of outrage; and violation of civil rights. (Id.) The suit was timely removed to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Not. Removal [Docket 1]). The defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss the case, arguing that it is precluded by the earlier state court action. (Mot. to Dismiss [Docket 5]). This motion is now ripe for review.

B. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or pleading. Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, that standard "does not require 'detailed factual allegations' but 'it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'" 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) for the proposition that "on a motion to dismiss, courts 'are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation'"). A court cannot accept as true legal conclusions in a complaint that merely recite the elements of a cause of action supported by conclusory statements. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To achieve facial plausibility, the plaintiff must plead facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable, and those facts must be more than merely consistent with the defendant's liability to raise the claim from merely possible to probable. Id.

In determining whether a plausible claim exists, the court must undertake a context-specific inquiry, "[b]ut where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer morethan the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). A complaint must contain enough facts to "nudge[] [a] claim cross the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

C. Discussion

The defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed because the suit is precluded by the earlier state court action based on the same facts. There are two types of preclusion, res judicata and collateral estoppel. "Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars re-litigation of any claims that were or could have been raised in a prior proceeding between the same parties." Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2008). Meanwhile, collateral estoppel bars the

re-litigation of specific issues actually determined in a prior action. Id. A state court judgment is given the same preclusive effect in federal court as it would have in the forum where the judgment was rendered. Id. In this case, the state court judgment was rendered in West Virginia. Therefore, whether the plaintiff's claims are barred by either res judicata or collateral estoppel is governed by West Virginia law. Id.

"When entertaining a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, a court may take judicial notice of facts from a prior judicial proceeding when the res judicata defense raises no disputed issue of fact." Q Intern. Courier Inc. v. Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000)). In this case, the plaintiff has not disputed the factual accuracy of the record in the prior state court action. Accordingly, the court will take judicial notice of the prior proceeding.

1. Res Judicata

In West Virginia, res judicata "generally applies when there is a final judgment on the merits which precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating the issues that were decided or the issues that could have been decided in an earlier action." Slider v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins Co., 210 W.Va. 476, 480 (2001); State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 9 (1995). The purpose of the doctrine is "to permit repose on the part of defendants who have been subject to suit," so that they can "avoid 'the expense and vexation attending relitigation of causes of actions which have been fully and fairly decided.'" Slider, 210 W.Va. at 480 (quoting Sattler v. Bailey, 184 W.Va. 212, 217 (1990)). Moreover, the doctrine "serves to 'conserve judicial resources, and foster[] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.'" Slider, 210 W.Va. at 480 (quoting Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 588 (1983) (internal quotations omitted)).

a. Claims against the City of Charleston

In this case, the first issue is whether the claims against the City of Charleston are barred by res judicata. Both the plaintiff and the City of Charleston were parties to the previous state court action. The plaintiff argues, however, that this case is not barred by res judicata because the state court did not consider the plaintiff's constitutional claims. (Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Dismiss [Docket 7], at 2).

There are three elements to preclude the litigation of an action based on res judicata. Blake v. Charleston Area Med. Center, 201 W.Va. 469, 477 (1997). First, there must have been a final adjudication on the merits by a court with jurisdiction. Id. Second, both the prior and current action must have involved the same parties, or individuals in privity with those parties. Id. Third, "the cause of action identified for resolution in the subsequent proceeding must be identical to the cause of action determined in the prior action or must be such that it could havebeen resolved, had it been presented, in the prior action." Id. (emphasis added). The test to determine whether a cause of action is the same is "to inquire whether the same evidence would support both actions or issues . . . . If the two cases require substantially different evidence to sustain them, the second cannot be said to be the same cause of action and barred by res judicata." Slider, 210 W.Va. 476, 481 (2001) (quoting White v. SWCC, 164 W.Va. 284, 290 (1980)).

In this case, it is uncontested that the state court had jurisdiction to hear the case and did in fact issue a final adjudication of the matter. Both the plaintiff and the City of Charleston were parties in the state court action and are also parties in the current action. The constitutional issues arise from exactly the same factual allegations appearing in the state court action and could have been resolved if they had been presented in that action. Accordingly, the court FINDS that all of the elements of res judicata are met. It is ORDERED that the plaintiff's claims against the City of Charleston are...