Harrison v. City of Fort Wayne
| Decision Date | 08 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:17-cv-00419-SLC |
| Parties | KEIONA L. HARRISON, also known as Keiona Harrison, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FORT WAYNE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court1 on the motions in limine filed by Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant Keiona Harrison ("Harrison") (ECF 120), and Defendants and Counter-Claimaints Fort Wayne Police Officers Robert Hollo, George Nicklow, Christopher Hawthorne, and Julie McConnell (the "Defendant Officers") and Defendant City of Fort Wayne (collectively, "Defendants") (ECF 123, 131). For the following reasons, the parties' initial motions in limine (ECF 120, 123) will each be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants' supplemental motion in limine (ECF 131) will be GRANTED.
Harrison is suing Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for use of excessive force, unlawful search of her purse and person, and failure to intervene in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state-law battery claims. The Defendant Officers, in turn, are bringing state law defamation counter-claims against Harrison. Harrison's claims arise out of a series of events occurring on May 13, 2017, at approximately 3:15pm. Defendants Hollo, Nicklow, andHawthorne were conducting a traffic stop in the parking lot of a CVS Pharmacy, located at 5802 S. Anthony Boulevard, Fort Wayne Indiana. As Defendant Hollo was transporting the passenger of the stopped vehicle, Tyronte Wilms, to a police squad car, Wilms yelled something to Harrison, her distant cousin who had arrived in the CVS parking lot in a separate vehicle. Harrison contends that Hollo then approached her and asked for her name, before using excessive force to pull her to the front of a squad car, handcuffing her, and sitting her in the back of the squad car when she questioned why he needed her name. She asserts that Defendant Hollo then unlawfully searched her purse to retrieve her driver's license. Harrison further contends that after Defendant McConnell arrived on the scene, Defendant McConnell unlawfully performed a quasi-cavity search, using excessive force to do so. Throughout this course of events, Harrison contends that the other Defendant Officers failed to intervene to prevent the alleged constitutional violations.
Defendants dispute Harrison's version of events, asserting that any force used against her was justified. They further contend that Defendant McConnell performed a proper protective pat-down, and that, in any event, Harrison consented to both the pat-down and for Defendant Hollo to retrieve her identification from her purse. The Defendant Officers also contend that Harrison defamed them and invaded their privacy by false-light publicity by falsely contending that they violated her constitutional rights in statements made to her work supervisors, Michael Manuel and Eric Zimmerman, and a former Fort Wayne Police Officer, Miguel Rivera. Harrison contends that any statements she made are true and that her statements to Manuel and Zimmerman are privileged.
"A motion in limine is a request for guidance by the court regarding an evidentiary question." Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562, 570 (7th Cir. 1999) () (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Federal district courts have the power to exclude evidence in limine pursuant to their authority to manage trials." Dartey v. Ford Motor Co., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (citation omitted).
"[A]s the term 'in limine' suggests, a court's decision on such evidence is preliminary in nature and subject to change." Id.; see United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1989) (). In fact, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has specifically noted that "a ruling [in limine] is subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in the proffer." Connelly, 874 F.2d at 416 (alteration in original) ("[E]ven if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.").
Thus, a ruling on a motion in limine is not a final ruling on the admissibility of the evidence that is the subject of the motion; rather, an order on a motion in limine is essentially an advisory opinion, "merely speculative in effect." Wilson, 182 F.3d at 570-71 (emphasis omitted) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984)).
Defendants do not object to Harrison's efforts to preclude references or allusions to attorney fees; settlement negotiations; tax considerations; or "send a message" arguments inopening or closing statements. As such, Harrison's motion (ECF 120) is GRANTED as to these matters.
Harrison first seeks to bar any narrative reports by the Defendant Officers and other officers who may testify, claiming they are biased, prejudicial, and constitute inadmissible hearsay. (ECF 120 at 1-2). In response, Defendants contend that the reports are admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(8) () and 803(5) (recorded recollection). (ECF 126 at 1).
At this juncture, Harrison's Motion in limine is GRANTED with respect to this evidence. Presumably, any narrative reports may ultimately be admissible, at least in part, under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), although certain hearsay statements within the reports may need to be redacted. Without having an opportunity to rule in the context of the trial, the admissibility of the documents and the prejudicial effect of the imbedded statements cannot be ascertained. Counsel are directed to confer in an effort to reach a stipulation concerning suitable redactions. Moreover, until Defendants have laid a proper foundation, they may not use the documents to refresh any witness's recollection or read the document into evidence under Rule 803(5).
Harrison also seeks to prohibit Defendants from introducing evidence that she had participated in criminal conduct, contending that such evidence would constitute impermissible hearsay. (ECF 120 at 2-3). In doing so, Harrison points out that she was never charged with a crime, and requests if such evidence is permitted, the Court issue a limiting instruction. (Id.). Defendants, in response, contend that the Defendant Officers should be permitted to testifyregarding what they observed Harrison do and what Harrison said during the investigatory stop on May 13, 2017. (ECF 126).
At this point, Harrison's Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. As mentioned, two of the issues in this case are whether the Defendant Officers used excessive force against Harrison and whether the Defendant Officers could have properly conducted a pat-down search. In an excessive force case, "the question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Additionally, "[t]o justify a warrantless pat-down search without probable cause, the officer must also be able to point to specific and articulable facts indicating that the individual may be armed and present a risk of harm to the officer or to others." United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the jury is entitled to hear a full account of the events leading up to and surrounding any use of force against Harrison or search. See Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2008); Smith v. Ball State Univ., 295 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2002). In other words, the Defendant Officers will be permitted to testify as to why they detained Harrison, as that would be relevant to the reasonableness of the force used and the need to conduct a pat-down search. Fed. R. Evid. 401.
However, as Harrison does not specify when this potential criminal conduct occurred, it is possible she is referring to events occurring before or after May 13, 2017. On the record before the Court, there is no suggestion that any of the Defendant Officers intend to introduce evidence of Harrison's potentially criminal acts, if any, before or after May 13, 2017. Even if they did, though, it is hard to see how such conduct would be at all relevant to either the excessive force or unlawful search, as there is no evidence that any of the Defendant Officerswere aware of Harrison's criminal history, if any, at the time of the investigatory stop. See Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 804-05 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (). Accordingly, Harrison's motion is GRANTED in this regard.
Harrison does not object to Defendants' efforts to preclude references or allusions to settlement negotiations; references regarding whether the City of Fort Wayne will be paying any judgment against the Defendant Officers; any written statements and Harrison's affidavit concerning the events of May 13, 2017; and Facebook posts related to this incident. As such, Defendants' motion (ECF 123) is GRANTED as to these matters.
To continue reading
Request your trial