Harrison v. City of Fall River

• Decision Date: 26 November 1926
• Citation: Harrison v. City of Fall River, 257 Mass. 545, 154 N.E. 255 (Mass. 1926)
• Parties: HARRISON v. CITY OF FALL RIVER. PREVOST v. SAME. GRIME v. SAME.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

257 Mass. 545

154 N.E. 255

HARRISON

v.CITY OF FALL RIVER.

PREVOST

v.SAME.

GRIME

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Nov. 26, 1926.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Bristol County; Joseph Walsh, Judge.

Separate actions of contract by William Harrison, by Arthur H. Prevost, and by Charles Grime against the City of Fall River to recover wages.Findings for plaintiffs in each action, and defendant excepts.Exceptions overruled.

T. C. Crowther and P. H. Harrington, both of Fall River, for plaintiffs Harrison and Prevost.

T. C. Crowther, of Fall River, for plaintiff Grime.

C. W. Donovan and J. T. Farrell, both of Fall River, for defendant.

PIERCE, J.

The plaintiff in each of the above entitled actions, which sounded in contract, on January 9, 1925, was duly enrolled in the classified civil service and permanently employed in the water department of the city of Fall River.The plaintiffs Harrison and Prevost on January 9, 1925, and Grime on January 10, 1925, each received a notice from the said water department to the effect that he was suspended or laid off because ‘of a lack of funds in the department.’On their applications the plaintiffs Harrison and Prevost were given a hearing by the water board, but no notice of its decision was given either plaintiff‘within three days after the hearing,’ as G. L. c. 31, § 43, provided should be given.The plaintiff Grime did not request a hearing, ‘but made repeated requests to be given his former work.’In the case of each plaintiff there was work in the department to be done of the kind the plaintiff was engaged in at the time of his suspension, and there was a continued need of such work to be performed by some one during the period covered by the action of each plaintiff.

Upon the several petitions of Harrison, Prevost and Grime, peremptory writs of mandamus were issued on February[257 Mass. 547]13, 1926, ordering in each petition that the plaintiff be reinstated in his employment in the water department.In each writ as issued the single justice of this court adjudged after full hearing:

‘That your petitioner was duly enrolled in the classified list of the public service of the commonwealth and duly and permanently employed’ as a skilled laborer in said water department of said city for a period in the case of Harrison of over 12 years, in the case of Prevost of over 9 years, and in the case of Grime of over 6 years; ‘that he[Harrison, Prevost, or Grime] continued in said employment up to January 9th, 1925, when he was discharged illegally, without just cause and in the violation of the provisions of General Laws, c. 31, §§ 43, 44, and 45; that he has since been refused employment in said department although there was work to be done there which your petitioner was capable of doing and ready to do.’

After the hearing of each action in the superior court the judge, sitting without a jury, in substance found that the plaintiff therein was a laborer in some described capacity in the water works department of the defendant city, and was within the classified civil service; that he was illegally discharged on January 9, 1925, and by virtue of a writ of mandamus issued by the Supreme Judicial Courthe was reinstated on March 1, 1926; that between said dates he was refused employment, although there was work which he could have performed; that he acted in good faith in seeking other sources of income.

[1] At the trial in the superior court of the actions of Harrison and Prevost the defendant offered, and the judge refused to receive, testimony tending to prove the financial condition of the water department at the time these men and eighteen other employees of that department were suspended as was alleged ‘for lack of funds,’ and offered to show from such testimony:

‘That the right of the plaintiff[s] to continuous employment not having been established, it was within the exercise of the discretion of the water board acting in good faith in reducing expenses that these men were laid off.’

The defendant also requested in each action the following rulings:

‘1.On all the evidence the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.

‘2.Since plaintiff made no request for reemployment and was never refused work, he acquiesced in his suspension.

‘3.If plaintiff really believed he would not be re-employed, it became his duty immediately to seek other employment.

‘4.Plaintiff had no right to continuous employment in the absence of funds which, in the opinion of the defendant were necessary to maintain department at its former level.

‘5.When in order to live within departmental receipts it became necessary to curtail operations, the method by which operating expenses were to be reduced was within the discretion of the defendant.

‘6.Unless plaintiff proves that the defendant abused their...