Harrison v. Clarke
| Decision Date | 26 September 1910 |
| Docket Number | 3,300. |
| Citation | 182 F. 765 |
| Parties | HARRISON v. CLARKE et ux. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
T. F Garver (Frank Farrell, T. W. Harrison, and R. D. Garver, on the brief), for appellant.
Wm. G Clark (Eugene Schaffter, on the brief), for appellees.
Before HOOK and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.
This suit was originally instituted by Harrison against Clarke to wind up the affairs of a partnership existing between them for the purchase, development, and sale of land and to recover damages claimed to have been sustained by reason of defendant's breach of his contractual duty. The Circuit Court on the original submission of the case entered a decree dissolving the partnership, ordering the undisposed of lands sold, fixing the rights of the parties to the proceeds, and rendering a personal judgment against the defendant for certain advances made by complainant in case there were insufficient net proceeds to satisfy the same. The decree denied to complainant any compensation for his services rendered in carrying out the provisions of the contract of partnership and required him to pay one-half of the costs of the suit. It was comprehensive and exhaustive, adjusting with much care the many details and disputed claims of the parties.
The complainant, feeling aggrieved at the denial of compensation for his personal services, as well as for some other reasons prosecuted an appeal to this court. We affirmed the decree below (90 C.C.A. 413, 164 F. 539) in all respects except as to Harrison's claim for services and as to costs. We held that defendant's failure to discharge the obligations imposed upon him by the contract of partnership defeated the joint enterprise and entitled complainant to a reasonable sum for his personal services rendered in the faithful discharge of the duties devolved upon him and fixed that sum at $12,000. We also held that by reason of defendant's breach of the contract the costs of the suit should be adjudged against him.
After stating the foregoing conclusions we, speaking by Hook, Circuit Judge, said:
The unmistakable meaning of the opinion was that there were two errors only in the decree of the trial court; one in denying to complainant compensation for his services (except in a small sum measured by interest on some money advanced by him), and the other in requiring him to pay any part of the costs of the suit. In all other respects the decree was found to be correct, and, as is usual in equity cases, with a view of ending the controversy upon the record as made by the parties, we directed the trial court to make an end of the litigation by entering a decree as indicated in the opinion; that meant to modify it only by substituting the sum of $12,000 for the small item equal to interest on Harrison's expenditures, as compensation for his personal services and to impose all the costs of suit upon defendant. Instead of permitting the trial court to proceed and make these modifications according to the mandate of this court, the complainant immediately filed a supplemental bill seeking to recover interest on the award of $12,000 made by us from and after January 19, 1905, when the suit was originally instituted and seeking also to recover certain further compensation for services rendered by him prior to the date of the final decree. The learned trial judge sustained a demurrer to the supplemental bill so far as these claims are concerned and entered a decree as directed. The present appeal challenges the correctness of this action.
In justification of his proceeding, complainant urges that the award of $12,000 made by this court for personal services implies that that amount was due as of the date of filing the suit and claims that it should bear interest like other demands for money from the time it became due until it should be paid. This contention overlooks the fact that this court for reasons satisfactory to it determined otherwise. The opinion and the mandate taken together clearly indicate that that amount only was to be allowed complainant, and the trial court had no discretion to enlarge or reduce it either by the addition of interest or otherwise. Its duty was to obey the mandate, and in doing so manifestly committed no error.
It is also urged as justification for the claims both of interest and further compensation to the complainant that the original decree of the Circuit Court contained a provision retaining jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of making further orders as and when necessary. We think the retention of jurisdiction, however, was not intended for the purpose of litigating any new and independent issues.
As already observed, the trial court made an exhaustive decree adjudicating the rights of the parties with much detail. This was modified by us only in the particulars already indicated, and as so modified it constituted a final disposition of each and all of the contentions of the parties. We held in the former case that the rights of the parties were finally and definitely settled by the decree, and that nothing was left except to execute its provisions, saying:
'That the retention of jurisdiction was simply in aid of the details of execution according to the adjudicated rights of the parties.'
Such being the case, it was not open to complainant by any supplemental bill or elsewise to secure a new or different adjudication of any of the questions litigated or that might have been litigated in the original suit. It is well-settled practice in the federal courts of appeal in reviewing equity causes to dispose of them finally on the record before the appellate court and not remand them for further trial in the Circuit Court. There are some exceptions, however, where the exigency of particular cases like Pikes Peak Hydro-Electric Co. v. Power & Mining Machinery Co., 92 C.C.A. 392, 165 F. 184, requires a remanding to the trial court for further proceedings; but the advisability of putting an end to litigation with all convenient speed...
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Johnson v. Umsted, 9539.
...dispose finally of an equity suit upon the record on appeal and not remand it for further trial in the District Court. Harrison v. Clarke (C. C. A. 8) 182 F. 765, 767; Unkle v. Wills (C. C. A. 8) 281 F. 29, Since the rulings of the lower court upon the admissibility of evidence in an equity......
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