Harrison v. County of Alameda

• Decision Date: 18 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. C-87-5111 MHP,C-87-4326 MHP.,C-87-5111 MHP
• Parties: Leon Howard HARRISON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA; Douglas R. Hollenberg; Occupational Health Services, Inc.; Dierdra Hyatt; and Dr. Gail Price, Defendants. Lester STONE, Plaintiff, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

720 F. Supp. 783

Leon Howard HARRISON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA; Douglas R. Hollenberg; Occupational Health Services, Inc.; Dierdra Hyatt; and Dr. Gail Price, Defendants.

Lester STONE, Plaintiff, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Defendants.

Nos. C-87-5111 MHP, C-87-4326 MHP.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

July 18, 1989.

Lester Stone, San Francisco, Cal., pro se and Amitai Schwartz, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.

Guy T. Saperstein, Farnsworth, Saperstein & Seligman, Oakland, Cal., for amicus curiae.

Jerry Langer, San Francisco, Cal., for Leon Howard Harrison.

Jeff Spellberg, David Kahn, and David Donner, Deputy City Attys., San Francisco, Cal., for City and County of San Francisco, et al.

Robert W. Johnson, Stuckey & Johnson, Oakland, Cal., for Alameda County.

OPINION

PATEL, District Judge.

The court consolidated these cases for hearing on the issue of which statute of limitations governs actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 in the state of California following the Supreme Court decision in Owens v. Okure, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). Having considered the submissions and arguments of the parties and amici, for the following reasons, the court finds that the one-year statute of limitation, California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(3), applies to actions under §§ 1981 and 1983.

The court today also issues separate orders in both cases which deal with other pending issues and motions. In Stone, the court finds that, absent equitable tolling, plaintiff's section 1983 claims are time-barred. In Harrison, the court finds that plaintiff's section 1981 and 1983 claims are untimely, and therefore denies leave to amend to add those claims.

BACKGROUND

A. Stone v. City and County of San Francisco

Plaintiff alleges that he suffered personal injuries while he was being arrested and booked by San Francisco police officers. He brings state tort claims as well as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that his treatment violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff has recently obtained the services of an attorney in order to pursue this action.

It is undisputed that the incident date was March 22, 1985. On March 27, 1985, plaintiff filed a citizen's complaint with the San Francisco Office of Citizens' Complaints. He then retained an attorney who filed a claim against the City and County of San Francisco on May 29, 1985. The claim against the City was denied by the City Attorney's office on October 21, 1985. Plaintiff filed a pro per complaint on April 28, 1986 in San Francisco Superior Court. Defendants removed this action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). Defendants move for dismissal on the ground that the statute of limitations bars plaintiff's claims.

B. Harrison v. County of Alameda

Plaintiff, a Black male, sued the County of Alameda and others alleging that he was not hired as a sheriff because of racial discrimination prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. This case comes before the court on the motions to dismiss of defendants Alameda County, Occupational Health Services, and Dr. Gail Price. Plaintiff originally filed this action as a pro per complaint, and has been unrepresented by counsel throughout much of the litigation. At the hearing on the statute of limitations issue, plaintiff was represented by counsel.

Mr. Harrison applied for the position of Alameda County Deputy Sheriff in July 1985. He passed the written qualifying test, the physical abilities test, and the oral board interview. In April 1986, Mr. Harrison took the written and oral components of a psychological evaluation required by California law. In July 1986, the County rejected Mr. Harrison's application on the ground that he had failed the psychological exam.

Defendant Occupational Health Services is an independent consulting firm retained by Alameda County to conduct psychological testing of job applicants. At all times relevant to this action, defendant Hyatt was employed by Occupational Health Services. Defendant Dr. Price, a psychologist employed by Occupational Health Services, interviewed Mr. Harrison and recommended that Mr. Harrison not be employed by Alameda County. Defendant Hollenberg was the personnel director for Alameda County.

On February 9, 1987, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC notified plaintiff of his right to sue on August 18, 1987. On October 15, 1987, plaintiff filed a complaint naming Alameda County as the sole defendant and alleging a violation of Title VII. Plaintiff's first amended complaint was filed on July 25, 1988, again naming Alameda County as the only defendant. On September 26, 1988, plaintiff submitted a second amended complaint, naming for the first time additional defendants including Occupational Health Services and other individuals. On February 17, 1989, plaintiff sought for the first time to add claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against defendants Dr. Gail Price, Douglas Hollenberg, and Occupational Health Services, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Hollenberg. Defendants contend that these claims are time-barred.

LEGAL STANDARD

Although defendants in Stone label their motion as one for summary judgment, the court treats it as a motion to dismiss at this preliminary stage of the litigation. Defendants in Harrison have likewise moved to dismiss, or to deny leave to amend to add section 1981 and 1983 claims. A motion to dismiss will be denied unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064, 107 S.Ct. 949, 93 L.Ed.2d 998 (1987). All material allegations in the complaint will be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.1986).

DISCUSSION

To determine the appropriate statute of limitations in the instant case, the court considers both the retroactive effect of Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), and the application of Owens v. Okure, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). These issues will be discussed in turn.

A. Retroactivity of "Wilson v. Garcia"

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1946, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), determined that federal courts must select in each state the most appropriate statute of limitations for claims brought under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court held that state statutes of limitations for general personal injury actions should be applied to section 1983 actions. 471 U.S. at 276, 105 S.Ct. at 1947. Following Wilson, the Ninth Circuit and California courts held that the limitations period in California was one year under California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) § 340(3). Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.1987). Prior to Wilson, courts had determined that the limitations period for section 1983 actions was three years under CCP § 338(1). Usher, 828 F.2d at 558-59 (citing Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.1962)).

Thus, Wilson v. Garcia shortened the limitations period for section 1983 actions in California. Usher, 828 F.2d at 559. Concerned by the inequities a blanket application of Wilson v. Garcia might create, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a rule to deal with the retroactive application of Wilson. Usher, 828 F.2d at 560-61. The Usher court stated:

We hold that in states such as California, where the effect of Wilson v. Garcia is to shorten the limitation period for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, the limitation period for causes of action arising prior to Wilson shall be either (1) the pre-Wilson period, commencing at the time the cause of action arises, or (2) the post-Wilson period, commencing with the Wilson decision, whichever expires first. Thus, in California, the applicable statute of limitations is either three years from the time the cause of action arises or one year from Wilson, depending on which period expires first.

Id. at 561. See also Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 767 n. 1 (9th Cir.1989) (noting with approval Usher holding and stating that Wilson v. Garcia changed statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in California from three years to one year).

The cause of action in Stone arose on March 22, 1985. Wilson v. Garcia was issued on April 17, 1985. Under the logic of Usher, Mr. Stone's complaint would have been timely if it had been filed before April 17, 1986. However, the complaint was not filed until April 28, 1986. If the statute of limitations remains at one year, then plaintiff's section 1983 claims are barred. Since the cause of action in Harrison arose after Wilson v. Garcia, the retroactivity issue does not arise in that case.

B. Statutes of Limitations for Section 1983 Actions

The court now turns to the issue of which statute of limitations governs sections 1981 and 1983 claims in California in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Owens v. Okure, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). Plaintiffs and amici contend that the appropriate statute of limitations is four years under California Code of Civil Procedure § 343; defendants assert that CCP § 340(3), the one-year limitations period, governs section 1983 claims.

1. Lessons of "Owens v. Okure"

As the Supreme Court noted, Wilson "has not completely eliminated the confusion over the appropriate limitations period for § 1983 claims." Okure, 109 S.Ct. at 577. Following Wilson, courts at times took conflicting approaches in selecting the appropriate statute where states had enacted multiple statutes of limitations for personal...