Harrison v. Greeneville Ready-Mix, Inc.

Decision Date06 June 1967
Docket NumberREADY-MI,INC
Citation417 S.W.2d 48,24 McCanless 293,220 Tenn. 293
Parties, 220 Tenn. 293 Bobby HARRISON et al. v. GREENEVILLE
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

S. J. Milligan, Greeneville, Milligan, Silvers & Coleman, Greeneville, of counsel, for petitioner, Greeneville Ready-Mix, Inc.

Fred M. Hartman, Greeneville, Joseph L. Reed, Morristown, Reed & Terry, Morristown, of counsel, for respondent, Bobby Harrison and others.

OPINION

BURNETT, Chief Justice.

This was a suit by Harrison for himself and on behalf of other employees of Greeneville Ready-Mix, Inc., similarly situated, brought against Greenville Ready-Mix, Inc., seeking a recovery for alleged unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, liquidated damages and attorneys' fees. It was alleged that the defendant had failed to compensate these employees at the rate required by statute and had failed to compensate them for overtime work at the rate of one and one-half times the regular rate, it being alleged that at the time the work was being performed Ready-Mix's operation was within interstate commerce and thereby came within the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Subsequent to the bringing of this suit other parties caused themselves to be made parties plaintiff.

To this action the defendant made defense denying liability, etc., and alleging that all said employees had been paid all amounts to which they were justly entitled and denied that they were engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce and denied that they came within the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The defendant likewise denied that any of the projects or construction to which Ready-Mix had furnished materials were at the time of delivery of said products instrumentalities of commerce, and alleged that their operation was exempt from the Act for the reason that it was a retail establishment; that the product which it manufactures was not for resale; that its sales are recognized as retail sales; that all of its product and annual dollar volume of sales of goods produced by it are made within the State of Tennessee, where its plant is located, and all of its sales are within this State. Ready-Mix likewise alleged that its deliveries made to contractors were so small that this did not bring it within the provisions of the Act and that therefore under the De minimum rule the Act is not applicable. The statute of limitations was likewise plead.

During the taking of discovery depositions by the plaintiffs of the President and Secretary of Ready-Mix, Inc., plaintiffs' counsel demanded the production of payroll records and other records reflecting the amount of concrete furnished certain contractors on the project, the time of delivery of same and the amount paid therefor by the subcontractor. On the advice of counsel, the production of said documents was refused. Consequently a motion was made to the court wherein it was alleged that under the Pre-trial Discovery Act of 1959, T.C.A. § 24--1201 et seq., plaintiffs were entitled to have the defendant produce its corporate records as demanded. A hearing was had on said motion and the trial court ordered their production.

As a result of this order the Ready-Mix corporation informed the court that they wished to file a petition in the Court of Appeals to ask that court to review and reverse by writs of certiorari and supersedeas the trial court's action in ordering the defendant to produce these records for discovery purposes. The Court of Appeals denied said application in a unanimous opinion and based their denial upon an opinion which they had previously written in a case from Hamilton County of Southeastern Fleet Leasing, Inc., et al. v. Gentry, 416 S.W.2d 773, hereinafter to be referred to. As a result of the denial of the Court of Appeals a petition was presented to a member of this Court seeking writs of certiorari and supersedeas. In view of the importance of the matter these writs were granted and this question was set down for argument before this Court which has been had. After hearing oral arguments, reading briefs, and making a very extensive investigation of the matter, we are now in a position to decide this question.

Ready-Mix argues that this order of the trial judge to produce these records 'was erroneous, illegal, void and beyond the jurisdiction of the court for the following reasons' and then it said T.C.A. § 24--1201 et seq., does not require a party to a suit to produce corporate records pursuant to a demand that same be exhibited to a pretrial discovery and that such an order was unlawful and void because it deprives Ready-Mix and its counsel of their right to defend the lawsuit in an orderly and proper manner. We thus have the question squarely presented.

In Southeastern Fleet Leasing v. Gentry, supra, the Court of Appeals stated their reason for ordering the production of certain records, different entirely from those here, as follows:

'As to the first question, T.C.A. 24--1204 reads:

"Scope of examination.--Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided in 24--1205, 24--1206 the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. (Acts 1959, ch. 54, § 4.)'

'While it is true the Act does not in so many words require the physical production of 'documents' it expressly authorizes the examination of witnesses regarding the existence, description and nature of such tangible evidence. It would seem odd to say that a witness could be so examined but could not be required to produce for examination the evidence about which he is called upon to testify. We will not lightly ascribe to the Legislature such an oddity but will look to the spirit and purpose of the Act as revealed both in its caption and its body. Compare Carter v. Jett, 51 Tenn.App. 560, 370 S.W.2d 576, cited in Medic Ambulance Service, Inc. v. McAdams Tenn. Sup., 392 S.W.2d 103, hereinbelow discussed.

'That purpose is to promote the ascertainment of truth by aiding a party in preparing for trial, to prevent surprise and insure as far as possible a trial on the merits, rather than upon fortuitous and unforeseen developments at the trial. To adopt the construction urged in many cases would completely defeat the intent and purpose of the Act.

'In Medic Ambulance Service, Inc. v. McAdams, Supra, the plaintiff sought to compel the Railway Company to produce statements taken by its claim agent from its crew members immediately following the accident. There was no showing that a subpoena had ever been served on the agent or that the plaintiff had shown any diligence in 'discovering for himself the material sought for inspection and copying'. On these grounds the order of the trial judge requiring the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, M2008-02496-SC-S09-CV.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Tennessee
    • May 24, 2010
    ...rules reflect a broad policy favoring discovery of all relevant, non-privileged information. Harrison v. Greeneville Ready-Mix, Inc., 220 Tenn. 293, 302, 417 S.W.2d 48, 52 (1967); Wright v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 789 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990). This policy enables the parties an......
  • Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Tennessee
    • April 30, 2002
    ...Benton v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 416 (Tenn.1992); Payne v. Ramsey, 591 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tenn.1979); Harrison v. Greeneville Ready-Mix, Inc., 220 Tenn. 293, 302-03, 417 S.W.2d 48, 52 (1967), as do decisions regarding the application of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doct......
  • Deuel v. The Surgical Clinic, 07C2368
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Tennessee
    • August 16, 2010
    ...v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 416 (Tenn. 1992); Payne v. Ramsey, 591 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tenn. 1979); Harrison v. Greeneville Ready-Mix, Inc., 417 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Tenn. 1967)). Thus, we review the trial court's denial of the motion to compel and the motion for a protective order under an abuse of ......
  • White v Vanderbilt University, 97-00105
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Tennessee
    • December 30, 1999
    ...to seek the truth so that disputes will be decided by facts rather than by legal maneuvering. See Harrison v. Greeneville Ready-Mix, Inc., 220 Tenn. 293, 302, 417 S.W.2d 48, 52 (1967); Pettus v. Hurst, 882 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). The second policy is that the discovery rules ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT