Harrison v. Harrison

Decision Date04 April 1889
PartiesHarrison v. Harrison.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from superior court, Marion county; Lewis C. Walker, Judge.

Miller & Elam, for appellant. J. C. Green, Herod & Herod, and Winter, Baker & Daniels, for appellee.

Mitchell, J.

The questions for decision in the present case arise out of the following facts: On the 26th day of May, 1881, Alfred and John C. S. Harrison were partners engaged in a general banking business in the city of Indianapolis. They loaned to Joshua G. Adams $1,500, for which he executed his note due in 90 days, with Nathaniel N. Morris as surety. The note was not paid at maturity, and the evidence shows that payment was requested of Morris, who thereupon instructed the proprietors of the bank to charge the amount due on the note to his account, he having at the time an amount of money on deposit in the bank in excess of the sum due on the note. For prudential reasons, suggested by the bank, it was agreed that for the time being the note should not be charged up to Morris' account, but that the bank should consider an amount of the account equal to the sum due on the note as subject to be applied in payment thereof at any time, and that the note should remain and be held thenceforth by the bank, and be collected from Adams for Morris' benefit. The account was at no time to be drawn down to an amount less than that due on the note. Morris actually had to his credit from that time forward, a balance in excess of the amount due on the note, and this balance was used by the bank in its general business, the same as was the money left by other depositors. The matter remained in this condition until July, 1884, when the bank failed, and its assets were taken in charge by the Marion superior court, and placed in the hands of a receiver, at which time Morris had to his credit upwards of $4,000. The Adams note came to the hands of the receiver as part of the assets of the bank, and the latter collected from the principal maker about $1,400, which amount Morris claims should be paid over to him; he, as he alleges, having paid the note to the bank as surety for Adams. The foregoing, among other facts, were set up in an intervening petition by Morris, who asked that the receiver be ordered to pay over the money so collected from Adams to him. The judgment at special term, which was adverse to the petitioner, was reversed on appeal to the general term, and the receiver now prosecutes this appeal.

Whether or not the petitioner may require the receiver to pay over the money collected by the latter from Adams depends entirely upon the force and effect of the agreement between him and the bank. On the receiver's behalf it is contended that the rights of the parties were in no wise affected by the agreement; that without the agreement the bank had the right to appropriate a sufficient amount of Morris' deposit to the payment of the note after it became due; and that the agreement therefore conferred no right which the bank did not have before it was made. This position was untenable. It is a peculiarity of a deposit of money in bank that the moment the money is deposited it becomes the property of the bank, and the bank and the depositor assume the legal relation of debtor and creditor. Bank v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152;Carr v. Bank, 107 Mass. 45; Bank v. Henninger, 105 Pa. St. 496; Morse, Banks, (3d Ed.) § 289. The general rule in keeping the account of a depositor is that as money is paid in and drawn out a balance may be considered as struck at the date of each payment or entry, on either side of the account; and it is the right of the bank, in case the depositor becomes indebted to it by note or otherwise, and the deposit is not specially applicable to a particular purpose, or there is no express agreement to the contrary, to apply a sufficient amount thereof to the payment of any debt due and payable from the depositor to the bank. Bank v. Hill, 76 Ind. 223;Bank v. Peck, 127 Mass. 298;Bank v. Henninger, supra. This results from the right of set-off, which obtains between persons occupying the relation of debtor and creditor, and between whom there exists mutual demands. It is familiar law, however, that mutuality is essential to the validity of a set-off, and that, in order that one demand may be set off against another, both must mutually exist between the same parties. Accordingly it is settled that a bank can claim no lien upon the deposit of one partner, made on his separate account, in order to apply it on a debt due from the firm; nor can the joint and several note of three persons be paid out of the individual deposit of one, unless he be the principal, and the others sureties, or unless it becomes necessary in order to do complete equity or avoid irremediable injustice. Watts v. Christie, 11 Beav. 546; Dawson v. Bank, 5 Pike, 283;Sefton v....

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6 cases
  • Shepard v. The Meridian National Bank
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 23 November 1897
  • Shepard v. Meridian Nat. Bank
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 23 November 1897
  • First Nat. Bank of Aurora v. Mulich
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 2 April 1928
    ... ... Affirmed ... [266 P. 1111] ... Morrissey, ... Mahoney & Scofield, of Denver, and Fred A. Harrison, of ... Aurora, for plaintiffs in error ... [83 ... Colo. 519] Edwin H. Park, of Denver, for defendant in error ... DENISON, ... ...
  • Sol Popofsky Co., Inc. v. Wearmouth
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 9 May 1933
    ... ... the case of Murray v. First Trust & Savings Bank, ... 201 Iowa 1325, loc. cit. 1332, 207 N.W. 781; Lamb v ... Morris (Harrison v. Harrison), 118 Ind. 179, 20 N.E ... 746, 4 L. R. A. 111; Shopert v. Indiana National ... Bank, 41 Ind.App. 474, 83 N.E. 515 ... ...
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