Harrison v. Hill
| Decision Date | 30 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-4599-L |
| Parties | CAMPBELL HARRISON & DAGLEY L.L.P. and CALLOWAY, NORRIS, BURDETTE AND WEBER, PLLC, Plaintiffs, v. ALBERT G. HILL III and ERIN HILL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court is Defendants' Rule 60(a) or, Alternatively, Rule 59(e) Motion for Correction or Clarification of Interest Calculation (Doc. 120), filed June 17, 2015. Having considered the motion, response, reply, surreply, record, and applicable law, the court denies the motion.
The court need not set forth the extensive history of this case, as the parties are well-aware of the legal and factual background pertaining to the pending motion. In brief, this matter arises from a protracted fee dispute between the Hills1 and their former attorneys, Campbell Harrison & Dagley, L.L.P., including Suzanne E. Goss, of counsel to Campbell Harrison & Dagley, L.L.P.("CHD"); and Calloway, Norris, Burdette & Weber, PLLC ("CNBW"). The Hills entered into fee agreements with former counsel containing an arbitration clause whereby any dispute arising in connection with the legal services provided would be subject to binding arbitration. See Doc. 28-1 at 228-29 & Doc. 28-2 at 7-8. After the Hills terminated their legal relationship with CHD and CNBW, and the parties were unable to reach agreement as to payment of legal fees, CHD and CNBW filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was granted by United States District Judge Reed C. O'Connor on February 18, 2011. See Campbell Harrison & Dagley, LLP, et al. v. Hill, C.A. No. 3-10-cv-2269-O, at ECF No. 88.
On November 13, 2012, the arbitrators ruled in favor of CHD and CNBW, awarding, in pertinent part, $3,150,000 in hourly attorney's fees to CHD, $152,167 in hourly attorney's fees to CNBW, and $25,026,774 in contingent attorney's fees to CHD and CNBW. On November 14, 2012, CHD and CNBW filed this action to confirm the arbitration award. On January 31, 2013, the Hills filed a motion to vacate or, alternatively, modify the arbitration award. On May 28, 2014, the court, among other things, upheld the award of hourly fees, vacated the award of contingent fees, and entered judgment accordingly. See Mem. Op. (Doc. 83) & Judgment (Doc. 84). CHD and CNBW filed a timely notice of appeal.
On April 2, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in the case, ruling in favor of CHD and CNBW and affirming their arbitration award against the Hills. Doc. 108 (Fifth Circuit Op. at 9-10).2 The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to this court "for further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion, including determining the amount due for pre-judgment interest, at a rate of five percent, and setting, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, the rate of post-judgment interest." Id. at 10. On May 11, 2015, the Fifth Circuit issued its mandate. Doc. 109 (Judgment & Mandate).
On May 13, 2015, CHD and CNBW filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Mandate. CHD and CNBW asserted that postjudgment interest should be calculated from the date of the new final judgment after remand, and prejudgment interest should be calculated from November 22, 2011 (the date the arbitration claim was filed) until the date before entry of the new final judgment after remand. Mot. 2-3 (). The Hills opposed the motion, arguing that judgment should not be entered because: (1) they intended to challenge the Fifth Circuit's decision by way of a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and (2) entry of final judgment would violate the final judgment in Hill v. Hunt, C.A. No. 3-07-cv-2020-L. With regard to CHD and CNBW's proposed interest calculations, the Hills's only objection was that "[i]f an attorney's fee award is unconscionable, then any percentage of that award as interest is likewise unconscionable." Resp. 8 (Doc. 112).
On June 3, 2015, the court rejected the Hills's arguments, granted CHD and CNBW's Motion for Payment, and entered final judgment in CHD and CNBW's favor in the amount of $40,915,407.13. Docs. 118 (Mem. Op. & Ord.) and 119 (Judgment). Notably, this amount included prejudgment interest on the entire award (including both the hourly and contingent fee awards) calculated at the rate of 5% per annum from April 22, 2011 (the date the arbitration action wasfiled), to June 2, 2015 (the date before final judgment after remand was entered). In its memorandum opinion, the court concluded that the Hills waived any future challenge to the court's calculation of prejudgment interest, stating as follows:
Finally, although the Hills made a conclusory statement they opposed entry of judgment because the proposed judgment "contain[ed] the wrong calculation of interest," they offer no argument for the basis that it was erroneously calculated or an alternative method for calculating interest. The court, therefore, finds that the Hills' failure to set forth their opposition with particularity to the form of final judgment submitted by CHD and CNBW and the calculation of interest set forth in CHD and CNBW's motion is a waiver of any such challenges.
June 3, 2015, Mem. Op. & Ord. 4-5 (citation omitted) (Doc. 118).
On June 17, 2015, the Hills filed Defendants' Rule 60(a) or, Alternatively, Rule 59(e) Motion for Correction or Clarification of Interest Calculation. Doc. 120. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for determination. Prior to addressing the motion, the court sets for the applicable legal standards.
Federal Rule of Civil procedure 60(a) provides the following:
The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from an oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with ot without notice. But after an appeal has been docketed in the appellate court and while it is pending, such a mistake may be corrected only with the appellate court's leave.
"Motions for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence." Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Such motions may not be used to relitigateissues that were resolved to the movant's dissatisfaction. Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1989). A Rule 59 motion may not be used to relitigate old matters, raise arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to entry of judgment. See generally 11 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE § 2810.1 at 127-28 (2d ed. 1995); see also Simon, 891 F.2d at 1159. When considering a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider, a court may not grant such a motion unless the movant establishes: "(1) the facts discovered are of such a nature that they would probably change the outcome; (2) the alleged facts are actually newly discovered and could not have been discovered earlier by proper diligence; and (3) the facts are not merely cumulative or impeaching." Infusion Resources, Inc. v. Minimed, Inc., 351 F.3d 688, 696-97 (5th Cir. 2003). District courts have "considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to alter a judgment." Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 921 (5th Cir. 1995). In exercising this discretion, a district court must "strike the proper balance between the need for finality and the need to render just decisions on the basis of all the facts." Id. With this balance in mind, the Fifth Circuit has observed that Rule 59(e) "favor[s] the denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment." Southern Constructors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993).
In Defendants' Rule 60(a) or, Alternatively, Rule 59(e) Motion for Correction or Clarification of Interest Calculation, the Hills argue that the court should amend its June 3, 2015, Judgment because it erred in its calculation of prejudgment interest on the award of hourly fees. While the Hills do not dispute that prejudgment interest began accruing on April 22, 2011, they contend that it ceased accruing on May 28, 2014, the date the court first entered judgment, and noton June 2, 2015, the date before the court's entry of judgment after remand. Specifically, the Hills argue as follows:
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