Harrison v. Howe
| Decision Date | 26 May 1896 |
| Citation | 67 N.W. 527,109 Mich. 476 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | HARRISON v. HOWE. |
Error to circuit court, Bay county; Andrew C. Maxwell, Judge.
Action by George Harrison against Moses Howe. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
Lee E. Joslyn, for appellant.
G. H Francis and Lyon & Pierce, for appellee.
This is an action on the case, brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for an alleged statement made by defendant as to the plaintiff's right to lease a certain piece of property on Midland street, West Bay City. Plaintiff was defendant's tenant, and held by virtue of a 12-year lease executed in March, 1886. Plaintiff built a building on the land, and rented it for an hotel in which liquors were sold. Subsequently the hotel burned, and the building was rebuilt one story, and since that time has been used for various purposes. The building has two parts, each with a rental value of about $12 per month. Plaintiff, through his son as agent, sought to sublet one of these departments to one Fournier, to be used for saloon purposes. Plaintiff's testimony tended to show that Harrison and Fournier had completed arrangements for the lease at a monthly rental of $12, when the latter had a conversation with the defendant Howe, and was told by him that Mr. Harrison could not rent the building, according to the contract, for saloon purposes. Fournier also testified that Howe objected to having a saloon on the premises, and because of said objections and Howe's statement concerning plaintiff's right to lease he refused to rent the premises. Plaintiff claims that through Fournier's refusal to take the place it was without a tenant for five months. Plaintiff brought suit, and recovered judgment in both the justice and circuit courts for the sum of $52.40. Defendant, on the trial, offered testimony tending to show that at the time the lease was made plaintiff had orally agreed not to sublet the premises for a saloon. It also appears that the plaintiff, on learning of defendant's statement to Fournier, showed defendant the lease, and called attention to the clause which gave him the right to sublet for "business purposes," and the defendant then stated that he did not know that the clause was in the lease and went with him to Fournier, and told him that he could go in, but Fournier had then rented another place. The defendant's counsel asked the court to charge the jury that this claim is not actionable, even if the defendant has failed to prove that what he said as to his claim of title is true, unless the jury find that the defendant used the words and said what he did with express malice. The circuit judge refused this request, and charged the jury as follows This is not a case of manual interference with the tenant's possession. The plaintiff's right of recovery, if any, rests upon a false statement of defendant affecting plaintiff's right in the property; in other words, a slander of title. The fact that plaintiff derived his title from defendant does not determine the question, except as the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's rights bears upon the question of motive or want of good faith in the claim. One of the leading cases of slander of title (Smith v. Spooner, 3 Taunt. 246) was a case where the relation of tenant and landlord existed between the parties, and it was held that an assertion of title by the defendant was not actionable unless malicious. In this case the defendant had title to the fee. He was interested in the character of occupancy, and his assertion related to the rights of the plaintiff in...
To continue reading
Request your trial