Harrison v. McPherson, No. CV01 0278005-S (CT 7/27/2004)

• Decision Date: 27 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. CV01 0278005-S,CV01 0278005-S
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Katie A. Harrison v. Bryan McPherson et al.

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

Katie A. Harrison v. Bryan McPherson et al.

No. CV01 0278005-S

Superior Court of Connecticut

Judicial District of New Haven at Meriden

July 27, 2004

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#129)

TANZER, JUDGE.

In the early morning hours of May 4, 2000, the plaintiff, Katie Harrison ("the plaintiff" or "Harrison"), sustained serious injuries as a passenger involved in an automobile accident on I-384 in Manchester. Harrison has brought this action in four counts against Bryan McPherson ("McPherson") and John Franta ("Franta") and their landlord, Chunja Lee ("Lee").

In her amended complaint, Harrison alleges that the one-car collision in which she sustained injuries "arose in consequence of the intoxication and carelessness" of the operator of the vehicle, Crystal Woodtke ("Woodtke"). The plaintiff further alleges that prior to the collision, Woodtke, Harrison and a friend had attended a party held in the first-floor apartment of a three-family house at 370 Valley Street in the town of Willimantic ("the premises"). The party was hosted by McPherson and Franta ("the party"). McPherson and Franta were tenants in the premises—the first floor of 370 Valley Street—under a lease with Lee.

In the first and second counts, the plaintiff claims that the collision and her injuries were a result of the negligence and recklessness of McPherson and Franta because, inter alia,¹ they provided alcoholic beverages to Woodtke, a minor, in violation of General Statutes §30-86 and they provided alcoholic beverages to Woodtke when they knew or should have known she was intoxicated.

In the third and fourth counts, respectively, the plaintiff claims that the collision and her injuries were a result of the negligence and recklessness of Lee. The plaintiff claims that Lee was in control of the premises "by virtue of her ownership." She claims that Lee was negligent in that she should have known that McPherson and Franta were hosting improperly supervised "beer parties," should have taken steps to prohibit such activities upon the premises and should have coordinated with officials about monitoring and controlling improper and dangerous activities at the premises. Additionally, in the fourth count, Harrison alleges that Lee failed to prevent the use of the premises to provide alcoholic beverages to a minor and failed to evict McPherson and Franta from the premises.

Lee has moved for summary judgment on the third and fourth counts. Lee maintains that Harrison cannot establish that she owed any duty to Harrison. Harrison has filed her opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book §17-49. "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hertz Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 245 Conn. 374, 381, 713 A.2d 820 (1998). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). "[T]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 252, 819 A.2d 773 (2003).

"A `material fact' is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Zappone, 59 Conn.App. 311, 315, 757 A.2d 608, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 947, 762 A.2d 903 (2000). "The purpose of the complaint is to limit the issues to be decided at the trial of a case and is calculated to prevent surprise." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchetti v. Ramirez, 40 Conn.App. 740, 747, 673 A.2d 567 (1996), aff'd, 240 Conn. 49, 688 A.2d 1325 (1997).

There is no dispute that on May 4, 2000, Harrison was a passenger in an automobile operated by Woodtke on I-384 in Manchester. The automobile left the traveled portion of the highway and struck two trees resulting in fatal injuries to Woodtke and serious injuries to Harrison. There is no dispute that on May 4, 2000, Woodtke was a minor. Finally, it is alleged in the complaint and has been admitted by Lee that the collision arose in consequence of the intoxication of Woodtke and that Woodtke was operating her vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both.

In addition to those facts, the allegations of the complaint that are germane to the motion for summary judgment are the following: Number 370 Valley Street in Willimantic is a three-family house located near the Eastern Connecticut State University. McPherson and Franta were tenants in the first floor apartment of the premises. From approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 2000, and continuing into the early morning hours of May 4, 2000, McPherson and Franta held and/or hosted a party at the premises. At some time between approximately 10:30 p.m. on the evening of May 3, 2000, and the collision of 1:37 a.m. on the morning of May 4, 2000, while Woodtke was a guest at the party, she was sold, purveyed and/or furnished alcoholic liquor while she was intoxicated. At the time of the party and the accident, Lee owned the premises at number 370 Valley Street in Willimantic. It is alleged that Lee was in control of the premises by virtue of her ownership of the same. Franta and McPherson were occupying and in possession of the premises pursuant to a lease with Lee.

The specific allegations of negligence on the part of Lee in paragraph twenty-two of the third count are as follows: "(a.) She knew, or in the exercise of due care should have known, that the defendants McPherson and Franta were hosting improperly supervised `beer parties' and should have taken reasonable and timely steps to prohibit such activities upon the premises; (b.) She failed to reasonably and properly monitor and inspect the premises for unreasonable activity such as the party herein; (c.) She failed to properly and timely inquire of the defendants McPherson and Franta, or of others, if they were engaged in activities such as the party in question at the premises; and (d.) She failed to coordinate with the police or other appropriate officials concerning improper and dangerous activities at the premises and regarding taking reasonable steps to monitor, control and/or prohibit the same."

The above allegations are included in the recklessness count, the fourth count, in addition to the following: "(e.) She failed to prevent the use of the premises to provide alcoholic beverages to minors, including Crystal L. Woodtke and/or in violation of Section 30-86 of the Connecticut General Statutes, Revision of 1958, as amended; (f.) She failed to timely and properly evict or attempt to evict the defendants McPherson and Franta from the premises when she knew, or should have known of their activities as referred to herein."

The plaintiff's cause of action "invokes the well established proposition that a tortfeasor is liable for all damages proximately caused by its negligence." First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., 247 Conn. 597, 604, 724 A.2d 497 (1999). The elements of a negligence cause of action are duty, breach, proximate cause and injury. RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384, 650 A.2d 153 (1994). "To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct legally caused the injuries . . . [L]egal cause is a hybrid construct, the result of balancing philosophic, pragmatic and moral approaches to causation. The first component of legal cause is causation in fact. Causation in fact is the purest legal application of . . . legal cause. The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor's conduct." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. Andrew's Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 24-25, 734 A.2d 85 (1999). "Because actual causation, in theory, is virtually limitless, the legal construct of proximate cause serves to establish how far down the causal continuum tortfeasors will be held liable for the consequences of their actions . . . The fundamental inquiry of proximate cause is whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligent conduct In negligence cases such as the present one, in which a tortfeasor's conduct is not the direct cause of the harm, the question of legal causation is practically indistinguishable from an analysis of the extent of the tortfeasor's duty to the plaintiff." (Citations omitted.) First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., supra, 247 Conn. 604.

"A causal relation between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the plaintiff's injuries is a fundamental element without which a plaintiff has no case . . . If the chain of causation of the damage, when traced from the beginning to the end, includes an act or omission which, even if wrongful or negligent, is or becomes of no consequence in the results or so trivial as to be a mere incident of the operating cause, it is not such a factor as will impose liability for those results." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539, 546-47, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004), quoting Grody v. Tulin, 170 Conn. 443, 448-49, 365 A.2d 1076 (1976).

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