Harrison v. Moncravie

• Decision Date: 30 March 1920
• Docket Number: 5421.
• Citation: 264 F. 776
• Parties: HARRISON et al. v. MONCRAVIE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

264 F. 776

HARRISON et al. v. MONCRAVIE.

No. 5421.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 30, 1920

C. S Macdonald, of Pawhuska, Okl. (C. S. Beekman, of Tulsa, Okl and T. J. Leahy, Swan C. Burnette, and F. W. Files, all of Pawhuska, Okl., on the brief), for appellants.

A. M Jackson, of Winfield, Kan. (A. L. Noble, of Winfield, Kan and Dale & Bierer, of Guthrie, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SANBORN, Circuit Judge, and LEWIS and MUNGER, District Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

On June 1, 1917, Henry E. Moncravie, an incompetent member of the Osage Tribe of Indians, died intestate, seized of about 650 acres of land in the state of Oklahoma, which had been duly allotted to him, and which he held under restrictions on its alienation in accordance with the act of Congress (34 Stat. 539, c. 3572). He left surviving him his widow, Luella Moncravie, the complainant in the District Court, and Henri Eunice Moncravie his daughter, then a minor, whose name is now Henri Eunice Moncravie Harrison. This daughter and A. W. Comstock, as her guardian ad litem and as her general guardian, were the defendants below, and in this discussion the parties will be styled as in the District Court. The issue between them is whether the plaintiff is entitled as an heir of Henry Moncravie, her former husband, to one-half of this land and of its rents, profits, and proceeds, or his daughter, as his sole heir, is entitled to all of them. The answer to this question is conditioned by these conceded facts:

This land descended to the decedent's heirs under the act of Congress in accordance with the laws of descent and distribution of the state of Oklahoma. Those laws provided that, in such a case as that under consideration, this land should descend in equal shares to the surviving wife of Henry Moncravie and to his child. Revised Laws of Oklahoma 1910, Sec. 8418. But in the year 1915 the Legislature of that state also provided that--

'No person who is convicted of having taken, or causes or procures another so to take, the life of another, shall inherit from such person, or receive any interest in the estate of the decedent, or take by devise or legacy, or descent or distribution, from him, or her, any portion of his, or her, estate. ' Session Laws of Oklahoma 1915, p. 225, Sec. 1; Bunn's Ann. Supp. to Revised Laws of Oklahoma 1915, Sec. 8418.

At the time of the death of Moncravie, his wife was, and still is, a citizen of the state of Kansas, and he died in that state. There then was, and still is, a statute of that state similar in all material respects to that just quoted, to the effect that no person convicted of killing, conspiring to kill, or procuring the killing of another should inherit or receive property from the person so killed. General Stat. of Kansas 1915, Sec. 3856. In the year 1918, in the district court of Cowey county, in the state of Kansas, the plaintiff was convicted 'of manslaughter in the third degree in the unlawful killing of Henry Moncravie with a dangerous weapon, in the heat of passion, and without a design to effect death,' and was sentenced to 'the state industrial farm for women for a period not to exceed three years. ' The question in this case on the merits is whether or not the plaintiff inherits one-half of this real estate in Oklahoma, notwithstanding her conviction of manslaughter in the third degree in Kansas. The court below was of the opinion that she did, and rendered a decree in her favor, from which the defendants have appealed.

At the threshold of the discussion the plaintiff is met by the assertion of counsel for the defendant that the decree should be reversed, because the court below had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this suit, for the reason that the county court of Osage county, Okl., upon the petition of the defendants, had, before this suit was commenced, appointed the defendant A. W. Comstock, first, as special, and, second, as general, administrator of the estate of Moncravie, Mr. Comstock had qualified as such, and has since been and still is administering that estate. As such administrator he took possession of the property before the suit in hand was initiated. They invoke the conceded rule that the court which first acquires jurisdiction of specific property by the seizure thereof, or by the due commencement of a suit from which it appears that it is or will become necessary to a determination of the controversy involved therein, or to the enforcement of the prospective judgment or decree for the court to seize, to charge with a lien, to sell, or to exercise like dominion over the property, thereby withdraws that property from the jurisdiction of every other court, so far as is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the suit, and that court is entitled to retain such control as is requisite to effectuate its final judgment or decree therein free from the interference of every other tribunal. Sullivan v. Algrem, 160 F. 366, 369, 87 C.C.A. 318, 321.

But this rule is inapplicable to the case in hand. This is a suit in equity by a citizen and resident of the state of Kansas against residents and citizens of the state of Oklahoma, to obtain an adjudication between them of the complainant's right as an alleged heir of her deceased husband to receive one-half of his real estate in Oklahoma, to a partition thereof, and to an enforcement of that adjudication. Every estate of a decedent in the possession of an administrator, an executor, or other party constitutes a trust held for the benefit of those equitably entitled to receive it. The High Court of Chancery in England, at the time of the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73, c. 20), had jurisdiction of the adjudication and enforcement of trusts. The jurisdiction in equity of the courts of the United States, derived from the federal Constitution and statutes, over controversies between citizens of different states which involve the requisite amounts, is like unto that of the High Court of Chancery of England in 1789, and it includes the adjudication and the enforcement of that adjudication of the claims of citizens of other states as heirs, legatees, and as creditors (where the proper diversity of citizenship exists and the requisite amounts are involved) to interests in estates of decedents in the possession of administrators, executors, or other parties engaged in the administration thereof under the legislation of the states establishing courts of probate and giving them jurisdiction of such administration.

This jurisdiction of the federal courts, it is true, does not include the power to draw to them administration of estates as such, or to take from the proper officials of the probate court, during their administration of the estates in due course, the possession of the property necessary for that administration. But it confers the power and imposes the duty upon the federal courts sitting in equity to hear, determine, adjudge, and to enforce their adjudications of the claims of the citizens of other states, who invoke their jurisdiction by proper suits to interests as heirs, legatees, distributees, or creditors in estates in possession of officers of probate courts of states other than those of the residence of the claimants engaged in the administration thereof, although such officers may have obtained their possession before such suits were commenced in the federal courts.

The affirmance and exercise of this jurisdiction has been frequent and constant in all the federal courts. Illustrations of its exercise may be found in adjudications of the rights of heirs in Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 610, 620, 621, 622, 13 Sup.Ct. 906, 37 L.Ed. 867; Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank Co., 215 U.S. 33, 41, 43, 45, 46, 30 Sup.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed. 80, and in many other cases. Illustrations of its exercise in the adjudication of the rights of devisees and legatees may be found in Gaines v. Fuentes et al., 92 U.S. 19, 20, 23 L.Ed. 524; Richardson v. Green, 61 F. 423, 429, 435, 9 C.C.A. 565, 571, 578; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497, 3 Sup.Ct. 327, 27 L.Ed. 1006; and Sawyer v. White, 122 F. 223, 227, 58 C.C.A. 587, 581. Illustrations of its affirmance and exercise in the adjudication of the rights of creditors may be found in Brun et al. v. Mann, 151 F. 145, 150, 151, 80 C.C.A. 513, 518, 519, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 154, Union Bank of Tennessee v. Vaiden, 18 How. 503, 15 L.Ed. 472, Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U.S. 215, 12 Sup.Ct. 440, 36 L.Ed. 130, Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67, 74, 10 L.Ed. 357, Borer v. Chapman, 119 U.S. 587, 588, 589, 7 Sup.Ct. 342, 30 L.Ed. 532, Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430, 19 L.Ed. 260, Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U.S. 86, 98, 9 Sup.Ct. 237, 32 L.Ed. 630, Johnson v. Waters, 111 U.S. 640, 667, 4 Sup.Ct. 619, 28 L.Ed. 547, Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U.S. 557, 570, 13 Sup.Ct. 503, 37 L.Ed. 279, and Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank, 187 U.S. 211, 227, 23 Sup.Ct. 52, 47 L.Ed. 147.

The decree goes no further than to adjudge that the complainant is entitled to an undivided half interest in the property of the estate of her deceased husband situated in the state of Oklahoma, that the lands be partitioned between her and the daughter of the decedent, if partition can be justly made and that the partition and sale of the property shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, as provided by section 6 of the act of Congress of April 18, 1912, 37 Stat. 86. It does not deprive the administrator or the county court of the possession of the estate or disturb the orderly administration thereof. 'It is to be presumed,' however, as the Supreme Court said in the Waterman Case, 215 U.S. 46, 30 Sup.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed. 80, 'that the probate court will respect any...