Harrison v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 18 May 1962
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2242.
• Citation: 205 F. Supp. 449
• Parties: Walter HARRISON, Plaintiff, v. Charles L. MURPHY, and Anne S. Murphy, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

205 F. Supp. 449

Walter HARRISON, Plaintiff, v. Charles L. MURPHY, and Anne S. Murphy, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 2242.

United States District Court D. Delaware.

May 18, 1962.

Thomas H. Wingate and Newton White, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.

Courtney H. Cummings, Jr., of Killoran & Van Brunt, Wilmington, Del., for defendants.

LAYTON, District Judge.

This is an action by plaintiff under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983¹ and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3), to recover damages against the defendants, owners as tenants by the entireties of a restaurant, for refusing to allow him to remain seated in their diner after he had ordered food, solely because he was a Negro.

The complaint alleges that this refusal to permit plaintiff to seat himself at the diner counter was "under color of a statute, ordinance, regulation, custom and usage of the State of Delaware * * *" with the result that plaintiff was deprived of a right, privilege, and immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Injunctive relief was not sought, so 28 U.S.C.A. § 2281 is inapplicable here.

The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

It has been long settled that the Civil Rights Act, upon which this plaintiff relies, applies only as a restriction upon actions of a state. The Civil Rights Act enforces the provisions of the 14th Amendment which is not concerned with the acts of private individuals. As was said in the celebrated Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883):

"It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws."

Further, the Court states:

"In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under State authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress."

109 U.S. at 17, 3 S.Ct. at 25. See also Screws v. U. S., 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961).

In addition to the requirement of "state action" just referred to, the language of the Civil Rights Act expressly requires that the action complained of must have been taken "under color" of law. As stated by Chief Justice (then Justice) Stone in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941):

"Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of' state law."

See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961); Screws v. U. S., 325 U.S. 91, 109, 65 S. Ct. 1031 (1945).

The plaintiff insists that "state action" is present in the form of the Delaware Innkeeper's Statute, 24 Delaware Code, Section 1501,² which he interprets as discriminatory in that it permits innkeepers, etc., to refuse to serve Negroes as such. The defendant takes the opposite view pointing to the language of the Supreme Court of Delaware in Wilmington Parking Authority v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894, 902 (Sup.Ct.Del.1960) in which that Court apparently held that Section 1501 was merely a restatement of the common law and not discriminatory in character. However that may be, when the Burton case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, at least some of the justices expressed doubt not only as to the true interpretation of Section 1501 but also three of them thought the case should be remanded to the Delaware Supreme Court for a clarification of the meaning of its language.³ See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961).

Since the existence of "state action" rests upon a proper interpretation of Section 1501, what should be done? The section is a state statute. It is not for the federal courts to decide the constitutionality of a state statute where reasonable minds would differ as to its meaning and some of the justices of the highest Court have themselves differed or questioned the true meaning of the very statute. In such a case, the federal court should abstain until the parties have first obtained a construction of the Act from the highest state court. See generally, 1 Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 0.203 at 2101-24 (1959). As Justice Harlan wrote in Harrison v. N. A. A. C. P., 360 U.S. 167, 176-177, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152 (1959):

"According every consideration to the opinion of the majority below, we are nevertheless of the view that the District Court should have abstained from deciding the merits of the issues tendered it, so as to afford the Virginia courts a reasonable opportunity to construe the three statutes in question. In other words, we think that the District Court in dealing with Chapters 31, 32, and 35 should have followed the same course that it did with respect to Chapters 33 and 36.

"This now well-established procedure is aimed at the avoidance of unnecessary interference by the federal courts with proper and validly administered state concerns, a course so essential to the balanced working of our federal system. To minimize the possibility of such interference a `scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments * * * should at all times actuate the federal courts,' Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 52 S.Ct. 217, 76 L.Ed. 447, as their `contribution * * * in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority * * *.' Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971. In the service of this doctrine, which this Court has applied in many different contexts, no principle has found more consistent or clear expression than that the federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to intrepretation until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass upon them. See, e. g., Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., supra; City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 62 S.Ct. 986, 86 L.Ed. 1355; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101; American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873; Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 70 S.Ct. 640, 94 L. Ed. 877; Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 73 S.Ct. 600, 97 L.Ed. 983; Government & Civic Employees, etc. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 77 S.Ct. 838, 1 L.Ed.2d 894. This principle does not, of course, involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise; it serves the policy of comity inherent in the doctrine of abstention; and it spares the federal courts of unnecessary constitutional adjudication. See City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., supra, 316 U.S. at 172-173 62 S.Ct. at 988." (Emphasis supplied).⁴

While it is clear that the doctrine of abstention could be applied to these facts and the plaintiff required to seek a construction of Section 1501 from the Delaware Courts, nevertheless, as originally pointed out, there remains the question, a jurisdictional question moreover, whether the action here complained of was taken "under color" of law. If not, the plaintiff could not be successful even if "state action" were present. Under such circumstances, it would be clearly improper to burden the Delaware Supreme Court with a difficult question of statutory construction in advance of a determination by this Court of the "under color" of law point.

On this phase of the case, the plaintiff takes the position that the discriminatory act was "under color" of law inasmuch as it was sanctioned by Section 1501. Apparently, the plaintiff argues that Section 1501, in effect, constitutes an authorization by the State legislature to innkeepers, etc., to exclude Negroes as such whenever their presence would be offensive to a majority of their patrons. Further, he points to the Supreme Court definition of "under color" elsewhere quoted,⁵ the general language of which, it must be conceded, would superficially include discriminatory actions on the part of restaurant owners under Section 1501. But merely because the action here complained of falls within the broad, general language of the Supreme Court definition is not enough. We have here a task of statutory construction which requires a finding of Congressional intent in the light of the conditions provoking the passage of the Act. The Civil Rights Act was passed shortly after the Civil War. Its main purpose was to provide a remedy against outrages perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan. While the Congress had no jurisdiction to promulgate legislation punishing the Klan as such because of the purely local nature of its activities, nevertheless, it was conceived that a federal remedy could be devised to punish representatives of a state, county or city who refused to lend their official aid in protecting the...