Harrison v. Owens
| Decision Date | 07 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 8:11-2215-MGL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Jane Wecker Harrison, Plaintiff, v. Fred Owens, Andre Bauer, Ken Ard, Glenn McConnell, Eugene A. "Andy" Laurent, Tana Vanderbilt and Sam Davis, Defendants. |
Pending before this Court is Defendants Eugene Laurent, Tana Vanderbilt, and Sam Davis's ("DDSN Defendants") Second Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 164), and Defendant Fred Owens's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 165.) After considering the arguments of the parties, the pleadings submitted and the record in this case, the pending motions are hereby GRANTED as set forth below.
This is an action by Jane Wecker Harrison ("Plaintiff") against remaining Defendants Fred Owens, Eugene Laurent, Tana Vanderbilt, and Sam Davis (collectively "Defendants"). Pursuant to an alleged contract or agreement with the Newberry County Disabilities and Special Needs Board ("Newberry DSN"), Plaintiff was formerly a caregiver of two severely disabled women ("Sarah Doe" and "Sally Roe") as part of a "foster care" program called Community Training Home I ("CTH I"). (ECF No. 62, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff claims that her "CTH I license" was revoked as a retaliatory action to cover up a history of abuse of one of her clients and to prevent Plaintiff from exposing a financial scheme involving compensation for caregivers. (ECF No. 62, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants alleging the following causes of action: 1) fraudulent misrepresentation; 2) interferencewith a contract; 3) wrongful termination; 4) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due process, equal protection, and related violations; 5) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy; 6) common law conspiracy; 7) defamation; and 8) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 62.)
On November 7, 2012, this Court granted former Defendants Ken Ard, Andre Bauer, and Glenn McConnell's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (ECF No. 89.) Subsequently, the DDSN Defendants, Laurent, Vanderbilt, and Davis of the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs moved, pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 92.) In an order Dated August 12, 2013, this Court granted these Defendants' motion only as to Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and denied the motion as to all other causes of action. (ECF No. 136.) On March 21, 2013, Defendant Fred Owens, individually and in his official capacity as the former Director of the Newberry Department of Special Needs Board, moved for summary judgment and, with regard to some of Plaintiff's causes of action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 116.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 122) and an amended response to the motion. (ECF No. 127.) Defendant Owens filed a reply memorandum in support of the motion on April 29, 2013. (ECF No. 128.)
On September 3, 2013, the DDSN Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that they are immune from suit on the federal claims under the qualified immunity doctrine because Plaintiff did not possess a clearly established liberty or property interest, nor did the DDSN Defendants violate any federal right of the Plaintiff. (ECF No. 137-1 at 1.) These Defendants also filed a motion pursuant to Rule 26(c) and Local Civil Rule 16.00(C), staying discovery until such time as the Court adjudicates the qualified immunity defense asserted in their motion. (ECF No. 138.) Plaintiff filed a lengthy response in opposition to the DDSN Defendants' motion, challenging Defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity and asking the Court instead to grant summaryjudgment in favor of Plaintiff and restore Plaintiff's CTH I license. (ECF No. 149.) Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Correct and Supplement Plaintiff's Response to the DDSN Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and a request for an evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 151.) Specifically, Plaintiff desired to correct errors and omissions in the response and sought an evidentiary hearing to aid the Court in determining whether it would be appropriate to grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and rule that Plaintiff's CTHI license should be restored. (ECF No. 151 at 8.)
In an order dated March 28, 2014, this Court issued an order denying Defendants' first motions for summary judgment for the present purposes, denying Defendants Laurent, Vanderbilt, and Davis's Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF No. 138) as moot, and granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's Motion to Correct and Supplement Plaintiff's Response to the DDSN Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for Evidentiary Hearing. (ECF No. 151.) In the March 28, 2014 order, this Court granted defendants leave to re-file a dispositive motion limited to the issue of immunity and the points specifically set forth in the Court's order for additional briefing. (ECF No. 163.) The DDSN Defendants and Defendant Owens filed their second motions on April 7, 2014. (ECF Nos. 164 & 165.) Plaintiff filed her response in opposition to the Defendants' motions on April 17, 2014 (ECF No. 166) and additional exhibits in support on April 18, 2014. (ECF No. 168.) This Court held a hearing on the motions on May 21, 2014. The matters are ready for ruling.
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248. The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A litigant "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). "[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate." Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1996).
As noted in this Court's March 28, 2014 order, the remaining Defendants seek dismissal of the federal claims (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985) against them on, among other reasons, the basis of qualified immunity. (ECF Nos. 116-1 at 14; 137-1 at 11.) Each of the remaining defendants pled qualified immunity as a defense in their answers to Plaintiff's amended complaint. (ECF No. 66 at ¶ 34; ECF No. 67 at ¶ 146; ECF No. 68 at ¶ 146; ECF No. 69 at ¶ 140.) As the DDSN Defendants point out in their motion to stay discovery, qualified immunity is a threshold question to be resolved by the Court. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1991) ().
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity does not protect an official who violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id. (emphasis added)."Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines." Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).
Determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity generally requires a two-step inquiry. See generally Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Courts considering whether to dismiss a complaint based on qualified immunity should consider both "whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right," and "whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct." Id. at 232 (citations omitted). The court may "exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand." Id. at 236. Qualified immunity can be established, and is in fact, specifically encouraged, at the summary judgment stage when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and when the undisputed facts establish that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against Defendants in their "individual and official capacities" as each has "acted outside the scope of [his or her] employment under color of state law." (ECF No. 62 at ¶¶ 23, 61, 65, 77.) But qualified immunity is not a defense for individuals sued in their official, rather than personal, capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985).1 Previously,this Court noted that the Defendants did not fully articulate a reasonable basis for immunity as to claims Plaintiff...
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