Harrison v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2020
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 8:16-cv-704-T-23AEP
• Parties: JOE HARRISON, Applicant, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

JOE HARRISON, Applicant, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

CASE NO. 8:16-cv-704-T-23AEP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

September 30, 2020

ORDER

Harrison applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and challenges his convictions for both three counts of sexual battery on a minor and a count of lewd and lascivious molestation of a minor, for which Harrison is imprisoned for life. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit ___") support the response. (Doc. 14) The respondent both admits the application's timeliness (Doc. 12 at 3) and argues that Ground Two is procedurally barred from federal review. (Doc. 12 at 15-16)

I. BACKGROUND¹

Harrison met I.K. at a Boys and Girls Club in Georgia where Harrison was the education director. I.K., who was five years old, frequently got into trouble atthe club. Harrison took I.K. under his supervision with the permission of I.K.'s mother. Five years later, Harrison moved to Florida.

Harrison contacted I.K.'s mother several years later. I.K.'s mother said that I.K. had good days and bad days at school. Harrison suggested that I.K. spend the summer with him and I.K.'s mother agreed. When I.K.'s mother lost her job and had health problems, Harrison suggested that I.K. live with him and go to school in Florida. I.K.'s mother agreed and gave Harrison legal guardianship of I.K., who was thirteen.

I.K.'s grades in school improved but his conduct did not. A female student accused I.K. of exposing his penis. When an assistant principal confronted I.K. with the accusation, I.K. said that Harrison had sexually molested him. The school contacted the police and Harrison. Detectives and Harrison came to the school.

Harrison followed the detectives to the police station where the detectives interrogated Harrison. Harrison initially denied any sexual contact with I.K. but ultimately accused I.K. of raping him. Harrison claimed that I.K. physically restrained him and had anal sex with him against his will. Harrison also admitted that he had touched I.K.'s penis and had oral sex with I.K.

Harrison was charged with four counts of sexual battery on a minor and one count of lewd and lascivious molestation of a minor. The jury found Harrison not guilty of one count of sexual battery and guilty of the remaining four counts as charged. The trial court sentenced Harrison to three concurrent life sentences forthe sexual battery convictions and 15 years for the lewd and lascivious molestation conviction.

II. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

The respondent argues that Ground Two is procedurally barred from federal review because Harrison failed to exhaust his available state court remedies. An applicant must present each claim to a state court before raising the claim in federal court. "[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly presen[t]' federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). Accord Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982) ("A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error."). "To provide the State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004) (citing Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66).

Ground Two:

Harrison asserts that the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights by prohibiting him from both cross-examining witnesses and calling character witnesses. Harrison argues that he presented this claim as a violation of a federally protectedright on direct appeal by citing Lewis v. State, 570 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). (Doc. 16 at 24) Because Lewis both cited Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), and addressed the federal constitutional right to confront witnesses, Harrison alerted the state court to the federal nature of his claim. Reese, 541 U.S. at 32 ("A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court petition or brief, for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim 'federal.'"); Wells v. Sec'y Dep't Corrs., 343 F. App'x 581, 583-84 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Since Wells cited as part of his unavailability claim 'a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds,' he sufficiently showed a desire to raise a federal issue.") (quoting Reese, 541 U.S. at 32). Ground Two is entitled to a review on the merits.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), explains this deferential standard:

In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter,562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). See White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 427 (2014) ("The critical point is that relief is available under § 2254(d)(1)'s unreasonable-application clause if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no 'fairminded disagreement' on the question . . . .") (citing Richter); Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) ("And an 'unreasonable application of ' those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.") (citing Woodall, 572 U.S. at 419). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) ("It is the objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision that we are to decide."). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412.

The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 694. A federal court must afford due deference to a state court's decision. "AEDPA prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) ("This is a 'difficult to meet,' . . . and 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-courtrulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt' . . . .") (citations omitted).

When the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its decision in a reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons as stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) ("[A] federal habeas court simply reviews the...