Harrison v. State Bank of Monticello
| Decision Date | 10 May 1911 |
| Docket Number | No. 6,968.,6,968. |
| Citation | 47 Ind.App. 568,94 N.E. 1020 |
| Parties | HARRISON v. STATE BANK OF MONTICELLO. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Cass County; John S. Lairy, Judge.
Action by the State Bank of Monticello against George Harrison. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
McConnell, Jenkines, Jenkines & Stuart, for appellant. Kistler & Kistler, for appellee.
Suit upon promissory note. Judgment for $114.15 in favor of appellee, from which this appeal is taken.
The complaint is in the usual form and answered by denial, plea of payment, and want of consideration. The motion for a new trial is based on alleged error of law and sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding. The overruling of this motion is the error assigned and relied upon for reversal.
The evidence shows, without controversy, that appellant, on August 23, 1904, was not indebted to appellee, but was indebted to Gustabel & Co. in the sum of $328.35, and on that date, in settlement of said debt, appellee executed the note in suit for like amount, payable to appellee; that the transaction was with Mr. Gustabel, and nothing was said about drawing the note payable to the bank; that payments were made on the note by checks drawn in favor of and sent to Mr. Gustabel, which were properly credited upon the note. It is contended upon behalf of appellant that the evidence does not sustain the allegations of the complaint, but does prove the answer of want of consideration.
[1] A valuable consideration, moving from the maker of a promissory note to a third person, will support the obligation in favor of the payee of the note, and such third party need not know when the note is executed that it is payable to him, in order to enforce collection. 1 Daniel on Negotiable Inst. (3d Ed.) § 185; Moore v. Hubbard, 15 Ind. App. 84, 42 N. E. 962;Waterman et al. v. Morgan et al., 114 Ind. 237, 16 N. E. 590;Miller v. Billingsly, 41 Ind. 489;Carnahan et al. v. Tousey et al., 93 Ind. 561;Lackey v. Boruff, 152 Ind. 371, 377, 53 N. E. 412. This rule was originally one of equity only, but, under our Code, is available in any civil action. Potter v. Smith, 36 Ind. 231, 236; Miller v. Billingsly, supra.
[2] The evidence showing a valuable consideration, though moving to Gustabel, instead of appellee, the contention that the proof does not support the allegations of the complaint is not sustained; nor is the answer of want of consideration proven. There is no issue presenting a claim of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation in obtaining appellant's signature to the note. He admits the signing and the consideration to Gustabel. On this showing, under the issues, appellee is bound by the terms of the note as executed. 1 Daniel on Negotiable Inst. (3d Ed.) §§ 186, 814; 2 Daniel on Negotiable Inst. (5th Ed.) §...
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