Harrison v. Town of Braintree

Decision Date14 April 1969
PartiesTredwell A. HARRISON et al. v. TOWN OF BRAINTREE.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Dace J. Moore, Town Counsel, for respondent.

Douglas A. Randall, Wollaston, for petitioners.

Kevin Hern, Harold M. Wilcox and Walter E. Graham, Boston, for Armstrong Cork Co. and others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, KIRK and REARDON, JJ.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

This is an appeal by the town of Braintree from a decision of the Land Court on a petition under G.L. c. 240, § 14A, and c. 185, § 1 (j1/2), to determine the validity of the zoning by-law as amended May 25, 1966, in its effect on the land and buildings on West Street owned and occupied as their home by the petitioners. The judge in the Land Court ruled that the amendment was invalid on several grounds.

The amendment was adopted following our decision in Harrison v. Building Inspector of Braintree, 350 Mass. 559, 215 N.E.2d 773. The case had come before us on appeal from orders sustaining demurrers to a petition for a writ of mandamus to enforce the zoning by-law and to bar the use for industrial access of certain lots zoned for residential use. The allegations were that a 1954 amendment had changed from residential uses to industrial uses the classification of all the land (save the 200 foot buffer strip below described) within the bounds of four ways, one of which was West Street. The 1954 amendment excluded from its effect, and hence, as we ruled, left within the residential zone all the land within a distance of 200 feet of the street lines. Textron Industries, Inc. (Textron 1), having acquired a large tract of land mostly in the interior industrial zone, but extending into the buffer zone, was using such land in the buffer zone, on both sides of the petitioners' property, for access to its industrial property. We held that this was industrial use, not permitted by the by-law in the residential zone, that the demurrers should be overruled, and that, if the facts as alleged were established in the Superior Court, the entry of any order for relief should be stayed for a stated period to give an opportunity for the town to take 'orderly municipal action' to provide legal access.

The ensuing step taken by the town that concerns the petitioners' land was to amend the by-law to add a new use in residential districts: 'Sec. II * * * 10. Access or egressways, public or private, to or from land in any other district; subject to the approval by the Board of Appeals, however, on such ways established after the adoption of this amendment.'

The by-law specifies how the board of appeals shall exercise its power: 'Sec. IX * * * Board of Appeals. 'There shall be a Board of Appeals of three members and two associate members appointed as provided in Section 14, of Chapter 40A of General Laws,' as amended, which shall act on all matters within its jurisdiction under this by-law in the manner prescribed in said section and subject always to the rules that it shall give due consideration to promoting the public health, safety, convenience, and welfare, encourage the most appropriate use of land, and conserving property values, that it shall permit no building or use injurious, noxious, offensive, or detrimental to a neighborhood, and that it shall prescribe appropriate conditions and safeguards in each case.'

The judge found that the use of the petitioners' residence had been adversely affected by noise, dust, lights, and vibration, and that, although the petitioners had spent about $11,500 to overcome these factors, they had not been able fully to do so and the value of their property was substantially diminished.

The brief of amici curiae questions the jurisdiction of the Land Court. Section 14A of c. 240 provides in part: 'The owner of a freehold estate in possession in land may bring a petition in the land court against a city or town wherein such land is situated * * * for determination as to the validity of a municipal ordinance, by-law or regulation * * * which purports to restrict or limit the present or future use, enjoyment, improvement or development of such land, or any part thereof, or of present or future structures thereon, including alterations or repairs, or for determination of the extent to which * * * (it) affects a proposed use, enjoyment, improvement or development of such land by the erection, alteration or repair of structures thereon or otherwise as set forth in such petition.'

The primary purpose of proceedings under § 14A is to determine how and with what rights and limitations the land of the person seeking an adjudication may be used under the provisions of a zoning enactment in terms applicable to it, particularly where there is no controversy and hence no basis for other declaratory relief. Pitman v. City of Medford, 312 Mass. 618, 620, 45 N.E.2d 973; Woods v. City of Newton, 349 Mass. 373, 376--377, 208 N.E.2d 508; Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. Inc. v. Town of Reading, 354 Mass. 181 184--185, 236 N.E.2d 188. a See Sisters of Holy Cross of Mass. v. Board of Appeals of Town of Brookline, 347 Mass. 486, 490--491, 198 N.E.2d 624; Noonan v. Moulton, 348 Mass. 633, 637, 204 N.E.2d 897. For the most recent of the many cases under G.L. c. 240, § 14A, brought by landowners whose land has been subjected to the zoning classification or reclassification which is attacked, see Rosko v. City of Marlborough, Mass., 242 N.E.2d 857. b

In Pierce v. Town of Wellesley, 336 Mass. 517, 146 N.E.2d 666, the Land Court proceedings were brought by a resident in the neighborhood of the land affected by a zoning amendment. The jurisdiction of the Land Court was not questioned or discussed.

Although the new subsection of the Braintree by-law applies to all the land in the town, in that it permits any lot not now used for access to be so used with the consent of the board of appeals, it is not this part of the amendment that adversely affects the petitioners' land. The first part of subsection 10 expressly changes the zoning classification of residential parcels such as Textron's in use in 1966 for access road so as to permit such use, and this part of the amendment does not apply to the petitioners' lot. Hence the issue is whether the owner of land affected by the rezoning but not within the rezoned area may proceed in the Land Court. 2

We deem appropriate a broad construction of c. 240 § 14A. With court dockets greatly overloaded, access to...

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19 cases
  • Harrison v. Textron, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • April 30, 1975
    ...Land Court judge's decision that the amendment was illegal in so far as it purported to validate existing ways. Harrison v. Braintree, 355 Mass. 651, 247 N.E.2d 356 (1969). Thus, the town's purported ratification of the existing access roads adjacent to the Harrisons' property was invalid. ......
  • Harrison v. Brooks, 71-1055.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • July 27, 1971
    ...of residentially zoned land on both sides of plaintiffs' property is unreasonable as a matter of law." Harrison v. Town of Braintree, 355 Mass. 651, 656, 247 N.E.2d 356, 360 (1969). The district court dismissed the complaint on two grounds: (1) that there was no statutory basis of jurisdict......
  • Amberwood Development v. Bd. of Boxford, 04-P-1599.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • November 29, 2005
    ...to a specific lot or use. The Land Court is considered a particular court of competence in such matters. See Harrison v. Braintree, 355 Mass. 651, 654, 247 N.E.2d 356 (1969). See also Kindercare Learning Centers, Inc. v. Westford, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 924, 818 N.E.2d 594 "The primary purpose of ......
  • Sturges v. Town of Chilmark
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • March 27, 1980
    ...validity of a . . . by-law" in the respect claimed. G.L. c. 240, § 14A, as amended by St.1975, c. 808, § 5. See Harrison v. Braintree, 355 Mass. 651, 654, 247 N.E.2d 356 (1969). We view § 14A, a remedial statute, as intended to permit any landowner to petition for a decision concerning the ......
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