Harrison v. Turner
| Decision Date | 22 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 46A05-1101-PL-46,46A05-1101-PL-46 |
| Parties | GARY J. HARRISON, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. LINDA TURNER and DEBORAH HRIC, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE:
GARY J. HARRISON
Michigan City, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
CHRISTOPHER D. SIMPKINS
BLEEKE DILLON CRANDALL
Indianapolis, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE LAPORTE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jennifer L. Koethe, Judge
Appellant-Plaintiff, Gary J. Harrison (Harrison), appeals the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Appellees-Defendants, Linda Turner (Nurse Turner) and Deborah Hric (Nurse Hric) (Collectively, the Nurses).
We affirm.
Harrison raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
Harrison was incarcerated at the Westville Correctional Facility in Westville, Indiana. Both Nurse Turner and Nurse Hric were nurses who worked at Westville Correctional Facility. Harrison was in the behavioral segregated unit and suffered from chronic hypertension. Harrison was prescribed HCTZ, Maxzide, and Lisinopril for his hypertension and excess fluid.
On September 13, 2008 at 5:00 a.m., Nurse Turner was on duty distributing medications to inmates. Nurse Turner gave Harrison a manila envelope containing medication prescribed for another inmate, Jared Harris. This medication consisted of two psychotropic drugs: Thorazine, a drug used for the treatment of schizophrenia, andArtane, a drug used to manage the side effects of Thorazine. Harrison ingested both the Thorazine and Artane and allegedly began suffering side effects thereafter. At some point, it was determined that Nurse Turner administered the incorrect medication to Harrison.
Later that evening, around 8:03 p.m., Nurse Hric conducted a follow up examination and monitored Harrison's blood pressure, noting that Harrison's blood pressure was 130/78. Approximately three hours later, corrections officers found Harrison unconscious on the floor, lying in a pool of urine. Nurse Hric examined Harrison, noted that his blood pressure was 146/80, and found a small abrasion on the left side of Harrison's forehead. Dr. Ross was notified, and Harrison was ordered to receive neurological checks every fifteen minutes for two hours. The following day, September 14, 2008 at 2:41 a.m., Nurse Hric examined Harrison again, found him alert and oriented, and noted that Harrison had taken aspirin, which she had removed from Harrison's cell. Finally, Nurse Hric examined Harrison at 6:05 a.m. in response to Harrison's complaint of vomiting blood. Nurse Hric found Harrison's toilet water pink and took blood samples. Throughout these examinations, Nurse Hric noted that Harrison was "yelling, belligerent, demanding, out of control, and uncooperative with [her] attempts to assess him." (Appellee's App. pp. 56-57).
At approximately 11:22 a.m., a different nurse examined Harrison, and sent him to urgent care based upon Nurse Hric's prior reports. Harrison was placed on a liquid diet for twenty-four hours. Around 12:50 p.m., another nurse examined Harrison and notedthat Harrison said he had vomited five to six times in the prior twenty-four hours. The nurse called the Indiana Poison Center and was advised that any anti-psychotic medication would be out of Harrison's system. Thereafter, other medical professionals including nurses, a physician, and psychologists, continued to closely monitor and provide Harrison with treatment, including an electrocardiogram test, medication for nausea, as well as counseling for his hypertension, fear of ingesting incorrect medication, and distrust of the Nurses. Although Harrison refused to take his hypertension medication during Nurse Hric's visits, he later relented, and admitted to feeling better.
On February 11, 2009, Harris filed his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Nurses alleging that they had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by giving him the wrong medication and subsequently denying him medical treatment. On April 12, 2009, Harrison filed his requests for admission against both Nurses. On April 29 and May 27, 2009, Nurse Hric and Nurse Turner filed their Answers to Harrison's Complaint. On June 15, 2009, Harrison filed a motion to compel discovery responses which the trial court denied on June 17, 2009. On August 3, 2009, Harrison filed his responses to the Nurses' interrogatories with the trial court. On March 9, 2010, Harrison filed his second motion for production of documents. On April 7, 2010, Harrison filed his second motion to compel discovery of documents, which the trial court denied on April 15, 2010. On July 12, 2010, the trial court denied Harrison's second motion to compel. On September 22, 2010, Harrison filed his requests for subpoena duces tecum against third parties,which the trial court ordered held until Harrison submitted proof of compliance with notice requirements under Ind. Trial Rule 34(C).
On October 8, 2010, the Nurses filed their motion for summary judgment. On October 27, 2010, Harrison filed his memorandum of law in opposition to the Nurses' motion for summary judgment. On November 2, 2010, the Nurses filed their reply. On November 17, 2010, Harrison filed a motion to strike the Nurses' reply. On December 16, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Nurses' summary judgment motion as well as Harrison's motions to compel and to strike. On January 7, 2011, the trial court issued its Order granting summary judgment in favor of the Nurses and denying Harrison's motions to compel and to strike.
Harrison now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Harrison contends that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the Nurses on Harrison's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Both federal and state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over §1983 claims. Higgason v. Stogsdill, 818 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Although Harrison cites to federal decisions addressing Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the applicable standard of review of summary judgment, "Indiana courts do not follow federal rules of procedure." Minor v. State, 641 N.E.2d 85, 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied; see also Ind. TrialRule 1. Moreover, Indiana's summary judgment procedure "differs significantly" from summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tom v. Voida, 654 N.E.2d 776, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. Thus, we review Harrison's appeal of summary judgment under T.R. 56.
Under T.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. When reviewing the grant of summary judgment on appeal, we apply the same standards as the trial court in deciding whether to affirm or reverse summary judgment. Leo Machine & Tool, Inc. v. Poe Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 936 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), aff'd on reh'g. We must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court has correctly applied the law. Id. When moving for summary judgment, the defendant must show that the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action. Id. at 859. We consider all of the designated evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 858-59. The party appealing the grant of summary judgment has the burden to persuade us that the trial court's ruling was improper. Id. at 859. If the record discloses an incorrect application of the law to the facts, then the grant of summary judgment must be reversed. Id.
Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment. Special findings are not required in summary judgment proceedings andare not binding on appeal. Id. However, such findings offer this court valuable insight into the trial court's rationale for its review and facilitate appellate review. Id.
T.R. 56(C) also requires each party to a summary judgment motion "to designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion." Neither the trial court nor the reviewing court may look beyond the evidence specifically designated to the trial court to make a determination in a summary judgment proceeding. Leo Machine & Tool, Inc., 936 N.E.2d at 859. Further, T.R. 56(H) specifically prohibits appellate courts from reversing a grant of summary judgment "on the ground that there is a genuine issue of material fact unless the material fact and the evidence relevant thereto shall have been specifically designated to the trial court." On appeal, we can affirm summary judgment under any theory supported by the designated evidence. Branham v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc., 744 N.E.2d 514, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
Under Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(f), the appellant is required to provide an appendix containing all documents necessary to adjudicate the issues raised by the appellant. Although Harrison filed his Appendix containing the trial court's Order, the chronological case summary, and certain discovery requests and responses, essential documents required to adjudicate his appeal are noticeably absent. These include the Nurses' motion for summary judgment, memorandum in support,...
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